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Executive Summary
1. The submitting organisations welcome the opportunity to contribute to the third cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Azerbaijan. This submission focuses on compliance with international human rights obligations with respect to freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly and of association, in particular concerns relating to:
2. The Azerbaijani Government has failed to implement many of the recommendations relating to each of these issues accepted during its last UPR, with the situation deteriorating quite significantly in the period under review.
Constitutional amendments
3. Amendments to the Constitution of Azerbaijan were approved through a hasty referendum in September 2016, without any Parliamentary debate or scrutiny of the proposals, and amid a crackdown on journalists, activists and groups opposed to the amendments, preventing voters from having access to all relevant information and opinions. The referendum was also plagued by reports of irregularities, including ballot stuffing and fraud.(1) The Venice Commission also raised concerns that the referendum did not comply with even national legal requirements.(2)
4. The amendments include provisions with deleterious impacts on the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association in Azerbaijan, including by consolidating the powers of the President and weakening democratic checks and balances, including by weakening the Courts.(3) Article 32 of the Constitution was amended to ostensibly protect against the publication of information about a person’s private life, but its broad scope potentially limits the ability of journalists and others to report information about public officials that are in the public interest. Article 47(III) was amended to prohibit propaganda provoking “hostility based on any other criteria”, which similarly may be applied to limit dissent against the requirements of international human rights law, while Article 49(II) of the Constitution was amended to enable sweeping restrictions on assemblies to prevent the disruption of “public order or public morale”.
5. These Constitutional amendments, and the weakening of the judiciary, further undermine the efforts of civil society, human rights defenders and others to bring national law into compliance with Azerbaijan’s international human rights law obligations, and to secure accountability for human rights violations.
Recommendations
Safety of journalists
6. During its last UPR, the Azerbaijani government accepted 8 recommendations(4) related to ensuring the safety of journalists, including by conducting impartial, thorough and effective investigations into all cases of attacks harassment and intimidation against them, and by bringing perpetrators of such offences to justice.(5) These recommendations have not been implemented, with impunity for attacks against journalists and media workers cultivating a climate of self-censorship.
7. There is still total impunity for the March 2005 murder of Monitor magazine editor-in-chief Elmar Huseynov, as well as for the November 2011 murder of prominent writer and journalist Rafig Tagi.
8. In the period of review, the following cases are highlighted as evidence that impunity, as well as lack of adequate prevention and protection measures, are a continuing problem:
Recommendations
Enact measures to ensure the safety of journalists, in line with Human Rights Council resolution 33/2,(7) including, inter alia:
Arbitrary arrests and detentions of critics
9. During its last UPR, Azerbaijan accepted 16 recommendations(8) related to ensuring that human rights defenders, lawyers and other civil society actors are able to carry out their legitimate activities without fear or threat of reprisal, obstruction or legal and administrative harassment. Similar recommendations were accepted in relation to the treatment of journalists and writers, including that defamation should be decriminalised.(9)
10. Nevertheless, in the period under review Azerbaijan has continued its practice of targeting critical or dissenting voices with politically motivated arrests on spurious charges, extended pre-trial detentions (ranging from months to more than a year) and custodial sentences. The UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, who visited Azerbaijan in May 2016, have noted that, notwithstanding the release of some high profile prisoners, the practice of the government to detain those with oppositional views continues, in violation of their international human rights law obligations.(10)
11. The Azerbaijani authorities arbitrarily arrest individuals for engaging in dissent and release them as a mechanism of control. There are often waves of arbitrary arrests and detentions prior to and around significant events, for example in the run up to and after the European Olympic Games in 2014 and the Formula 1 Grand Prix in 2015. As of August 2017, civil society activists within Azerbaijan estimate there to be 158 confirmed political prisoners. (11, 12)
12. Individuals arbitrarily arrested or detained for their political opposition include:
13. Arbitrarily arrested and detained journalists and bloggers, include:
14. The following writers and poets have been arbitrarily arrested and detained:
15. The following civil society actors have also been arbitrarily arrested and detained in the period under review:
16. The following activists have been arbitrarily arrested and detained:
17. Released political prisoners are commonly unable to return to their previous work and political activities. Many have not had convictions quashed, are under surveillance, face travel bans, and ongoing harassment:
18. The family members in Azerbaijan of dissidents living abroad have also been targeted:
19. During its last UPR, the Azerbaijan authorities accepted recommendations to enhance the role of the Ombudsman as a preventative mechanism against torture.(21) However, as the Working Group also noted, there are serious and credible allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment against those detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, which are not adequately investigated. These include the case of Bayram Mammadov (above)(22). Mehman Huseynov, a popular blogger known for exposing corruption among Azerbaijani officials, who was convicted to two years’ imprisonment on defamation charges in March 2017. The charges were in connection to a statement Huseynov made in January 2017, describing torture inflicted upon him by police officers after his detention.
Recommendations
Forced closure and harassment of independent media outlets and journalists
20. During its last UPR, Azerbaijan accepted 14(23) recommendations related to ensuring respect for media freedom, independent journalism, and media diversity, including to take into account Council of Europe in this regard.(24)
21. The Azerbaijani authorities dominate the country’s media landscape, through regulations, direct ownership or indirect economic control. In the period under review, the majority of independent media outlets have been forced to close or go into exile, with those still operating inside the country subject to police raids, financial pressures, and prosecution of journalists and editors on politically-motivated charges. Where media outlets have been forced to stop print publication and publish only online, their sites are subject to periodic blocking and throttling by the Azerbaijani authorities.
22. Forced closure of media outlets include:
23. Meydan TV, an independent online media outlet whose coverage includes human rights abuses and government corruption, closed its Baku office in December 2014 due to safety concerns. It continues to operate from its headquarters in Germany, in cooperation with journalists in Azerbaijan, despite relentless harassment and state-level blocking of the site since May 2017.(32) In August 2015, the Azerbaijani Prosecutor General’s Office launched a criminal case in relation to Meydan TV’s activities under Articles 213.2.2 (evasion of taxes in a large amount), 192.2.2 (illegal business) and 308.2 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code. In April 2016, 15 individuals were named in the criminal investigation, with Aynur Elgunash, Aytaj Ahmadova, Sevinj Vagifgizi, and Natig Javadli subject to travel bans.(33) Journalists associated with Meydan TV have been repeatedly summoned for interrogations by the Prosecutor’s Office.(34) The case remains open.
24. Harassment of individual journalists who express critical opinions or deviate from official State accounts in their reporting remains a serious concern. In September 2017, dozens of journalists were dismissed from the government controlled ATV television channel after well-known journalist and TV host. Turan Ibrahimov spoke on a live broadcast about corruption, including how high-ranking officials targeted an entrepreneur to illegally take over his business.(35)
25. Access to foreign media outlets remains restricted, notwithstanding the government’s acceptance of a specific UPR recommendation to expand media freedoms across broadcast platforms, including by ending its ban on foreign broadcasts on FM radio frequencies as well as restrictions on the broadcast of foreign language television programmes.(36) A 2009 ban imposed by NTRC (based on Article 13 of Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Telecommunication), remains in place, preventing foreign entities from accessing national frequencies, which effectively took the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of America, off the air.(37) The NTRC, established on 5 October 2002 by Presidential Decree (#795), is fully funded from the state budget and the President directly appoints its members. Similarly, the Azerbaijani public service broadcaster, Ictimai, consistently demonstrates clear bias favourable to the government and ruling party, a problem exacerbated by the lack of media pluralism and alternative information sources in the country.
26. Civil society organisations focused on media freedom issues have also been targeted. In August 2014, the office of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (IRFS) was raided by the authorities in the capital Baku as part of a broader crackdown on NGOs in Azerbaijan. They confiscated equipment, documents, and assets, and the staff were harassed and interrogated by Azerbaijan’s Public Prosecutor office. As a result, IRFS has been forced to cease its operations in Azerbaijan; its Director, Emin Huseynov, remains in exile since fleeing Azerbaijan in 2014.(38)
Recommendations
Legislative restrictions to freedom of expression online
27. During its last UPR, Azerbaijan accepted recommendations to protect freedom of expression online.(39) However, various laws have been amended to increase restrictions in the period under review.
28. On 15 November 2016, the Azerbaijani Parliament approved amendments to Articles 148 and 323 of the Criminal Code, creating a new offence of “slander or insult” through “fake user names, profiles or accounts”, as well as increasing penalties for “smearing or humiliating the honour and dignity” of the Azerbaijani president where the offence is committed online.(40) The government has not acted on its 2011 proposal to decriminalize defamation,(41) which currently carries a sentence of up to 3 years in prison. This is in spite of accepting a recommendation at the 2nd UPR cycle to abolish defamation provisions in the criminal code, and to “refrain from initiating defamation lawsuits against civil society activists and journalists”.
29. On 10 March 2017, the Parliament passed new amendments to the laws on “Information, Informatisation and Protection of Information” and “Telecommunications”, extending government control over online media.(42) The amendments establish obligations for website owners or hosts to delete within eight hours, on notice from the authorities, unlawful content.(43) Prohibited content includes any information criminalised under national laws, including broad “extremism” and “defamation” provisions. If the content is not removed, authorities can apply for a court order to block the website, though websites with information considered “a danger for the state or society” can be blocked without a court order, subject to subsequent judicial review.
30. Between March and April 2017, access to a number of online new sites with content critical of the government were blocked in Azerbaijan.(44) Contrary to the provisions in the above laws, neither the hosts or owners of these outlets were informed about the blocks in advance. On 12 May 2017, a Baku Court ruled to impose an official ban on five independent media websites deemed harmful and dangerous for national security. Along with Meydan TV, Azadliq newspaper, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Azerbaijani Service, Azerbaijan Saati website and video channel, and Turan TV video channel have all been blocked.(45)
31. In September 2017, access to the website of the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) was blocked inside Azerbaijan after they published the “Azerbaijan Laundromat” – a series of reports that uncovered high level corruption by Azerbaijani officials and implicated European and other diplomats and politicians.(46)
Recommendations
Legislative restrictions to freedom of association
32. During its last UPR, the Azerbaijan government accepted numerous specific recommendations to bring its Law on Non-Governmental Organisations into conformity with international human rights law and to create a safe and enabling environment for civil society,(47) but it has not done so.
33. In 2013 and 2014, amendments to the already-onerous 2011 Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (Public Associations and Funds) entered into force. These amendments provided the government with broad discretion to dissolve, impose financial penalties on, and freeze the assets of NGOs for infractions of administrative regulations, closing the few remaining loopholes for the operation of unregistered, independent, and foreign organisations.(48) The Venice Commission has found that the amendments “seem to be intrusive enough to constitute a prima facie violation of the right to freedom of association”(49), and their impact since has caused the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to call for their repeal.(50)
34. The 2014 amendments established a de facto licensing regime for NGOs, giving the government broad discretion to arbitrarily refuse or delay the registration of grants, establishing complicated and onerous procedures for registration, and allowed for restrictions on NGOs’ access to their bank accounts for non-compliance. The impact of these new rules has been to severely limit civil society space. While some NGOs have reportedly had their bank accounts unfrozen in April 2016,(51) several organisations no longer have in their possession many of the documents required for grant registration, because Azerbaijani investigative authorities seized them in the course of inspections and criminal investigations.(52) Meanwhile, the accounts of many other human rights organisations and independent NGOs remain frozen, including in July 2014 those of the Legal Education Society and its head, Intigam Aliyev, causing the NGO to cease operations.
35. The 2014 amendments have also made it much harder for foreign entities to provide grants to local NGOs, requiring them to have an agreement with government ministries. As a consequence, throughout 2015, foreign governments that previously provided grants to local NGOs postponed their activities.
36. The Government of Azerbaijan established the Azerbaijani State Council for Support to NGOs in 2007, which aims to provide a domestic source of financial assistance to local NGOs. However, NGOs applying to the Council for grants have reported that they were told to sign a statement promising to refuse to have any relations with international NGOs critical of the Government of Azerbaijan, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, among others. In addition, one NGO receiving funding from the Council has reported that its activities have become subject to constant control by the state donor, undermining its ability to operate independently.
37. On October 21, 2016, President Aliyev signed into law a decree on the Simplification of Registration of Foreign Grants in Azerbaijan, effective from 1 January 2017.(53) The new regulations simplify some procedures for registration of foreign grants, but do not address the legal requirement for NGOs to register grants, and do not eliminate the requirement for the Ministry of Finance to provide an opinion on the expediency of each grant from a foreign donor, and most importantly, they do not change the broad discretion of the authorities to arbitrarily deny grant registration. The Law on Grants and the Law on State Registration and State Register of Legal Entities remains intact.
Recommendations
Restrictions to freedom of assembly and protests
38. During the last UPR cycle, Azerbaijan accepted multiple recommendations regarding protection of the right to peaceful assembly.(54) However, the authorities continue to severely restrict protests in public spaces and organisers of peaceful actions have been arbitrarily arrested and detained.
39. Amendments to the Law on Peaceful Assembly in May 2008 stipulate that demonstrations may only held in a number of approved sites, all of which are far from the centre of Baku, thereby diminishing the impact of protest. Further changes to the Law on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, adopted in November 2012 and criticised by UN special procedures, criminalised participants of peaceful gatherings when they “cause significant violation of the rights and legal interests of citizens”.(55) On 14 May 2013, amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences increased the penalties for “organising, holding and attending an unauthorised assembly” to 60 days’ detention, receiving criticism from Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.(56)
40. Police have used unlawful and disproportionate force to disperse protests,(57) and participants in peaceful assemblies have been arbitrarily detained.(58) For example:
Recommendations
Footnotes
1. Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (IRFS), The Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety Statement on the Outcomes of the Constitutional Referendum in Azerbaijan, (29 September 2016), available at https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/the-institute-for-reporters-freedom-and-safety-statement-on-the-outcomes-of-the-constitutional-referendum-in-azerbaijan/.
2. Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, Azerbaijan Preliminary Opinion on the draft modifications to the constitution submitted to the referendum of 26th September 2016, (20 September 2016), available at
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-PI(2016)010-e p. 5
3. See e.g., amendments to Articles 89, 98, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, and 108 of the Constitution, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2016)054-e.
4. Recommendations of Canada, Italy, Germany, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Slovakia, Norway and Austria.
5. Specifically the recommendations of Canada, the United Kingdom, Slovakia, Norway.
6. Council of Europe’s Media Alert Platform, Meydan TV Director Emin Milli Threatened for Critical Reporting on European Games, (30 June 2015), available at – https://go.coe.int/1y4r2
7. ARTICLE 19, “Prevent – Protect – Prosecute: Acting on UN Human Rights Council Resolution 33/2”, (September 2017), available at: https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38883/Safety-of-Journalists-guide.pdf
8. Recommendations of Austria, Ireland, Slovakia, United States, United Arab Emirates, Czechia, France, Italy, Canada (x2), Sweden, Chile, Norway, Mexico and Germany.
9. Recommendations of Slovenia, Germany, Canada, and Austria.
10. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on its mission to Azerbaijan, A/HRC/36/37/Add.1, 2 August 2017; available at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/36/37/Add.1
11. The Working Group on Unified List of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan, Updated Unified List of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan, (28 August 2017), available at –
http://smdtaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Political-Prisoners-Report_Azerbaijan-August_2017.pdf
12. All Articles in this section refer to Articles of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.
13. European Court of Human Rights, Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 15172/13), 22 May 2014
14. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Decision CM/Del/Dec(2017)1294/H46-2, 21 September 2017; available at: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=0900001680749f3c
15. Meydan TV, Customs Service Releases Info. on Arrest of Gozel Bayramli, (29 May 2017), available at – https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/politics/23173/
16. Council of Europe’s Media Alert Platform, Azerbaijani Journalist Elchin Ismayilli Sentenced to 9 year in Prison, (18 September 2017), available at – https://go.coe.int/alXEf
17. International Press Institute, Concerns as head of Azerbaijan news agency arrested, (31 August 2017), available at – https://ipi.media/concerns-as-head-of-azerbaijan-news-agency-arrested/
18. The Azerbaijan Free Expression Platform, Imprisoned (2013): Ilkin Rustemzade, (15 June 2016), available at – http://azerbaijanfreexpression.org/ilkin-rustemzade/
19. The Azerbaijan Free Expression Platform, Arrested (2016): Elgiz Gahraman, (18 August 2016), available at – http://azerbaijanfreexpression.org/arrested-2016-elgiz-gahraman/
20. The Azerbaijan Free Expression Platform, Conditionally Released (2016): Intigam Aliyev, (18 August 2016), available at – http://azerbaijanfreexpression.org/imprisoned-2014-intigam-aliyev/
21. Recommendation of Bulgaria.
22. Meydan TV, Youth activist Bayram Mammadov on torture in police custody, (17 May 2016), available at -https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/politics/14510/
23. Recommendations by Canada (x3), Cyprus (x2), Italy, Germany, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Slovakia, Netherlands (x2), Norway and Austria.
24. Specifically recommendations Italy
25. Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Deprived of income, Azerbaijani paper is forced to stop publishing, (20 June 2014) available at https://rsf.org/en/news/deprived-income-azerbaijani-paper-forced-stop-publishing
26. RFE/RL – Radio Azadliq, Azadliq Radio Baku Bureau Sealed Shut , (26 December 2014), available at -https://www.azadliq.org/a/26763625.html
27. RFE/RL, RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service: Radio Azadliq, available at – https://pressroom.rferl.org/p/6126.html
28. https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/private-broadcaster-ans-tvs-broadcast-suspended-for-one-month/
29. Council of Europe (CoE)’s PACE, The functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan (provisional report), p.12
30. Chai-khana, Azerbaijan’s ANS: Death of a TV Station, (17 July 2017), available at: https://chai-khana.org/en/azerbaijans-ans-death-of-a-tv-station
31. CoE, Statement on the arrest of Mehman Aliyev in Azerbaijan, (25 August 2017) available at – https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/statement-on-the-arrest-of-mehman-aliyev-in-azerbaijan
32. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/83591
33. Meydan TV, Fifteen journalists named in criminal investigation of Meydan TV, (21 April 2016), available at -https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/13829/
34. E.g. https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/24362/
35. IRFS, Major Shake-up at ATV, (27 September 2017), available at – https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/major-shake-up-at-atv/
36. As recommended by Canada.
37. RFE/RL, Azerbaijan Bans RFE/RL, Other Foreign Radio From Airwaves, (30 December 2008), available at https://www.rferl.org/a/Azerbaijan_Bans_RFERL_Other_Foreign_Radio/1364986.html
38. The Guardian, Swiss fly out opposition journalist hiding at its Azerbaijan embassy, (14 June 2015), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/14/swiss-fly-out-opposition-journalist-hiding-at-its-azerbaijan-embassy
39. Recommendations of Czechia and Canada
40. IRFS, Azerbaijani Parliament Approve Bill Restricting Online Speech, (29 November 2016), available at https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/azerbaijani-parliament-approves-bill-restricting-online-speech/.
41. See National Program for Action to Raise Effectiveness of Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in the Republic of Azerbaijan, (27 December 2011), available at http://en.president.az/articles/4017.
42. IRFS, Azerbaijani Government Takes Big Steps to Keep Online Media under Control, as Parliament Adopts Restrictive Law related to Information, (10 March 2017) available at https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/azerbaijani-government-takes-big-steps-to-keep-online-media-under-control-as-parliament-adopts-restrictive-law-related-to-information/.
43. As above.
44. Meydan TV, Blocking of Websites in Azerbaijan Moving Ahead at Full Steam, (17 April 2017) available at – https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/22317/
45. Eurasianet.org, Azerbaijan: Court Upholds the Blocking of Independent Media Outlets (15 May 2017), available at – http://www.eurasianet.org/node/83591
46. Meydan TV, OCCRP blocked in Azerbaijan, (5 September 2017) available at – https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/24988/
47. Recommendations of Austria, Ireland, Slovakia, United States, Switzerland, Czechia, France, Chile, Norway, Mexico, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Uruguay.
48. US State Department, Country Reports for Human Rights Practices 2015: Azerbaijan, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253035.pdf p.22
49. Venice Commission Opinion, supra note 3, at para. 91
50. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16393&LangID=E
51. Minval.az, Власти снимают арест на банковские счета ряда НПО, (06 April 2016), available at – http://minval.az/news/123568530
52. US State Department, Country Reports for Human Rights Practices 2015: Azerbaijan, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253035.pdf p.22; See also: http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/pwyp-news/azerbaijan-authorities-raid-civil-society-offices-in-continued-crackdown-on-ngos/
53. The International Centre for Non-Profit Law, Civic Freedom Monitor: Azerbaijan, (29 May 2017), available at – http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/azerbaijan.html
54. Recommendations of Slovakia, United States, Germany, France, Uruguay, and Hungary.
55. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/046/29/PDF/G1404629.pdf?OpenElement
56. CoE Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Report following Commissioner Muižnieks visit to Azerbaijan – 22 to 24 May 2013, (6 August 2013), available at – https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2501767&SecMode=1&DocId=2130154&Usage=2
57. Such as the official shown in the photo on the cover of ARTICLE 19’s report ‘Living as Dissidents’, taken during a 14 April 2010 unsanctioned demonstration staged by the Musavat Party. See ARTICLE 19, ‘Azerbaijan: Authorities Clamp Down on Protesters in First Election-Related Demonstration’, 15 April 2010. http://www.article19.org/pdfs/press/azerbaijan-authorities-clamp-down-on-protesters-in-first-election-related-de.pdf
58. For example, a flash mob by 5 individuals in support Rasul Jafarov, one of the arrested human rights defenders, on his birthday on 17 August 2014, resulted in arbitrary arrests and police violence.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”12″ style=”load-more” items_per_page=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1507719850906-a6d11292-e9f6-0″ taxonomies=”7145″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
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[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Turkey’s state of emergency, announced after July’s coup attempt, was extended for three months in January. While new executive orders continue to increase the repression of opposition journalists, academics, trade unionists, performers and institutions, parliament is discussing changes to the constitution that have been described as a “regime change”. As in the past, the state of emergency has hit Kurdish-populated regions hardest.
The Amed Film Festival was held jointly by the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Culture and Art Directorate and the Middle East Cinema Academy Association (OSAD) in 2012. The objective of the festival was to introduce viewers to films created in the Middle East in all languages of the peoples of the region, with a special emphasis on Kurdish filmmakers, and to contribute to film production. The festival also aimed to “provide the groundwork for filmmakers to be able to express themselves on a free platform”. The second festival, planned for November 2016 under the slogan “Unlimited Cinema”, could not be mounted due to the appointment of a trustee to run the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality and the arrest of its co-mayors, who were members of the pro-Kurdish HDP. Or rather, the festival committee asserted that trustee mayoralties were illegitimate due to “intervention in the people’s will” and decided not to work with the trustee.
In any case, it was unlikely that the trustee mayoralty would have allowed the festival to use any of the venues under its administration. Festival organisers made a call for solidarity to local and international festivals, asking them to show their films between 22-25 December, as “the duty of art and artists under these conditions is not to shrink away, but to raise their voices to explain the reality of the times”.
The festival’s films were shown in Diyarbakır, Istanbul, Van, Batman, Cyprus and Italy. They were put on in trade associations, trade unions and other associations in Diyarbakır (Pir Sultan Abdul Cultural Association and Cemevi, TMMOB, and Eğitim Sen), at the Batman Culture and Art Association in Batman, at the Cyprus Üretim Sokağı Cultural Centre in Cyprus, and at the Mezopotamya Cinema and contemporary arts centre Depo in Istanbul. The Italian leg was organised by Gianluca Peciola from the Left Ecology Freedom Party.
Peciola had been behind the successful initiative to twin Rome’s mayoralty with Kobane in 2015, and he expressed his solidarity with the festival: “There is heavy repression in Turkey, especially in the cultural and artistic fields. We are in solidarity with Kurdish artists and the Kurdish people, whose cultural values and cultural works are being repressed in Kurdistan. We want to demonstrate this solidarity through this work.”
The festival had planned to screen 90 films but it was only able to show 45. However, the call for solidarity and the responses to that call created a positive atmosphere. In Diyarbakır alone, 2,000 people watched the films.
Director Zeynel Doğan, who sits on the festival committee, said that the festival had been stronger before, having been weakened when it lost its support. Despite this Doğan said its “energy had increased”.
Amed Theatre Festival, which had been organised by Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality City Theatre shortly before the film festival, experienced similar issues.
After the trustee was appointed to the mayoralty, the Amed Theatre Festival was cancelled. Subsequently, 10 theatre groups from Turkey and Europe that were going to be part of the festival performed on their own stages between 21 November and 5 December in support of the festival, under the slogan “We are the reality, you are playing with reality”.
MKM Teatra Jiyana Nû, a troupe who perform in Kurdish, explained its solidarity with the festival: “The issue here isn’t merely that a festival is not taking place, the issue is that the breath that society is able to take thanks to art is being allowed to be stifled. We do not want that breath to be stifled, and even if the Amed Festival cannot physically take place in Amed [Diyarbakır], we say ‘Amed Theatre Festival is everywhere’ in the belief that one day it will definitely once again be held there.”
It is worth also noting that no large festival in Istanbul has responded to the Amed Festival’s call for solidarity: from the perspective of the Istanbul festivals, it is becoming much more difficult for regional festivals to stand in solidarity with one another.
“Cutting off the breath of society” is a good description of the repression being carried out in the Kurdish region. Fifty-two of the 106 pro-Kurdish mayoralties have had trustees appointed to them, and 76 co-mayors are under arrest on the grounds of “supporting terror organisations”. The state of emergency Executive Order Regarding the Taking of Certain Precautions shut down dozens of associations in the region. The cultural and artistic divisions of municipalities in the region are being rendered non-functional.
All the actors in the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality City Theatre, which creates and puts on plays in Kurdish, have been fired. From the time pro-Kurdish parties began to take over municipalities in 1999, there was a big revival in cultural and artistic life in Turkey’s Kurdish provinces. New venues opened, regular audiences began to attend events and workshops held by these venues integrated the young people of the region into the artistic environment. Even during the peace process, these institutions were under surveillance, but despite these conditions, they made an important contribution to the protection and development of Kurdish language and culture, its use as a language of artistic production and its institutionalisation.
The dismantlement of artistic groups working at venues such as theatres under municipality control, the Cegerxwin Cultural Centre and the Amed Art Gallery is a sign that from now on these spaces are only to be used in ways that suit the political and cultural agenda of the new municipal administration.
In a funny sense, the way in which the Amed film and theatre festivals were left without support or venues after refusing to work with the trustee has led actors in Diyarbakır’s cultural and artistic world to critically evaluate their own practices. Artistic institutions that had been able to create and prosper for years thanks to the opportunities provided by municipal administrations saw this as an opportunity for cooperation with local organisations and to form an independent model of production and circulation. This also opened the way for certain ideas which had been considered before, such as travelling festivals, to be put into practice. According to filmmaker and OSAD board member İlham Bakır, another example of a future intention now being put into practice thanks to the de facto predicament of the festival was an independent structure to show films over a wider geographical area in cooperation with other institutions.
Filmmakers from the region, as part of the work aiming to restructure the Kurdish movement along egalitarian and democratic lines in political and social life, have long considered the questions of how a democratic cinematic production and distribution model can be put into place and whether a cinematic fund could be established independently of the government. Indeed, they have even invited a group of filmmakers from Istanbul to discuss the idea of a cinematic commune.
Both festivals are preparing to open their own venues in order to continue working independently.
Meanwhile, as artistic groups are no longer be able to benefit from the political advantages the Kurdish movement provided in the region, the idea of a commune has gaining traction.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1485772040601-4013dd52-0984-10″ taxonomies=”8607″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
Each week, Index on Censorship’s Mapping Media Freedom project verifies threats, violations and limitations faced by the media throughout the European Union and neighbouring countries. Here are five recent reports that give us cause for concern.
Le FN refuse toujours certains médias car ils posent trop de questions gênantes en désaccord avec leurs idées… https://t.co/8pmw2hwdPi
— Tous contre le FN (@TousContreLeFN_) September 15, 2016
The right-wing National Front (FN) party of France held its summer conference in Fréjus earlier this month. On 16 September the party refused to allow access to the independent media website Mediapart and the Quotidien television programme. The party has denied access to Mediapart in the past due to its critical reporting on the party.
Journalists’ societies of Radio France, le Monde, le Figaro, Libération, le Parisien, les Echos, Courrier International, AEF, France 2, France 3, TF1, Itélé/Canal+ denounced the ban and said they hoped it would not happen again. The FN has refused to grant access to journalists in the past despite this being against the law.
Regardless of the party’s attempt to keep Mediapart from the summer conference, the website claims they hired a freelance writer to cover the event.
Vladimir Romensky was removed by police from a Russian polling station on 18 September. Romensky is a reporter for the independent television channel Dozhd and was sent to the polling station to investigate potential voter fraud. He was responding to rumors that ballot stuffing had occurred at the site.
When Romensky attempted to enter he was approached by a man who refused to introduce himself and did not allow Romensky or his camera crew to access the polling station. A nearby police officer then intervened and demanded to see Romensky’s documents. Despite having all the necessary documents for his camera crew and himself, the police officer called armed guards and pushed the crew out of the station.
Dmitry Korotkov, a reporter for the Russian news site Fontanka, was arrested in St Petersburg on 18 September while investigating voter fraud.
Korotkov was looking into information about carousel voting, which occurs when an organised group of voters travels to different voting districts to repeatedly vote, even though they are not registered in that district. Fontanka discovered that voters were given four ballots at a certain polling station after revealing a special stamp on their passports to polling officials.
Korotkov was able to obtain the passport stamp and received four ballots at the designated polling station even though he was not registered in the specific district. In response, the polling official offered for him to sign as another voter.
Korotkov revealed to the polling official who he was and the fraud that was occurring. The official promised to investigate the situation and called the police, however Korotkov was detained instead. They charged him with illegally obtaining ballot papers.
Arson attack on journalist’s car: A car belonging to the crime correspondent Dina Kleanthous of online news s… https://t.co/t7MzdvCO40
— Tweet Cyprus (@TweetCyprus) September 19, 2016
At around 2am on 19 September, crime reporter Dina Kleanthous’ car was set on fire by an unknown arsonist.
Kleanthous is a reporter for the online news site Reporter Online. She believes the act is not personal, but a response to her work. Kleanthous had recently been receiving threats regarding a story she was covering.
Dunja Mijatović, a representative for the Freedom of Media in the OSCE, said: “This blatant attempt to coerce a journalist who is reporting on news of public interest is simply unacceptable, I urge the authorities to investigate this incident thoroughly and bring to justice those responsible.”
Azerbaijani Minority Journalist Arrested On Drug Charges: The chief editor of the Baku-based “Tolisi sado” (The … http://t.co/IUvXiBbM
— FreePresss (@FreePresss) June 22, 2012
Hilal Mammadov, the editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Tolyshi Sado, was summoned by police on 19 September. The newspaper covers the ethnic minority of Talysh in Azerbaijan.
Mammadov is a former political prisoner, sentenced to five years in prison in 2013 on spurious charges of “illegal selling of drugs”, “high treason”, and “incitement to national, racial, social, and religious hatred and hostility”. Mammadov was pardoned in March 2016.
After being summoned on 19 September, Mammadov claims the police asked him whether he was a part of a “secret opposition“ and he was forced to give the names of his family to the officials.
Mapping Media Freedom
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The Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy, alongside 16 NGOs including Index on Censorship, today voiced support for the UN joint-statement on human rights in Bahrain. The statement, delivered by Switzerland at the 30th session of the UN Human Rights Council, was co-signed by 33 countries, including 19 EU states and the United States of America.
The statement remains open for additional signatories until the end of the Human Rights Council session on 2 October 2015. The NGOs invite states who have not signed to do so and call on those who have to continue exerting collective pressure for human rights progress in Bahrain.
Letter
To the Governments of: Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Spain
24 September 2015
Excellencies,
We, the undersigned non-governmental organisations, write to voice our support for the joint statement on the human rights situation in Bahrain delivered by Switzerland at the 30th Session of the Human Rights Council (HRC).
Since the last joint statement on Bahrain in June 2014, the government has continued to curtail the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. Human rights defenders, political opposition leaders, members of the media, and youth have faced intimidation, arrest, arbitrary detention, unfair trials and acts of reprisal by the authorities. Furthermore, negotiations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR) for a programme of technical capacity building in Bahrain have stalled in the period since the June 2014 joint statement.
We urge your government, therefore, to sign the joint statement on Bahrain delivered by Switzerland at the HRC’s 30th session in order to refocus international attention on human rights in Bahrain and encourage the government of Bahrain to constructively address its ongoing violations.
International pressure on Bahrain continues to assist in addressing human rights violations in Bahrain, as reflected by the decision of the King of Bahrain to release prominent human rights defender Nabeel Rajab under a royal pardon after he spent over four months in prison for a tweet criticising the government.
It is critical, therefore, to take action now to reaffirm the high level of international concern over human rights conditions in Bahrain. To abandon collective pressure on Bahrain at a time when the situation is continuing to deteriorate would send an entirely wrong message to the Bahraini government, and undermine both internal and external efforts to foster genuine reform.
Switzerland has indicated that this joint statement will be open for additional signatories throughout the session. We therefore call on your government to recommit to supporting human rights in Bahrain, and to add your endorsement to this joint statement.
Sincerely,
Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB)
Amnesty International
ARTICLE 19
Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR)
Bahrain Institute of Rights and Democracy (BIRD)
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
English Pen
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR)
European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (ECDHR)
Human Rights Watch
Index on Censorship
International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
Pen International
Rafto Foundation
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
World Organization Against Torture (OMCT)