12 Feb 19 | Europe and Central Asia, Index Reports, News and features, United Kingdom
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Britain’s new counter-terrorism bill, which passed into law on Tuesday, threatens freedom of expression, free speech group Index on Censorship has warned.
While lawmakers and the public focused on Brexit, the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill slipped through parliament with far too little attention from politicians.
“The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act crosses a line that takes the law very close to prohibiting opinions,” said Index on Censorship’s Head of Advocacy Joy Hyvarinen. The act criminalises expressing an opinion or belief that is “supportive” of a proscribed (terrorist) organisation if done in a way that is “reckless” as to whether it encourages another person to support a proscribed organisation. “This is a very dangerous legislative step to take in a democratic society,” Hyvarinen added.
Index on Censorship is also concerned about the implications of the new legislation for press freedom in the UK. It is now an offence to publish a photo or video clip of clothes or an item such as a flag in a way that raises “reasonable suspicion” (a low legal threshold) that the person doing so is a member or supporter of a terrorist organisation. This is highly likely to restrict and encourage self-censorship of journalistic activities. The clause also covers posting pictures on social media which have been taken in a private home.
In relation to press freedom, Index is also particularly concerned about the wide-ranging new border security powers contained in Schedule 3, which lack adequate safeguards to protect journalists and their confidential sources. The draft Code of Practice that will guide implementation of Schedule 3 must be strengthened to safeguard press freedom.
Index has, however, welcomed the government’s announcement during debates on the bill that it will undertake an independent review of the Prevent strategy, which Index had called for.
Background
The sections below highlight some of Index on Censorship’s concerns with the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act.
Index on Censorship began campaigning against the bill (draft law) as soon as it was introduced in the Parliament of the United Kingdom last summer because of its damaging implications for freedom of expression, including press freedom.
International concerns
The bill was widely criticised in the UK and also raised international concerns. The Media Freedom Representative of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) wrote to the UK authorities to express concerns and recommend changes to protect journalistic activities. United Nations special rapporteur Fionnuala Ní Aoláin stated that the bill needed to be brought in line with the UK’s obligations under international human rights law(1). Index filed an official notification with the Council of Europe’s platform for the protection of journalism about the bill’s implications for media freedom in the UK.
Small improvements: not enough
Index was pleased that some MPs and peers proposed amendments and argued for changes to safeguard freedom of expression. This led to some improvements to the bill, such as explicit recognition that carrying out work as a journalist or carrying out academic research is a reasonable excuse for accessing material online that could be useful for terrorism (see Clause 3).
Index also welcomed the government’s announcement that it will undertake an independent review of the Prevent strategy. Index and other organisations campaigned for such a review.
However, the improvements were not enough and Index remains very concerned about the impacts of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act on freedom of expression.
Reckless expressions of support for a proscribed organisation (Clause 1)
This clause criminalises expressing an opinion or belief that is “supportive” of a proscribed organisation if the person does so in a way that is “reckless” as to whether it encourages someone else to support a proscribed organisation.
This is a vague and unclear clause that comes far too close to criminalising opinion.
The clause risks closing down democratic debate. The Joint Committee on Human Rights pointed out: “It is arguable that clause 1 could include, for example, an academic debate during which participants speak in favour of the de-proscription of currently proscribed organisations.”(2) The News Media Association (NMA) pointed out: “It is easy to envisage a similar debate taking place among commentators on the pages of the UK’s newspapers.”(3)
The government decides which organisations are included on the list of proscribed organisations (see below). Legislation that could discourage someone from arguing in favour of removing an organisation from the list, for fear that it could be viewed as “supportive” and “reckless”, is deeply concerning from a freedom of expression point of view.
Proscribed (terrorist) organisations
The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act expands crimes related to organisations on the government’s list of proscribed organisations.
At the time of writing there are 88 proscribed organisations, including 14 in Northern Ireland. Proscription has significant consequences, including on freedom of expression.
The Home Office has informed Lord Anderson, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, that at least 14 organisations (4) do not meet the criteria for proscription. In other words, they should not be on the list.
An organisation can be removed from the list by applying to the Home Office. The very high legal costs involved, especially if it involves appealing a decision to refuse deproscription, are likely to be a significant obstacle. Only three organisations have been deproscribed (5).
During debates on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Lord Anderson proposed an amendment that would have required an annual review of proscribed organisations. This amendment was unfortunately not accepted.
Publication of images (Clause 2)
This clause criminalises publication of pictures or video of an item of clothing or an article such as a flag in a way that raises “reasonable suspicion” (a low legal threshold) that the person doing so is a member or supporter of a terrorist organisation. The clause covers posting pictures on social media which have been taken in a private home.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights found that the clause “risks a huge swathe of publications being caught, including historical images and journalistic articles”(6). United Nations rapporteur Fionnuala Ní Aoláin expressed concern that the clause risks criminalising “a broad range of legitimate behaviour, including reporting by journalists, civil society organisations or human rights activists as well as academic and other research activity”(7).
Obtaining or viewing material over the internet (Clause 3)
This clause makes it an offence to view or otherwise access information online that is likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing acts of terrorism. No terrorist intent is required.
Index is pleased with the recognition, following debates in parliament, that carrying out work as a journalist or carrying out academic research is a reasonable excuse for accessing material online that could be useful for terrorism.
However, the clause remains very problematic. Anyone who wanted to understand terrorism and its causes better could be caught by the clause; for example someone who was concerned that a family member was at risk of being attracted to terrorism.
In a submission related to this clause, Max Hill QC and Professor Clive Walker stated: “[T]he inherent claim is that viewers will either be seduced or have their will overwhelmed by the inevitable power and persuasion of the terrorist messages […] Yet, other outturns are statistically more likely by far.”
Hill and Walker highlighted that the government and researchers have repeatedly asserted that there is no clear production line from viewing extremism or even being “radicalised” into becoming an active terrorist (8). United Nations rapporteur Ní Aoláin made the same point noting “the danger of employing simplistic “conveyor-belt” theories of radicalization to violence, including to terrorism”(9).
Schedule 3 – border security powers
Schedule 3 introduces new border security powers, aimed at “hostile activity”. This is a vague and unclear concept, which is combined with very wide, intrusive new powers to stop, detain and search.
For example, under Schedule 3 a journalist who catches a domestic flight could be stopped without there being any suspicion that she or he had engaged in hostile activity. It is an offence not to answer questions or provide any material requested. At this point there are no protections for confidential journalistic material. It is extremely important that the draft Code of Practice that will guide how Schedule 3 is put in practice is strengthened to safeguard journalistic sources and press freedom.
Northern Ireland
During the passage of the bill, the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) identified a catalogue of problems in the bill related to Northern Ireland, which also threw its general flaws into sharp relief. As a CAJ briefing paper noted:
“We can quite properly criticise this draft legislation for criminalising what could often be innocuous or trivial behaviour. When looked at in the light of Northern Ireland reality, however, it looks grossly disproportionate if not ridiculous (10). […] The idiocy of applying these measures to Northern Ireland ought to give legislators pause for thought before they pass them for the whole of the UK.”(11)
It is regrettable that the majority of lawmakers do not seem to have paused for thought.
Contact: Joy Hyvarinen, Head of Advocacy, [email protected]
(1) Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Submission, House of Commons Public Bill Committee, OL GBR 7/2018, 17 July 2018, para.5.
(2) Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, Ninth Report of Session 2017–19, para. 12.
(3) News Media Association, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill: Briefing for the House of Lords, Second Reading, p. 1.
(4) This figure does not consider the 14 Northern Irish organisations, which may also include ones that do not fulfil the criteria for proscription.
(5) The Peoples’ Mujaheddin of Iran in 2008, the International Sikh Youth Federation in 2016 and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin in 2017. The Red Hand Commando has recently applied for deproscription. Reportedly the application was rejected.
(6) Note 2, para. 26.
(7) Note 1, para. 14.
(8) Max Hill QC & Clive Walker, Submission in relation to Clause 3 of the Counter Terrorism & Border Security Bill 2018, July 2018, para. 2(a).
(9) Note 1, para. 17.
(10) Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), 2018, 9 August 2018, Briefing on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, para.8.
(11) Above, para. 13.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1567076180113-10dba29d-3162-2″ taxonomies=”21″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
15 Jan 19 | Campaigns -- Featured, Digital Freedom, Digital Freedom Statements, Statements
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Index on Censorship shares the widespread concerns about the proposed EU regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online. The regulation would endanger freedom of expression and would create huge practical challenges for companies and member states.
Jodie Ginsberg, CEO of Index, said “We urge members of the European Parliament and representatives of EU member states to consider if the regulation is needed at all. It risks creating far more problems than it solves. At a minimum the regulation should be completely revised.”
[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Following the recent agreement by the European Council on a draft position for the proposed regulation on “preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online,” which adopted the initial draft presented by the European Commission with some changes, the Global Network Initiative (GNI) is concerned about the potential unintended effects of the proposal and would therefore like to put forward a number of issues we urge the European Parliament to address as it considers it further.
GNI members recognize and appreciate the European Union (EU) and member states’ legitimate roles in providing security, and share the aim of tackling the dissemination of terrorist content online. However, we believe that, as drafted, this proposal could unintentionally undermine that shared objective by putting too much emphasis on technical measures to remove content, while simultaneously making it more difficult to challenge terrorist rhetoric with counter-narratives. In addition, the regulation as drafted may place significant pressure on a range of information and communications technology (ICT) companies to monitor users’ activities and remove content in ways that pose risks for users’ freedom of expression and privacy. We respectfully ask that EU officials, Parliamentarians, and member states take the time necessary to understand these and other significant risks that have been identified, by consulting openly and in good faith with affected companies, civil society, and other experts.
Background on the Proposal
This regulation follows previous EU efforts to reduce the proliferation of extremist content online, including the EU Internet Forum launched in December 2015 and the March 2017 directive on combating terrorism. However, the proposed regulation would move beyond the voluntary cooperation underpinning previous initiatives and require member states to establish legal penalties against ICT companies for failure to comply with the obligations outlined in this proposal. GNI joins others who have flagged that more work is needed to analyze the effectiveness of these past approaches before the current proposal can be justified as necessary and appropriate.
This effort also come against a backdrop of separate initiatives by the European Commission to address other areas of “controversial content” online, including the May 2016 “Code of Conduct for Addressing Hate Speech Online”, the March 2018 “Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online,” and the September 2018 “Code of Practice to address the spread of online disinformation and fake news.”
GNI’s Work on Extremist Content to Date
GNI is the world’s preeminent multistakeholder collaboration in support of freedom of expression and privacy online. GNI’s members include leading academics, civil society organizations, ICT companies, and investors from across the world. All GNI members subscribe to and support the GNI Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy (“the Principles”), which are drawn from widely-adopted international human rights instruments. The Principles, together with our corresponding Implementation Guidelines, create a set of expectations and recommendations for how companies should respond to government requests that could affect the freedom of expression and privacy rights of their users. The efforts of our member companies to implement these standards are assessed by our multistakeholder board every other year.
In July 2015, GNI launched a policy dialogue — which began internally, and later expanded to include external stakeholders, including the European Commission and some member states — to explore key questions and considerations about government efforts to restrict online content with the aim of protecting public safety, and to discuss the human rights implications of such government actions. In December 2016, GNI released a policy brief, “Extremist Content and the ICT Sector,” that was informed by that dialogue and included recommendations for governments and companies to protect and respect freedom of expression and privacy rights when responding to alleged extremist or terrorist content online. We refer to these recommendations as a basis to highlight the following elements in the proposed regulation which remain a potential concern.
Definitional Challenges
In our policy brief, GNI noted that laws that prohibit incitement to terrorism “should only target unlawful speech that is intended to incite the commission of a terrorist offense and that causes a danger that a terrorist offense or violent act may be committed.” While the Council’s amendments clearly try to add greater definitional clarification to the requirement for “intent,” the regulation continues to reference the definition of “terrorist content” found in Directive (EU) 2017/541, which has been deemed problematic by human rights groups and independent experts. In addition, because this definition is based in a Directive, it creates the possibility that it will be interpreted with significant variance across member states. These definitional issues are likely to lead to legal uncertainty, as well as potentially overly-aggressive interpretations by companies that could result in the removal of content that should be protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Member State constitutions. Notably, and unlike the definition of terrorist offences in the Directive, the definition of terrorist content in the regulation does not clarify that content must amount to a criminal offence or be punishable under national law.
GNI notes in our extremist content brief that laws and policies should clearly distinguish between “messages that aim to incite terrorist acts and those that discuss, debate, or report them.” Because the regulation fails to make such a clear distinction, it will pose particular risks to the legitimate expression of journalists and researchers working on documenting terrorist abuses. It may also, unintentionally, impact those working on counter-terrorism efforts, including those trying to use arguments based in humor, satire, or religious doctrines to engage in counter-messaging or counter-narrative efforts.
Removal Orders
The proposal allows designated “competent authorities” to issue removal orders to companies requiring they remove terrorist content, deemed illegal under the proposed regulation, within one hour from receipt of the order. As noted in our policy brief, GNI members are expected to “interpret government restrictions and demands, as well as governmental authority’s jurisdiction, so as to minimize the negative effects on freedom of expression.” The rapid timeline prescribed potentially creates significant challenges for appropriate review of removal orders.
In addition, the potentially significant legal penalties for noncompliance will put increased pressure on companies to comply with these orders. While we appreciate the provisions, particularly in the Council’s amendments, allowing for companies to appeal such orders to the judicial authority of the member state that issued the request, it is not clear that this appeal delays the timeline for removal. If content is removed, the amount of time it can take for appropriate redress to take place and for content to be reinstated poses substantial freedom of expression risks.
Finally, GNI members have also worked extensively to understand and address the jurisdictional challenges that emerge when governments make orders that end up being enforced through or having impacts on other jurisdictions. While the provision for a “consultation procedure” added by the Council is helpful, the proposal still creates significant potential for conflicts of laws to emerge, which would add to the aforementioned lack of legal clarity.
Referrals
The proposed regulation would allow member states to establish “competent authorities” to issue referrals of content “that may be considered terrorist” for review by companies under their own terms and conditions, and if appropriate, removal. As others have noted, it is not clear competent authorities or member states are expected to have already determined that the content is illegal under national law prior to submission of a referral. The law also requires companies to establish “operational and technical measures facilitating expeditious assessment of content sent by competent authorities.”
In “Extremist Content and the ICT Sector,” we raised concerns about the potential for this type of referral to “set precedents for extra-judicial government censorship without adequate access to remedy, accountability, or transparency for users and the public.” GNI has called on governments to use formally established legal procedures when they demand the restriction of content by ICT companies, to adopt additional safeguards, and to be clear about whether they are issuing referrals or issuing legal orders, and it would appear that these referrals do not meet that standard. It is also unclear if there would or could be any independent, judicial oversight of this mechanism, and yet the proposal notes that lack of expeditious response could lead to the implementation of proactive measures or even legal penalties.
Duties of Care/Proactive Measures
GNI noted in “Extremist Content and the ICT Sector” that governments should not pressure companies to change their terms of service. Yet, Article Three of the proposal establishes “duties of care” whereby companies are expected to undertake reasonable and proportionate actions in accordance with the regulation for the removal of extremist content on their platforms, and furthermore, are expected to “include, and apply, in their terms and conditions provisions to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content.”
Beyond these “duties of care,” the proposed regulation also outlines an expectation for companies to undertake “effective and proportionate” “proactive measures to protect their services against the dissemination of content,” including through automated means. While the Council’s position notes that this requirement is “depending on the risk and level of exposure to terrorist content,” this fails to clarify if, when, and how companies should take such measures. Should a company receive a removal order under Article Four, they are required to implement these proactive measures, both to prevent re-upload of the content that was identified in a previous removal order, and on terrorist content more broadly, reporting back to the competent authority within three months about the proactive measures in place for “detecting, identifying, and expeditiously removing or disabling access to terrorist content.”
This aspect of the proposal poses an increased risk on the right to privacy, in so far as it calls on companies to proactively monitor and filter their users’ communications. Furthermore, as the proposal acknowledges, it “could derogate” from the provisions against a “general monitoring obligation” in Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive, “as regards certain specific, targeted measures, the adoption of which is necessary for overriding public security reasons” (see recital 19). Finally, it is important to recognize the potential freedom of expression risks that come from a reliance on automated filtering measures. Limitations on the effectiveness of existing technology to search, analyze, and filter content online are often underappreciated and can lead to over-removal of legitimate content.
Transparency & Redress
GNI would like to emphasize the critical need to ensure adequate redress and transparency measures are in place throughout the various elements of this proposal. The proposal clarifies requirements for companies to make available the reason for content removals, as well as avenues for content providers to contest the decision. However, there are no similar requirements for the competent authorities, and as previously noted, any appeals to member states’ judicial authorities under Article Four do not necessarily delay the timeline for decision. In sum, the proposal’s repeated reference to users’ right to remedy and the provisions on redress do not seem to be matched by specific guidance and effective implementation.
In our policy brief, GNI members flagged that “governments should regularly and publicly report, at a minimum, the aggregate numbers of requests and/or legal orders made to companies to restrict content and the number of users impacted by these requests,” and with regards to the requests for removal made under companies’ terms of service, “Governments should regularly and publicly report, at a minimum, the aggregate number of requests made to companies to restrict content and the number of users impacted by these requests.” While we appreciate that the transparency obligations for companies under Article Eight include a requirement to report on the “number of pieces of terrorist content removed or to which access has been disabled, following removal orders, referrals, or proactive measures, respectively,” there is little in the way of similar requirements for governments anywhere in the proposal. Under the current proposal, the obligatory government reporting only appears to apply for the purposes of assessing the proposal’s implementation and effectiveness, not for providing transparency for users and the general public.
Practical Issues
GNI would also like to flag some potential ambiguities in implementation that pose risks for users’ rights. First, there is very limited guidance for member states’ designation of competent authorities who carry out the provisions under Articles Four, Five, and Six. While Article 17 states that all member states must designate a competent authority or competent authorities and notify the Commission, the only requirements seem to be that competent authorities are “administrative, law enforcement or judicial authorities” (see recital 13). Furthermore, states are able to designate multiple competent authorities, which could cause confusion for companies receiving requests. Several companies have stated that the member states should be required to establish a single authority, which would seem a reasonable request.
Second, there are stringent requirements for companies to establish legal representatives to “ensure compliance with enforcement of the obligations under this regulation” (See recital 35), as well as points of contact to “facilitate the swift handling of removal orders and referrals,” including the one-hour timeline. In addition, the definition of “hosting service providers” in the regulation has been criticized for its lack of clarity as to what companies are covered under the proposal. In combination, these two issues pose potential challenges for smaller and medium-sized enterprises, who may not have the existing infrastructure to deal with the rapid, 24/7, requests and properly assess the potential human rights impacts, or may be discouraged from potential business opportunities at the cost of compliance with this regulation.
Conclusion
As noted above, the proposed regulation raises significant issues that must be addressed before it is enacted into law. At a minimum, amendments should: (i) ensure key provisions, such as the definitions of terrorist content, hosting service providers, and competent authorities are refined and clarified; (ii) clarify that legal challenges of content removal orders by companies will toll the 24-hour clock for related removals; (iii) require that content referrals under the regulation are reviewed against relevant laws and appropriate oversight mechanisms are in place for referrals; (iv) remove requirements that companies modify their terms and conditions; (v) eliminate, or significantly limit, situations where companies will be ordered or expected to implement “proactive measures” against their will; and (vi) strengthen provisions on remedy and transparency, including vis-a-vis government decisions.
GNI recognizes the importance of taking measures to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content online and stands ready to continue engaging with relevant actors, including the Council, the Commission, and Parliament to ensure that our collective efforts to address this challenge remain effective, efficient, and consistent with applicable human rights principles.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1547568745346-e52becbf-149c-9″ taxonomies=”4799, 2181″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
15 Jan 19 | Fellowship 2019, News and features, Press Releases
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- Judges include investigative journalist Maria Ressa, one of Time magazine’s people of the Year 2018; actor Khalid Abdalla
- Shortlist celebrates artists, campaigners and activists from Saudi Arabia to Serbia, Colombia to Cameroon
[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_column_text]A self-exiled Saudi street artist who uses murals to challenge her homeland’s repression of women, a Nigerian organisation that fosters community radio, a group of digital activists tackling online trolls in Colombia, and a Serbian collective of investigative journalists exposing government corruption are among the individuals and organisations shortlisted for the 2019 Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Awards Fellowships.
Drawn from more than 400 crowdsourced nominations, the shortlist celebrates artists, writers, journalists and campaigners fighting for freedom of expression against immense obstacles. Many of the 15 shortlisted nominees face regular death threats, others criminal prosecution or exile. Some are currently in prison for daring to speak out against the status quo.
“Free speech is the cornerstone of a free society – and it’s under increasing threat worldwide. That’s why it’s more important than ever to recognise the groups and individuals willing to stand up for it,” said Jodie Ginsberg, CEO of campaigning nonprofit Index on Censorship.
Awards fellowships are offered in four categories: arts, campaigning, digital activism and journalism.
Nominees include exiled street artist Ms. Saffaa whose murals highlight women’s rights and human rights violations in Saudi Arabia; Nigeria’s Institute for Media and Society, which goes to great lengths to improve the country’s media landscape by challenging government regulation and aiding the creation of community radio stations in rural areas; Colombia’s Fundación Karisma, which fights back against internet trolls and promotes freedom of expression online; and The Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia (CINS), an independent group of investigative journalists exposing corruption in the country.
Other nominees include ArtLords, a grassroots movement of artists and volunteers in Afghanistan; P24 (Platform for Independent Journalism), a civil society organisation with an ambitious goal of neutralising censorship in Turkey; Mohammed al-Maskati, a Bahraini activist and digital security consultant who provides digital security training to activists in the Middle East and in North Africa; and Mehman Huseynov, an imprisoned journalist and human rights defender who documents corruption and human rights violations in Azerbaijan.
Judges for this year’s awards, now in its 19th year, are award-winning investigative journalist and Rappler.com Editor-in-Chief Maria Ressa, actor and filmmaker Khalid Abdalla, computer scientist and author Dr. Kate Devlin, and writer and social activist Nimco Ali.
Abdalla said: “The abyss we are facing all over the world requires acts of courage and intellect capable of changing the terms of how we think and respond to the challenges ahead. We have to celebrate those who inspire us and lead by example, not just because they have managed to break barriers in their own contexts, but because some part of what they do holds a key for us all.”
Winners, who will be announced at a gala ceremony in London on 4 April, become Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Awards Fellows and are given year-long support for their work, including training in areas such as advocacy and communications.
“Many of the things that I dreamt of happening one day, in an idealistic way, have become reality, all thanks to Index,” Wendy Funes, 2018 Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Journalism Fellow, said. “Solidarity, love and friendship are really the things that can move this world, and that is what Index is made of with all of the support they have extended to me.”
This year, the Freedom of Expression Awards are being supported by sponsors including SAGE Publishing, Google, Private Internet Access, Edwardian Hotels, Vodafone, France Médias Mondes and Psiphon. Illustrations of the nominees were created by Sebastián Bravo Guerrero.
Notes for editors:
- Index on Censorship is a UK-based non-profit organisation that publishes work by censored writers and artists and campaigns against censorship worldwide.
- More detail about each of the nominees is included below.
- The winners will be announced at a ceremony in London on 4 April.
For more information, or to arrange interviews with any of those shortlisted, please contact Sean Gallagher on 0207 963 7262 or [email protected]. More biographical information and illustrations of the nominees are available at indexoncensorship.org/indexawards2019.[/vc_column_text][vc_custom_heading text=”Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Awards nominees 2019″ use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]
Arts
for artists and arts producers whose work challenges repression and injustice and celebrates artistic free expression
[/vc_column_text][vc_single_image image=”104530″ img_size=”full” alignment=”center”][vc_column_text]ArtLords
Afghanistan
ArtLords is a grassroots movement of artists and volunteers in Afghanistan who encourage ordinary citizens, especially women and children, to paint the issues that concern them on so-called blast walls: walls the country’s rich and the powerful have built around themselves to protect them from violence while the poor fend for themselves. Their work has turned a symbol of fear, tension and separation into a platform where social issues can be expressed visually and discussed in the street. ArtLords has completed over 400 murals in 16 provinces of Afghanistan. In March 2018, for International Women’s Day, ArtLords painted a tribute to Professor Hamida Barmaki, a human rights defender killed in a terrorist attack six years ago.
Zehra Doğan
Turkey
Zehra Doğan is an imprisoned Kurdish painter and journalist who — denied access to materials for her work — paints with dyes made from crushed fruit and herbs, even blood, and uses newspapers and milk cartons as canvases. When she realised her reports from Turkey’s Kurdish region were being ignored by mainstream media, Doğan began painting the destruction in town of Nusaybin and sharing it on social media. For this she was arrested and imprisoned. Imprisonment hasn’t stopped her from producing journalism and art. She collects and writes stories about female political prisoners, reports on human rights abuses in prison, and paints despite the prison administration’s refusal to supply her with art materials.
ElMadina for Performing and Digital Arts
Egypt
ElMadina is a group of artists and arts managers who combine art and protest by encouraging Egyptians to get involved in performances in public spaces, defying the country’s restrictive laws. ElMadina’s work encourages participation — through story-telling, dance and theatre — to transform public spaces and marginalised areas in Alexandria and beyond into thriving environments where people can freely express themselves. Their work encourages free expression in a country in which public space is shrinking under the weight of government distrust of the artistic sector. ElMadina also carry out advocacy and research work and provide a physical space for training programmes, residencies and performances.
Ms Saffaa
Saudi Arabia / Australia
Ms Saffaa is a self-exiled Saudi street artist living in Australia who uses murals to highlight women’s rights and human rights violations in Saudi Arabia. Collaborating with artists from around the world, she challenges Saudi authorities’ linear and limited narrative of women’s position in Saudi society, and offers a counter narrative through her art. Part of a new generation of Saudi activists who take to social media to spread ideas, Ms Saffaa’s work has acquired international reach. In November 2018, she collaborated with renowned American artist and writer Molly Crabapple on a mural celebrating murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi that read, “We Saudis deserve better.” [/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]
Campaigning
for activists and campaigners who have had a marked impact in fighting censorship and promoting freedom of expression
[/vc_column_text][vc_single_image image=”104531″ img_size=”full” alignment=”center”][vc_column_text]Cartoonists Rights Network International
United States / International
Cartoonists Rights Network International (CRNI) is a small organisation with a big impact: monitoring threats and abuses against editorial cartoonists worldwide. Marshalling an impressive worldwide network, CRNI helps to focus international attention on cases in which cartoonists are persecuted and put pressure on the persecutors. CRNI tracks censorship, fines, penalties and physical intimidation – including of family members, assault, imprisonment, and even assassinations. Once a threat is detected, CRNI often partners with other human rights organisations to maximise the pressure and impact of a campaign to protect the cartoonist and confront those who seek to censor political cartoonists.
Institute for Media and Society
Nigeria
The Institute for Media and Society (IMS) is a Nigerian NGO that aims to improve the country’s media landscape by challenging government regulation and fostering the creation of community radio stations in rural areas at a time when local journalism globally is under threat. Three-quarters of television and radio stations in Nigeria are owned by politicians, and as a result they are divided along political lines, while rural communities are increasingly marginalised. IMS’s approach combines research and advocacy to challenge legal restrictions on the media as well as practical action to encourage Nigerians to use their voices, particularly via local radio. IMS also tracks violations of the rights of journalists in Nigeria.
Media Rights Agenda
Nigeria
Media Rights Agenda (MRA) is a non-profit organisation that has spent the last two decades working to improve media freedom and freedom of expression in Nigeria by challenging the government in courts. While the constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression, other laws – including the sections of the Criminal Code, the Cybercrimes Act and the Official Secrets Act – limit and even criminalise expression. Through its active legal team, MRA has initiated strategic litigation targeting dozens of institutions, politicians and officials to improve the country’s legal framework around media freedom. Its persistent campaigning and lawsuits on freedom of information have helped improve access to government-held data.
P24 (Platform for Independent Journalism)
Turkey
P24 (Platform for Independent Journalism) is a civil society organisation that aims to neutralise censorship in Turkey — a country in which speaking freely courts fines, arrest and lengthy jail sentences. P24’s pro bono legal team defends journalists and academics who are on trial for exercising their right to free expression. It also undertakes coordinated social media and public advocacy work that includes live-tweeting from courtrooms and campaigning through an array of websites, newsletters and exhibition spaces. Its latest effort aims to provide spaces for collaboration and free expression in the form of a literature house and a project connecting lawyers and artists. [/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]
Digital Activism
for innovative uses of technology to circumvent censorship and enable free and independent exchange of information
[/vc_column_text][vc_single_image image=”104532″ img_size=”full” alignment=”center”][vc_column_text]Fundación Karisma
Colombia
Fundación Karisma is a civil society organisation that takes on online trolls by using witty online ‘stamps’ that flag up internet abuse. It’s an initiative that uses humour to draw attention to a serious problem: the growing online harassment of women in Colombia and its chilling effect. The organisation offers a rare space to discuss many issues at the intersection of human rights and technology in the country and then tackles them through a mix of research, advocacy and digital tools. Karisma’s “Sharing is not a crime” campaign supports open access to knowledge against the backdrop of Colombia’s restrictive copyright legislation.
Mohammed Al-Maskati
Middle East
Mohammed al-Maskati is a digital security consultant who provides training to activists in the Middle East and in North Africa. Working as Frontline Defenders’ Digital Protection Consultant for the MENA Region, Mohammed teaches activists – ranging from vulnerable minorities to renowned campaigners taking on whole governments – to communicate despite government attempt to shut them down. He educates them on the use of virtual private networks and how to avoid falling into phishing or malware traps, create safe passwords and keep accounts anonymous. As governments become more and more sophisticated in their attempts to track and crush dissent, the work of people like Al-Maskati is increasingly vital.
SFLC.in
India
SFLC.in (Software Freedom Law Centre) tracks internet shutdowns in India, a crucial service in a country with the most online blackouts of any country in the world. The tracker was the first initiative of its kind in India and has quickly become the top source for journalists reporting on the issue. As well as charting the sharp increase in the number and frequency of shutdowns in the country, the organisation has a productive legal arm and brings together lawyers, policy analysts and technologists to fight for digital rights in the world’s second most populous country. It also provides training and pro-bono services to journalists, activists and comedians whose rights have been curtailed.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]
Journalism
for courageous, high-impact and determined journalism that exposes censorship and threats to free expression
[/vc_column_text][vc_single_image image=”104534″ img_size=”full” alignment=”center”][vc_column_text]Bihus.info
Ukraine
Bihus.info is a group of independent investigative journalists in Ukraine who – despite threats and assaults – are fearlessly exposing the corruption of many Ukrainian officials. In the last two years alone, Bihus.info’s coverage has contributed to the opening of more than 100 legal cases against corrupt officials. Chasing money trails, murky real estate ownership and Russian passports, Bihus.info produces hard-hitting, in-depth TV reports for popular television programme, Nashi Hroshi (Our Money), which illuminates discrepancies between officials’ real wealth and their official income. One of the key objectives of the project is not just to inform, but to involve people in the fight against corruption by demonstrating how it affects their own well-being.
Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia (CINS)
Serbia
Investigating corruption is one of the most dangerous jobs in journalism: three investigative reporters have been murdered in the European Union in the past year alone. In Serbia, journalists face death threats and smear campaigns portray investigative journalists as foreign-backed propagandists. Against this backdrop, Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia (CINS) stands out as one of the last independent outlets left amid an increasingly partisan media. Using freedom of information requests, the CINS has created databases based on thousands of pages of documents to underpin its hard-hitting investigations. These include stories on loans provided to pro-government tabloids and TV channels. CINS also provides hands-on investigative journalism training for journalists and editors.
Mehman Huseynov
Azerbaijan
Mehman Huseynov is a journalist and human rights defender who documents corruption and human rights violations in Azerbaijan, consistently ranked among the world’s worst countries for press freedom. Sentenced to two years in prison in March 2017 after describing abuses he had suffered at a police station, Huseynov has put his life in danger to document sensitive issues. His work circulated widely on the internet, informing citizens about the real estate and business empires of the country’s government officials, and scrutinising the decisions of president Ilham Aliyev. Huseynov is still in prison and remains defiant, saying: “I am not here only for myself; I am here so that your children are not in my place tomorrow. If you uphold the judgement against me, you have no guarantees that you and your children will not be in my place tomorrow.”
Mimi Mefo
Cameroon
Mimi Mefo is one of less than a handful journalists working without fear or favour in Cameroon’s climate of repression and self-censorship. An award-winning broadcast journalist and the first-ever woman editor-in-chief of private media house Equinoxe TV and Radio, Mefo was arrested in November 2018 after she published reports that the military was behind the death of an American missionary in the country. Mefo reports on the escalating violence in the country’s western regions, a conflict that has become known as the “Anglophone Crisis” and is a leading voice in exposing the harassment of other Cameroonian journalists, calling publicly for the release of those jailed.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]
14 Jan 19 | Germany, Global Journalist, Media Freedom, News and features, Turkey, Turkey Uncensored
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]This article is part of Index on Censorship partner Global Journalist’s Project Exile series, which has published interviews with exiled journalists from around the world.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]
Can Dündar (Photo: Claude Truong Ngoc / Wikiepedia)
Can Dündar isn’t easily silenced.
The outspoken Turkish columnist and editor has been fired, jailed and even shot at by a would-be assassin for his coverage of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government. He’s been forced into exile, blocked from seeing his wife and faced calls from Turkey’s pro-government media that he be abducted from his new home in Berlin.
“Exile, on the one hand, is a paradise for a journalist like me,” says Can Dündar, 57. “In Turkey it was hell: you are not allowed to write or talk. In Germany, at least I can write, I can talk, I can defend my colleagues. But of course, I am away from my country, my family and my paper. And there are lots of risks around. I’ve been taking those risks and trying to fight back.”
Dündar isn’t one to avoid risks during his 37 years as a journalist, TV anchor and author. Earlier in his career he wrote for Hürriyet, one of the country’s largest news outlets, before becoming a columnist with the daily Milliyet. Dündar was fired from the latter in 2013 after criticizing the response of Erdogan’s ruling AKP party to the massive anti-government protests that began in Istanbul’s Gezi Park.
But Dündar wasn’t done. He went on to become editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet, a smaller newspaper that became increasingly critical of the government as Erdogan moved the country towards authoritarianism. In 2015, Cumhuriyet created a sensation by posting video footage online that it said showed Turkish intelligence forces transporting arms to opposition groups in Syria.
The report infuriated Erdogan, who labeled Dündar a traitor. Both Dündar and Cumhuriyet’s Ankara bureau chief, Erdem Gul were arrested and charged with espionage and ‘divulging state secrets.’ Dündar was interrogated for 11 hours before being taken to jail, where he was held 92 days, including 40 days in solitary confinement.
He was released to face trial, but on May 6, 2016, as Dündar awaited a verdict in his trial, a lone gunman approached him outside the courthouse and shot twice at him. The shots missed, and the gunman was wrestled away by a plain clothes policeman and Dündar’s wife. In video footage of the incident, the assailant is heard calling Dündar ‘a traitor’ – the exact the same words as Erdogan used to describe him.[/vc_column_text][vc_video link=”https://youtu.be/4YlDTDg2k1s”][vc_column_text]Dündar was sentenced to nearly six years in jail, but appealed his conviction. While on holiday overseas during the appeal in July 2016, members of the Turkish military launched a failed coup against Erdogan.
In the aftermath, Erdogan declared a state of emergency and began a sweeping crackdown against perceived political opponents and alleged supporters of a dissident cleric the government accused of inspiring the coup attempt. More than 160,000 people were arrested and 152,000 government workers were fired, according to the UN’s human rights office.
Among the arrested were 166 journalists, 75 of whom were convicted of various crimes, including coup-plotting and disseminating terrorism propaganda, according to the Stockholm Centre for Freedom. Thirteen of Dündar’s Cumhuriyet colleagues were charged in the purge.
All of this was enough for Dündar not to return to Turkey. Now living in Berlin, he divides his time between writing a column for the German newspaper Die Zeit, launching the startup Turkish news site Özgürüz and lecturing in Europe. A play based on his writings in jail called “We Are Arrested,” debuted in May at the Royal Shakespeare Company in the United Kingdom, just weeks after Turkey’s highest court ruled that Dündar’s jail sentence should be extended to 15 to 20 years.
Dündar spoke with Global Journalist’s Kris Croonen about harassment from pro-Erdogan Turks in Germany and Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to capture him. Below, an edited version of their interview:
Global Journalist: What made you decide not to return to Turkey?
Dündar: After the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the rule of law was lifted, and my lawyers warned me that under the state of emergency I would be in jail again and it won’t be that easy to get out this time.
The first thing they had done was arrest the high [court] judges who had decided for our release previously. They are all in jail, still.
So it was a kind of a coup d’etat by Erdogan. I also consulted my colleagues, my family, and everybody advised me not to come back. Of course it was not an easy decision because I went on a holiday just with a suitcase full of books and nothing else.
So I stayed in Europe,without anything. First I traveled in different countries: to London, to Paris and Berlin…but I realized that Berlin was the best option because there was a huge interest about Turkey in Germany. I got an offer from Die Zeit to write a regular column for them, and PEN/Germany offered me a scholarship. So I decided to stay here.
GJ: The Turkish community in Germany is about 3 million people – and many are fervent supporters of Erdogan. Isn’t Germany a little bit unsafe for you?
Dündar: Not “a little bit.” It’s really the most dangerous place on Earth for someone like me [laughs]. In the beginning, I was not aware of the risks. But then I realized immediately, and it’s still a problem.
GJ: Do you encounter real danger in Berlin from pro-government Turks?
Dündar: Yeah, that’s daily business. They attack, they come to annoy you, they insult you…That kind of stuff. But it’s nothing different than Turkey, you know, you get used to this always facing risks. It’s not new for me. I just have to be careful. And if I do something in public, the German police normally comes and protects me.
GJ: When did you realize that your wife wouldn’t be able to join you?
Dündar: Immediately after I arrived in Berlin, I called her. The day after she was about to come to me but she was stopped at the airport…without any reason. They took her passport and confiscated it. First they said her passport is not reading on the computer. Then they said it’s lost, although she had it in her pocket.
Shortly after, they published a kind of decree saying that if someone is being blamed for terrorist acts, their family members may also be banned from travel. For the Turkish government, I am a terrorist. Everybody challenging the government is a terrorist. So it’s two and half years now that we are living separately…She can’t travel…it’s tough, really, it’s a kind of punishment. She’s held like a hostage.
GJ: When Erdogan came to Germany in September, he threatened to stay away from a press conference if you would be there. In the end, you were the one who decided not to show up. Why did you give in?
Dündar: That’s correct. Mr. Erdogan said, “It’s me or him.” I decided that a journalist should not be the subject of the news, he should be the writer of the news…On the other hand, what was important is asking questions. So I gave my questions to my German colleagues and they asked them. Everybody understood what kind of politician we are dealing with and how he’s scared of journalists and questions.
GJ: Do you still think it’s been worth the sacrifice?
Dündar: Yes, because we are not only defending a profession, we also have to save our country. It’s a high price we are paying. But the alternative is losing the country. So we have to do everything we can. I feel responsible for my son [who lives in the U.K.], I want him to be able to live in a free country. I have to do my best and this is the least that I can do: writing as a journalist and talking.
GJ: Do you still hope to be able to return to Turkey?
Dündar: In the short term, it will be painful, but we are coming to the end of it. After sixteen years of power, now Erdogan is facing [his] most difficult period of time, at least economically. So we will see the consequences. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_video link=”https://youtu.be/6BIZ7b0m-08″][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Index on Censorship partner Global Journalist is a website that features global press freedom and international news stories as well as a weekly radio program that airs on KBIA, mid-Missouri’s NPR affiliate, and partner stations in six other states. The website and radio show are produced jointly by professional staff and student journalists at the University of Missouri’s School of Journalism, the oldest school of journalism in the United States. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Don’t lose your voice. Stay informed.” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_separator color=”black”][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Index on Censorship is a nonprofit that campaigns for and defends free expression worldwide. We publish work by censored writers and artists, promote debate, and monitor threats to free speech. We believe that everyone should be free to express themselves without fear of harm or persecution – no matter what their views.
Join our mailing list (or follow us on Twitter or Facebook). We’ll send you our weekly newsletter, our monthly events update and periodic updates about our activities defending free speech. We won’t share, sell or transfer your personal information to anyone outside Index.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][gravityform id=”20″ title=”false” description=”false” ajax=”false”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row full_width=”stretch_row_content”][vc_column][three_column_post title=”Global Journalist / Project Exile” full_width_heading=”true” category_id=”22142″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
