Uncomfortable, but educational: Freedom of expression in UK universities

28 Nov 2018

[vc_row full_width=”stretch_row_content_no_spaces”][vc_column][vc_empty_space][vc_single_image image=”103862″ img_size=”full” alignment=”center” css_animation=”fadeIn”][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Uncomfortable, but educational: Freedom of expression in UK universities” font_container=”tag:h1|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_custom_heading text=”Executive summary” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]This report is also available as a PDF[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]

Free speech is vital to the free flow of thoughts and ideas. Nowhere is this perhaps more important than in universities, which are crucibles for new thought and academic discovery, and whose remit is to encourage and foster critical thinking.

In recent years, however, there has been a concerning rise in apparent attempts to shut down debates on certain subject areas in universities in the UK and elsewhere. Speakers whose views are deemed “offensive”, “harmful” or even “dangerous” have been barred from speaking at events, conferences on particular topics cancelled and new laws introduced that some students and academics argue encourage an atmosphere of self-censorship that is inimical to the spirit of open debate essential for the testing and development of ideas.

Free speech on campus is not a new issue but, for a number of reasons, it has recently become more high profile in the UK and worldwide. For example, in the past three years:

• Repeated attempts were made at an event at Goldsmiths, University of London by its Islamic Society to prevent ex-Muslim and feminist campaigner Maryam Namazie from speaking. Students heckled Namazie and accused her of “intimidation”.
• The University of Manchester’s students union banned feminist speaker Julie Bindel and right-wing commentator Milo Yiannopoulos from speaking at a student society debate on free speech.
• A proposed conference at Southampton University questioning the legitimacy of the Israeli state was cancelled amid fears of mass protest.

A freedom of expression organisation with an international remit, Index on Censorship seeks to highlight violations of freedom of expression all over the world. Our approach to the principle of freedom of expression is without political affiliation.

In Free Speech on Campus we look at the situation today on UK campuses and in particular examine the existing legal and other protections for free speech in universities. This comes in the wake of renewed government commitments to protect freedom of expression on campus. We point out examples where rights to free speech are being curtailed by students, academics and student unions and highlight the ways in which both higher education institutions and student bodies could do more to protect freedom of expression.

Our findings suggest that existing legislation already provides a strong framework for protecting freedom of expression in this country. However, we are concerned that Prevent legislation in particular – which compels universities to refer students who seem at risk of being drawn into terrorism – is at odds with the statutory duty on universities to protect free speech and echo the call by the Joint Committee on Human Rights for a review of the Prevent policy.

Furthermore, our findings show that universities and student bodies could do more to explicitly demonstrate, and fulfil, their commitment to freedom of expression.

The main recommendations from this report are that:

1. Universities strengthen and simplify codes of practice
We recommend universities revise regularly and publicise more effectively their codes of practice on freedom of expression to make clear their responsibilities and commitment to protecting free speech on campus. See Appendix 1 for examples of good practice.

2. Student unions clarify policies
We urge student unions to reaffirm a commitment to freedom of expression in their policies and remove “no-platforming” policies that involve outlawing speakers who are not members of groups already proscribed by government.

3. Prevent review
We encourage the government to undertake an immediate independent review of the Prevent policy that assesses the Prevent duty’s effectiveness in the context of higher education and its impact on freedom of speech and association, as recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others.

4. Reject fines system to punish non-compliance
We do not believe that fines are the mechanism to promote freedom of expression on campus. Rather, a clearer commitment to freedom of expression from governing bodies and student unions would encourage this.

5. Survey attitudes to free speech and make rights education part of 11-18 curriculum
A comprehensive survey of staff and students’ attitudes and experiences would help to better identify strategies for promoting the value of freedom of expression on campus. Since free speech has been identified by government as a central British value, developing strategies for its better promotion – including developing educational training material for young people in secondary education – is a key component in ensuring its protection.

Our recommendations are aimed at all policy-makers involved with universities and other higher education institutions (HEIs), including the new regulator, the Office for Students (OfS). The recommendations are designed to help universities and their stakeholders navigate the current legislative requirements to protect public safety while balancing the need for free speech on campuses.

We hope that they help to empower HEIs against self-censorship for fear of undue media attention or reaction from students as “consumers” of education at private institutions. This work is not intended to be a conclusion to the subject, but rather a living document that continues to spark innovative ways of approaching free speech on campus. As a result, we welcome discussions and interactions with universities to continue the debate and resolve any unanswered questions.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Introduction” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]Freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination are intertwined rights. Both have been the subject of much debate in their application to HEIs, especially about the balance between the protection of free speech versus the duty of universities to prevent discrimination and provide a safe working environment for staff and students alike. Often these duties are presented as somehow mutually exclusive.

Activism on UK campuses is nothing new and the debate on free speech has been present since at least the 1960s. However, Index is concerned that laws passed in the last 30 years relating to free speech, anti-discrimination and counter-terrorism – as well as cultural attitude shifts towards freedom of expression among some in the student population – have the potential to make academic free thinking, social debate, and political activism that encourages diverse viewpoints more difficult.

University policies and practice

A survey by freedom of expression group Spiked in 2018 of 115 universities across the UK – in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland found that 54% actively censor speech. Some had rules that speakers could not appear on university platforms unless their speeches were cleared by university authorities. Some have banned or disinvited speakers in recent years, such as the former leader of the English Defence League, Tommy Robinson. Others have codes of conduct that prescribe (with threats of disciplinary action) acceptable ways of talking about certain issues in order to “promote an atmosphere in which all students and staff feel valued”. Universities have argued that the latter simply make clear that homophobic, sexist and racist language will not be tolerated as per their duties on promotion of equality (see page 10 Public Sector Equality Duty). Critics of the rankings say that the freedom of speech violations are exaggerated by the “red ratings” given in the survey results and overstate the restrictions on freedom of expression on UK campuses.

Universities UK, the representative organisation for UK universities, has asserted the importance of protecting freedom of expression in higher education establishments and a number of leading academics have also spoken publicly on the issue. In early 2016, on the day of her formal installation as the new vice chancellor of Oxford University, the political scientist Professor Louise Richardson, said: “Education is not meant to be comfortable. Education should be about confronting ideas you find really objectionable, figuring out why it is you should find them objectionable, fashioning a reasoned argument against them, confronting the person you disagree with and trying to change their mind, being open to them changing your mind. That isn’t a comfortable experience, but it is a very educational one.”

Students’ behaviour

Students in the UK have also been responsible for limiting speech: boycotting pro and anti-Israel speakers; banning tabloid newspapers in the student union; and “no-platforming” feminists who have been critical of transgender men and women.

Sometimes universities and students work in tandem. For instance, when the student union at the London School of Economics objected to t-shirts being worn at the LSE Freshers Fair with the “Jesus and Mo” motif, the university’s security staff became involved and the students wearing the t-shirts were told they would be removed from the premises if they did not cover up the shirts.

UK government policy

The current UK government has stated on a number of occasions in recent years its commitment to ensuring freedom of expression in universities.

The new Office for Students was announced in January 2018 and took up operation as the new regulator for higher education in England from April 2018. The issue of free speech is already at the forefront of the regulator’s mind, as one of its key responsibilities is to assess students’ access to free speech and penalise institutions that do not comply with their own freedom of speech code.
Unlike the USA, the UK has no first amendment protection on speech. In recent times, while condemning bans on free speech, the UK government has put free speech limitations on a seemingly statutory footing, with the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) leading to the government’s Prevent policy, which – whether intended to or not – is having a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Prevent aims to curb home-grown terrorism. The Prevent policy applies across schools, further education colleges and universities to deny a platform to those who might promote terrorism unless the risks can be mitigated. The strategy has been interpreted as encouraging teachers and lecturers to report those who might have been radicalised or might radicalise others – although the CTSA does require institutions to have “particular regard to the duty to ensure free speech” and to “the importance of academic freedom” when carrying out the Prevent duty.[/vc_column_text][vc_single_image image=”103860″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes”][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”The road to legislation: a brief history” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]Freedom of expression at higher education institutions has a specific protection under the Education (No 2) Act 1986.

The act states that everyone involved with the governance of an HEI must take such steps as are “reasonably practicable” to ensure freedom of speech is secured for members, students, employees and visiting speakers.

This means that universities have an explicit duty to protect freedom of expression in their institutions. Notably it requires universities to keep up to date a code of practice that sets out what procedures it expects from staff and students regarding freedom of expression. Furthermore, it further includes student union premises as being part of the “university establishment” even if not owned by the university, which is significant when considering the degree to which student groups might be able to argue they are not party to the requirements of the act as regards freedom of expression.

The statutory duty on universities to protect freedom of expression came in part as in response to a series of clashes at university unions in preceding decades (see box on “no-platforming”).[/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner css=”.vc_custom_1543331576744{background-color: #efefef !important;}”][vc_column_inner][vc_column_text]No-platforming

Demonstrating against speakers, boycotting goods and banning or cancelling speeches (no platforming) has been present on UK campuses for many decades.

• “No-platforming” is a term used to mean the barring of certain speakers based on their political affiliations.
• It developed in the early 1970s as a reaction to attempts by the far-right National Front to recruit people on campus.
• The term “no-platform” was first used by the International Marxist Group, who argued: “The only way to deal with fascist type organisations like the National Front is to break up their activities before they grow to a size where they can begin to smash the activities of the working class.”
• At the 1974 National Union of Students conference, a “no-platform” policy was adopted. It stated: “[C]onference believes that in order to counter these [racist and fascist] groups, it is… necessary to prevent any member of these organisations or individuals known to espouse similar views from speaking in colleges by whatever means necessary (including disrupting of the meeting).”
• The no-platform policy was criticised by some at the time as a denial of free speech. The Guardian warned in an editorial: “Students should perhaps remember that frustration which leads to a denial of the right of one section of society is not something new. It is a classic pattern of fascism.”
• The current NUS policy, as set out in its articles of association, provides that no “individuals or members of organisations or groups identified by the Democratic Procedures Committee as holding racist or fascist views” may stand for election to any NUS position, or attend or speak at any NUS function or conference. Furthermore, officers, committee members, or trustees may not share a platform with any racist or fascist. The six organisations currently on the no-platform list are:
  • Al-Muhajiroun;
  • British National Party;
  • English Defence League;
  • Hizb-ut-Tahrir;
  • Muslim Public Affairs Committee.
  • National Action

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Legislation applicable to higher education institutions” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]The UK higher education system is quasi-public, essentially functioning as a system of “private institutions operating in the public interest”. There are around 162 HEIs – all publicly funded – and a handful of private universities in the UK. All UK institutions are legally independent, self-governing institutions.

Educational institutions in the UK are governed in a number of ways, depending on how they were established. UK HEIs are autonomous institutions and tend to be operated by internal articles of governance. Governance groups are usually councils and a board of faculties, supported by chairs of committees; some universities are set up as limited companies. In most cases the institution will have a body representing students as part of the governing group.

University policy, including staff and student behaviour, is governed by a range of legislation – from local laws in the UK to international treaties. The rights to freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination in the UK have evolved over time. The legal representations are therefore covered by common law, the UK’s domestic legislation and its international legal obligations.

From April 2018, a new regulator, the OfS became operational to begin regulating HEIs in England. Its responsibilities will include ensuring that HEIs promote the right to freedom of speech.

This section of Free Speech on Campus is intended to be an introduction to the legal obligations facing universities and HEIs. It is included as a summary and guide to help HEIs and stakeholders see at a glance the range of legislation, constitutions and codes that govern their operation and must be covered in their policies and codes of practice. For more information on the exact articles and their details – and specific legislation applicable to student unions – please see Appendix 2.

UK legislation

Freedom of expression is enshrined and protected in UK law by the Human Rights Act, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. The most important of the convention’s protections in this context is Article 10.

Article 10 states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

It is worth noting that freedom of expression, as outlined in Article 10, is a qualified right, meaning the right must be balanced against other rights. Nevertheless, several judgments by the European Court of Human Rights have held that “Freedom of expression…is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population”.

The recommendations laid out in this report suggest how this might be done in such a way as to ensure freedom of expression is given due consideration in any such assessments.

Section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986
As outlined above, section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 contains a duty to secure freedom of speech in educational establishments. It requires those involved in the government of any university or higher education institution to take steps to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for its members, students and employees and visiting speakers, and that the use of any premises of the establishment concerned is not denied to any persons on grounds connected to their beliefs, views, policies or objectives. The full text of this section can be found in the appendices.

Public Order Act 1986
The Public Order Act makes it an offence for anyone to deliberately cause another person to fear [that] violence will be used against them or from someone to intentionally harass, alarm, or distress another.

Education Reform Act 1988
The Education Reform Act protects academic freedom and requires university commissioners to: “ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions.”

Education Act 1994
The Education Act requires HEIs to bring to the attention of students, at least once a year, the requirements of the act relating to freedom of speech in universities and colleges.

Human Rights Act 1998
Since the Human Rights Act came into force, UK laws are required to be compliant with the rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights, including that of free speech and freedom of association and assembly. Under the act, HEIs are under a statutory duty to protect the free speech of staff and students, as well as protecting them from discrimination.

Higher Education Act 2004
The Higher Education Act applies in its definition of the types of higher education governing bodies that are bound by the duties of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (See below).

Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006
This creates an offence in England and Wales of intentionally inciting hatred against a person on the grounds of their religion or race.

Equality Act 2010
The Equality Act 2010 brings together more than 116 pieces of legislation covering anti-discrimination law in the UK. Chapter 2 of Part 6 of the Equality Act (the Higher Education Chapter) applies, in conjunction with Part 2 of the Equality Act, to HEIs, and specifically protects students and prospective students from discrimination, harassment or victimisation from the institution’s governing body. Chapter 2 of the Equality Act does not cover student unions (See Appendix 2 for more information).

Public Sector Equality Duty
As public bodies, most HEIs are subject to the Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The duty obliges public bodies to actively have regard to: eliminating discrimination, harassment, victimisation and other prohibited conduct; advancing equality of opportunity; and fostering good relations between people who have protected characteristics and those who do not.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 imposes a legal obligation on UK HEIs to “take steps to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.” This legislation forms part of the UK government’s Prevent Duty (See below and Appendix 2 for more detail).

Prevent Duty
There is a statutory duty on universities to tackle radicalisation through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Prevent, the counter-terrorism duty, applies across schools, further education colleges and universities (See case study below).

Higher Education and Research Act 2017
The Higher Education and Research Act aims to create a new regulatory framework for higher education, increase competition and student choice, ensure students receive value for money, and strengthen the research sector. The act established the Office for Students and sets out its role as the new regulator and funding council for the higher education sector. The role includes ensuring that students receive value for money. The OfS will also hold HEIs registered under the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 to account regarding the state of free speech on their campuses, with the powers to penalise institutions that do not comply with their own freedom of speech code.

International standards applicable in the UK

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (Articles 2, 7 and 19)
Written at the United Nations in the aftermath of the Second World War, this declaration sets out fundamental human rights for universal protection. Articles 2, 7 and 19 deal with freedom of speech and protection against discrimination.

European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 10 and 11)
Articles 10 and 11 in the European Convention on Human Rights help to protect free speech. Article 10 qualifies that right with responsibilities; and Article 11 covers public assembly for the purposes of exercising free speech, but also qualifies that with the right to reinforce public safety.

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
The Charter of Fundamental Rights brings together all the personal, civic, political, economic and social rights that were established at different times for different individual EU states. It also incorporates new developments in science and technology that may affect the protection of these rights – for example, data privacy. Articles 11 and 12 cover freedom of expression and assembling to express free speech.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (Articles 19, 20(2), 26 and 27)
This International Covenant is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It commits its parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. It qualifies those rights with the need for prohibiting violence or public disorder.

Protecting students and staff against discrimination

The following conventions protect citizens from harassment and discrimination. Universities and HEIs need to be aware of these laws. While they do not directly protect free speech, they can influence policies and decisions to allow certain events and speeches from happening on campus.

• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1981
•  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2008

It is worth noting that it is often wrongly assumed that the duties to protect staff and students from discrimination or harassment are in conflict with, or trump, duties to protect freedom of expression. This is not the case. In fact, we believe that with the exception of Prevent, it is perfectly possible to protect freedom of expression while also meeting other statutory duties. Universities and the OfS should be clearer in asserting this when “harm” and “safety” are used as arguments to restrict legal speech on campus.[/vc_column_text][vc_single_image image=”103887″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes”][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Current concerns on UK campuses” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]Between 2015 and 2017, the Spiked Free Speech University Rankings surveyed 115 universities in the UK and tracked 129 bans. The most recent Spiked report (2018) shows that 20 universities have banned some newspapers, 21 have banned speakers, 16 have suspended a number of student societies, 17 have banned adverts, 16 have banned a number of student societies, and nine have banned some types of fancy dress.

This suggests a climate in which freedom of expression is increasingly limited. However, the Joint Committee on Human Rights challenges this view in its recent report on freedom of expression in universities. It found: “The extent to which students restrict free speech at universities should not be exaggerated. Where it happens, it is a serious problem and it is wrong. But it is not a pervasive problem. The evidence we have taken shows that overall there is support for the principle of freedom of speech among the student population…much of the concern about free speech appears to have come from a small number of incidents which have been widely reported.”

Censorship is of course, most difficult to spot when it involves self-censorship. Few of the recent studies or surveys into censorship on campus relate to instances in which individuals or groups no longer feel able to discuss certain topics – and therefore it is currently impossible to quantify the actual level of censorship – or limitations on freedom of expression – taking place in UK universities. Even evincing positive support for the principle of free speech is not necessarily indicative that individuals are willing to put such support into practice when it comes to allowing speakers who are controversial, even offensive, to speak on campus.

More research is needed to understand the areas in which free speech is limited on campus and the extent to which students and staff feel able to air views freely.

This report identifies four key barriers we see facing universities relating to their statutory duty to protect freedom of expression. These are:
1. Prevent
2. No-platform policies
3. Heckler’s veto
4. Notions of speech as harm

Prevent

HEIs are obliged to abide by current regulations, and comply with the requirements of the OfS, the new regulator, as outlined above. While this includes promoting free speech, recent government legislation is also influencing university polices and codes of practice, often resulting in a knock-on negative impact on free speech on campuses. For example, the government’s anti-terrorism legislation requires institutions to comply with the Prevent duty as part of anti-terrorism legislation in a way that a number of people have argued is incompatible with its statutory duties to protect freedom of expression.

The Prevent duty guidance states: “[ … ] when deciding whether or not to host a particular speaker, RHEBs [relevant higher education bodies] should consider carefully whether the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups. In these circumstances the event should not be allowed to proceed except where RHEBs are entirely convinced that such risk can be fully mitigated without cancellation of the event [ … ]. Where RHEBs are in any doubt that the risk cannot be fully mitigated they should exercise caution and not allow the event to proceed.”

Although the government points out that the Prevent guidance does not preclude speakers with extremist views from speaking on campus and does not require academics to ‘report’ students who discuss sensitive issues, it is clear that the way in which Prevent guidelines are being understood is encouraging a level of caution that is at odds with the positive duty to secure freedom of speech in universities.

Imran Awan, associate professor in criminology at Birmingham City University, argued in an article published on Aljazeera.com: “Today, thanks to the government’s policies that aim to transform academic staff into counter-terrorism police, openness, tolerance and freedom of expression in UK universities are under threat. Academic staff are being encouraged to report their students for reasons like discussing certain ‘sensitive’ topics, asking certain questions or even reading ‘suspicious’ textbooks. Also, universities are being told not to give [a] platform to certain speakers because they have been classified – mostly without any substantial evidence – as extremists or radicals. All this is stifling academic debate, making university lecturers feel under pressure and forcing them to avoid ‘risky’ subjects and ideas rather than challenging, questioning and confronting them.”

At its 2015 congress, the University and College Union passed a policy setting out objections to the Prevent duty, including the fact that “[it] seriously threatens academic freedom and freedom of speech”. The National Union of Students has taken a stand against Prevent, arguing that it disproportionately targets Muslim students and poses a challenge to free speech. An NUS campaign, Students Not Suspects, has also challenged the legislation’s effect on students.[/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″ css=”.vc_custom_1543331688705{background-color: #efefef !important;}”][vc_column_text]What the Prevent duty says about universities

The Prevent duty was brought into force by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 which specifies certain authorities, including universities and higher education institutions, to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. The government provides online training on the Prevent duty.

The Prevent guidance includes the catch-all phrase that universities must make sure their students or staff are not “drawn into terrorism, which includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit. It is a condition of funding that all further education and independent training providers must comply with relevant legislation and any statutory responsibilities associated with the delivery of education and safeguarding of learners”.

Prevent on students
Noting that “young people continue to make up a disproportionately high number of those arrested […] for terrorist-related offences”, the Prevent guidelines identify universities as a place that young people “risk radicalisation”, which can be facilitated through events held for extremist speakers, or through other radicalised students on social media.

Prevent on events
Where events are concerned, the guidance contains this statement: “Where institutions are in any doubt that the risk cannot be fully mitigated they should exercise caution and not allow the event to proceed.”

Privacy
In January 2017 King’s College, London, told students that their email could be retained and monitored as part of the college’s Prevent obligations. It is believed other universities also monitor emails. Critics, including human rights lawyers, have said the policy is a catch-all for many types of political dissent and free speech, and that it encourages the demonisation of Muslims.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Most recently, the Joint Committee on Human Rights identified evidence given to the committee that showed Prevent was having a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Prevent duty

Prevent places a duty on educational institutions to deny a platform to those who might incite terrorism unless the risks cannot be mitigated. It also encourages universities to monitor students’ behaviour. The most controversial aspect of the legislation is that it is aimed at “extremist” speakers. “Extremism” as defined by the government is “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”. Critics, including Index on Censorship, argue this definition of “extremist” is too broad and does not simply include members of proscribed organisations but could potentially include anyone whose views do not currently chime with national views on particular issues (e.g. those who object to homosexuality on religious grounds). The government stresses that the policy only applies to extremist speakers who could draw others into terrorism but evidence suggests this is not how the policy has been understood, leaving universities struggling with two conflicting policies in which the cautious approach of Prevent is seen to trump the duty to protect free speech.

Conclusion

Evidence provided by academics and students to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, as well as interviews conducted with students and other organisations by Index on Censorship suggests that the Prevent duty is having a chilling effect on freedom of expression in British universities.

We recommend:
The government undertake an immediate independent review of the Prevent policy – and in particular the way it is being trained, understood and implemented – that assesses the Prevent duty’s effectiveness in the context of higher education and its impact on freedom of speech and association, as recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. This review should include a comprehensive survey – not simply small-scale sampling – of students and academics’ views and experiences. In particular, this should consider the degree to which these groups “self-censor”.

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator][vc_custom_heading text=”No-platforming” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]The principles of free debate include the idea that speech must be countered with speech so that ideas are explored, viewpoints challenged, and arguments refined. No-platforming goes against this principle by seeking to stop certain people speaking on the grounds that they hold views that are offensive. Although the current NUS policies only specify six groups who should be no-platformed, the policy and term have been applied far more widely to ban certain speakers from union events.

This is because the NUS’s position is that unions “have a right to refuse individuals and groups who threaten the safe environment students’ unions provide for their members”.

This definition is extremely broad, not least because “safe” (and the accompanying notion of “harm”) in this context are entirely subjective criteria, and risks a wide swathe of speakers being prevented from speaking on campus. We consider the question of harm in a later section.

At present, the NUS no-platform policy prevents representatives of the NUS from sharing a public platform with named individuals or groups, officially six “fascist and racist organisations”: Al-Muhajiron; British National Party; English Defence League; Hizb-ut-Tahir; Muslim Public Affairs Committee; and National Action. Two of these organisations: Al-Muhajiron and National Action are proscribed terror organisations under UK law and speakers from the others might well be unable to speak at universities under the government’s counter-terrorism and anti-extremist legislation.

While individual university unions and student groups are not bound by this list, a 2016 ComRes survey of 1,000 university students found that 63% supported the NUS “no-platform policy” and 54% thought that the policy should be enforced against people who could be found intimidating. In reality, no-platforming has been extended to other speakers student unions find offensive. The case study below examines in more depth the case of Julie Bindel who was no-platformed by Manchester Students Union for her view on transgender men and women.

Conclusion
Student unions should reaffirm a commitment to freedom of expression in their policies and remove all no-platforming policies that involve outlawing speakers who are not members of groups already proscribed by government.

While we welcome the focus on the OfS for ensuring that educational institutions promote free speech, we do not believe that penalties for non-compliance that include monetary fines or de-registration are likely to actively promote freedom of expression. Rather, we encourage a more active and vocal stance among university and student leadership that demonstrates a commitment to freedom of expression, that includes the freedom to voice ideas that others find offensive. It is vital in this context that more is done to divorce notions of offensiveness from harm (See section 4 below).[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″ css=”.vc_custom_1543331734870{background-color: #efefef !important;}”][vc_column_text]Manchester University Students Union no-platforms Julie Bindel

Julie Bindel is a “political lesbian feminist” who has campaigned against sexual violence for more than three decades. In October 2015 the Free Speech and Secular Society at Manchester University invited Bindel to speak at an event called From Liberation to Censorship: Does Modern Feminism Have a Problem With Free Speech? However, the students union decided to prevent her from speaking, claiming that Bindel’s views on transgender women were “dangerous” and could “incite hatred towards and exclusion of our trans students”.

The charge relates to views such as those expressed in the 2004 article “Gender benders, beware”, in which Bindel stated that transgender women are not women and that rape counsellor Kimberley Nixon was “a man in a dress”.

Bindel told Index that, while people have the right to be offended by her speech, this does not in itself justify shutting someone down. But the students were not invoking offence as the deciding issue. A third-year politics and history student at the university told Index in an interview that it was important for the students that the union was a place where students can be safe from “harm”. She noted students had a right to determine who or what the union allows or doesn’t allow on campus because they pay fees that partially fund the student union.

Bindel argues that resolutions by the NUS to no-platform her at universities have caused some students and even academics to shy away from debate or research on contentious issues: “I have looked at loads of syllabuses on prostitution or sex work, as they call it, on feminism, or in other words, on transgenderism, on sexuality, and there is literally no voice of dissent.”[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator][vc_custom_heading text=”Heckler’s veto” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Threatening violence or disruption in response to a speaking event on campus can be used as a way to prevent that speaker being heard, and – given universities duty to ensure the safety of its students – this could lead educational institutions to cancel events as a result. In many of these, because of legal requirements on universities and unions, student societies are charged a security fee for organising potentially disruptive events; they are required to give notice for inviting “controversial” speakers; and they must pass a number of checks before an event can be approved. All of the above means controversial speakers risk being unable to speak on campus because a risk‑averse institution would consider it unable to guarantee safety.

A “heckler’s veto” is a termed coined to describe a situation in which a speaker’s right is curtailed by:

• government or other action to prevent another party from reacting negatively to the speaker’s message
• a person who disagrees with a speaker’s message triggering events to cause the speaker to be silenced – such as the threat of demonstration or violence.

In October 2016 Hen Mazzig, a former Israeli Defence Force intelligence officer and self-described pro-Israel activist, gave a talk at University College London (UCL). He was met with protests from students and outside groups who viewed Mazzig as “complicit in the colonisation of Palestinian territory, protection of illegal Israeli settlements, and Israel’s illegal occupation”. UCL’s Provost Professor Michael Arthur stated that the university is “clear in its support both of freedom of speech and of the right to protest”. However, a UCL investigation found that, while the majority of protesters and attendees were non-violent, Mazzig’s freedom of speech was “intentionally disrupted”.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Conclusion

We believe that the findings of the judge in the Southampton case form a useful basis for improved codes of practice in assessments used by universities and student bodies when considering the security risks involved. Institutions must conduct credible risk assessments – and provide where practicable measures to protect students – to ensure that controversial speakers are able to speak on campus despite threats of potential violence.

These should form part of revised, simplified codes of practice on freedom of expression in universities.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″ css=”.vc_custom_1543331761228{background-color: #efefef !important;}”][vc_column_text]Heckler’s veto at Southampton University

At the University of Southampton in 2015, a proposed conference to examine the legality of the state of Israel called International Law and the State of Israel: Legitimacy, Responsibility and Exceptionalism sparked demonstrations on campus. In response, the university’s chief operating officer conducted a risk assessment and obtained a police report. Following this, the university’s vice‑chancellor withdrew permission for the conference to be held on campus, citing a high risk of disorder. In this case, the court accorded the university a wide discretion in determining its “reasonably practicable” response to such a situation.

In response, two professors sought permission for judicial review to reverse the decision to ban the conference. The professors submitted that, in refusing permission, the university had breached its duties to uphold freedom of expression under section 43 of the Education Act (and Article 10 of the ECHR), by virtue of the refusal having been: (i) made on the grounds that the views to be expressed at the conference were controversial and had led to complaints; and (ii) based on exaggerated and unsubstantiated security and safety concerns.

However, the appeal found that the decision to withdraw permission had been taken for proper reasons, in good faith, and with regard to the duty to promote freedom of speech. (R (Ben-Dors) v University of Southampton [2016] EWHC 953 (Admin))

The court found that:

• the decision was taken on the grounds of security (it was not possible to maintain good order or safeguard staff and students).
• the decision involved the “minimum derogation from the right of freedom of speech necessary to ensure safety and security”.
• the university had carried out an adequate risk assessment that concluded that the security of staff and students could not be secured in the face of the identified risk of 400 to 1,000 protestors.

Such assessment had been based on the experience of the Head of Security, advice from police, information obtained by the university, and its own risk assessment.

• the conference had not been cancelled because of the nature of the speakers, and it was legitimate for regard to be had to the nature of the speakers when considering the risks imposed by an event.
• the decision was only to prevent the conference being held at the identified location and at the identified time. There was no prohibition on the conference being held elsewhere, publication of material to be presented at the conference.
• a commitment had been made to commission an independent report exploring how the conference could be held in the future.

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator][vc_custom_heading text=”Speech as harm” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]It is the duty of universities to ensure the physical safety of students’ and staff while on campus and that they do not face discrimination. Whereas in the past notions of safety and harm related almost exclusively to physical acts, institutions and student bodies have become increasingly occupied with the harm that can be caused by words. As an organisation that understands very well the power of words, we would not seek to argue that words can never cause harm. However, we would stress both that the harm caused by words is subjective and that censorship of such words is not the way to tackle “harmful” ideas.

Other than the speech already outlawed by the various acts outlined above, most forms of speech are permitted by law. However, we increasingly see in arguments for speech to be censored on campuses the argument that the speech in question causes harm and should therefore be outlawed because this puts a university in breach of its duty to care for students.

In the USA, which has foreshadowed the majority of developments now being seen on UK campuses, three terms have become increasingly prominent in the debate. Microaggressions are small actions or word choices that appear to have no malicious intent but that are thought of as a kind of violence nonetheless. US lawyer Greg Lukianoff and academic Jonathan Haidt, give the example of microaggressions cited by the Asian American student association at Brandeis University in the United States, which sought to raise awareness of microaggressions against Asians through an installation on the steps of an academic hall. The installation gave examples of microaggressions such as “Aren’t you supposed to be good at math?” and “I’m colorblind! I don’t see race.”

Trigger warnings are alerts that academics might issue if something in a course might cause a strong emotional response. Lukianoff and Haidt describe how some students have called for warnings that Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart describes racial violence and that F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby portrays misogyny and physical abuse, “so that students who have been previously victimised by racism or domestic violence can choose to avoid these works, which they believe might ‘trigger’ a recurrence of past trauma”.

Today, the term “safe space” has come to mean anything from a specific space on campus that students of a certain background feel comfortable in, to the banning of speakers, ideas, and publications from the university campus as a whole. Broadly speaking, safe space policies include guidelines that promote a safe environment for students to engage in discussions free from interrogation and judgement. This may result in individuals in breach of such guidelines being asked to leave the discussion or the space.

In setting out their policies and codes of practice on freedom of expression on campus, it is important that subjective notions of “harmful” speech are not used by HEIs as the benchmark for dictating what speech is permissible. As discussed in previous sections, it is the statutory duty of academic institutions to protect freedom of speech. This includes speech that might be offensive or shocking. We see the protection of such speech as in no way incompatible with academic institutions other duties to protect students from discrimination or harassment.

However, Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt have argued that, conversely, trigger warnings could contribute to trauma survivors seeing themselves as constantly at risk of being triggered and perpetually unable to tolerate reminders of trauma. They also suggest trigger warnings and other protective campus practices could prompt students who have not experienced trauma to perceive threat and harm where there is none, making them more emotionally vulnerable and less resilient.

Statements of principle and codes of practice provide important frameworks by which HEIs can make clear their commitment to – and mechanisms for protecting – freedom of expression on campus.

We believe universities should use statements of principle and codes of practice to demonstrate that the duty of a university is to protect and promote freedom of expression so as to avoid confusion about what speech is and is not permissible on campus. All those who fall under the “governing body” – including student unions – must be made aware of their duty to comply with these commitments. In this context, we also welcome a commitment by the Charities Commission to review its guidelines as they concern student unions and free speech.

We are concerned by examples where codes appear to suggest that the duty to protect freedom of expression might have to be compromised in order to fulfil other duties or which outline types of speech that might be deemed unacceptable beyond illegal speech send confusing messages about the responsibility of the university in upholding freedom of expression. Complex procedures for inviting and approving speakers can also have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Examples of best practice are included in Appendix 1.

Conclusion

The existence of trigger warnings and safe spaces are not, in and of themselves, indicative of a lack of freedom of expression on campus although they certainly can be used to restrict expression. However, we are more concerned that universities have through deliberate messaging – or lack of messaging – allowed their statutory duty to protect freedom of expression be seen as in some way a lesser duty than that of protecting students. We would argue that it it is possible for a university to fulfil both its duty to protect students and staff from discrimination and harassment while at the same time allowing freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to offend.

We recommend that universities simplify and revise their codes of practice on freedom of expression and state these explicitly to students and staff as part of their induction processes.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″ css=”.vc_custom_1543331832371{background-color: #efefef !important;}”][vc_column_text]Trigger warnings – for or against?

Many universities in the UK, including individual lecturers, have introduced the term “trigger warnings”: a statement at the start of a piece of writing or video, for example, alerting the reader or viewer to the fact that it contains potentially distressing material. They apply mostly to subject matter dealing with violence against women, general violence and subject matter related to racism and colonialism. Supporters of this practice say that trigger warnings are not about shutting down debate, or letting students off doing work, but about signalling difficult subjects so that students do not relive trauma.

Dr Onni Gust, an assistant professor at the University of Nottingham, who teaches the history of the idea of monstrosity in the 18th century British Empire, defended their use in an article for The Guardian. Gust said trigger warnings did not mollycoddle students: “A trigger warning does not give permission for students to skip class, avoid a topic or choose alternative readings. What it does do is signal to survivors of abuse or trauma that they need to keep breathing. It reminds them to be particularly aware of the skills and coping strategies that they have developed and to switch them on.”

Izzy Gurbuz, wellbeing officer at the University of Manchester Students’ Union told student magazine The Mancunion that: “Trigger warnings simply allow those whose mental health could be significantly affected by certain topics to make informed decisions about their health. For example, adequately preparing themselves so they’re able to take part in particular discussion, or avoiding a situation which would cause them flashbacks or a panic attack.”[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_separator][vc_custom_heading text=”Other factors” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Students as consumers

Education is now a big business in the UK. In late 2017, there were more than 500,000 new university students compared to only 68,000 people in 1980. Research shows that there are now twice as many people getting a degree as were gaining five O-levels in the early 1980s.

The introduction of market principles to British academic life has had a number of effects in the arena of free speech, impacting on students and staff. Today’s students demand a world-class education, but they also want value for money. The Higher Education and Research Act 2017 reinforces a consumerist approach to university by treating students like customers. The “customer” relationship that students have with their educational institute has recently been reinforced by the OfS requirements to ensure value for money for students as one of its duties under the new regulation regime.

As Joanna Williams, author and editor at Spiked, says: “In today’s marketed and consumer driven higher-education sector, many students have come to expect freedom from speech. They argue the university campus should be a ‘safe space’ free from emotional harm or potential offence.”

In March 2017, academic Liz Morrish told the Times Higher Education that the “audit culture” in her university led to her resignation: “Last year saw the intensification of outcomes-based performance management in many universities … In the UK, much of the rush to management by metrics is in response to shifting government incentives and policy changes, which, fed through the mechanism of the research excellence framework, affect institutional priorities, reputations and funding levels. Many of these metrics are quite outside the control of academics. Nevertheless, they have been weaponised as tools of performance management, and the very nature of the scrutiny creates a hostile environment for academic freedom.”[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″ css=”.vc_custom_1543331866474{background-color: #efefef !important;}”][vc_column_text]Safe from harm?

In November 2016, City University’s student union voted in favour of a motion targeting tabloid newspapers that it claimed published divisive narratives that were sexist, demonised minorities, and scapegoated the working class. Written by student Nick Owen, the motion stated that: “There is no place for the Sun, Daily Mail or Express (in their current form) on City, University of London, campuses or properties.”

Owen told Index: “It was around about the time where Jo Cox had been murdered and the Express were running things about judges, Brexit, things that mirrored Nazi propaganda. I wanted the university to do something, to make a stand.”

Students opposing the motion did not disagree with the idea that the UK media needs criticising, but they did not view banning newspapers as a constructive way to improve the quality of journalism in the UK.

Journalism student Vincent Wood, who wrote a motion that successfully overturned the ban in February 2017, told Index: “We should be supporting journalists working at these papers who feel they are representing a view that they shouldn’t be. We offered to approach issues through education as oppose to grandstanding and potential bans.”[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Misreporting of free speech controversies

We are concerned that some free speech controversies may have been misreported, undermining attempts to promote debates about free expression in university.

In another incident, media widely reported that a student at the University of Edinburgh had been reported to university authorities by a fellow student for Islamaphobia for “mocking Islamic State on Facebook” – a story that was untrue but which succeeded in successfully smearing the reputation of the black female student who had reported the individual.15

These incidents reflect debates within British universities, not only among students but also among academics, about how to deal with the more diverse student population and a changing attitude to colonialism, race and the history of the UK.

Misreporting of freedom of expression issues in the UK risks diminishing support for the principle of freedom of expression more widely.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/2″ css=”.vc_custom_1543331885749{background-color: #efefef !important;}”][vc_column_text]Ban white philopshers?

When protests at SOAS, University of London, called for the “decolonisation of the curriculum”, news reports were inaccurate in their coverage. Students were calling for a greater representation of diverse voices in the philosophy curriculum and for white philosophers and history to be taught in its colonial context. Dr Meera Sabarathnam, a lecturer in international relations at SOAS, explained in her blog that this meant three things: challenging assumptions about culture and the way history is taught; putting philosophers and writers in their historical context; and thinking about “implications of a more diverse student body in terms of pedagogy and achievement”. The newspaper reports of this move inaccurately said that students wanted to “ban white philosophers”. The headline in the Daily Mail ran: “They Kant be serious! PC students demand white philosophers including Plato and Descartes be dropped from university syllabus.”[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_single_image image=”103856″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes”][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Conclusion and recommendations” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]1. University codes of practice

Under section 43 of the 1986 Education Act, universities are annually obliged to share their guidelines on freedom of expression. We recommend HEIs revise regularly and publicise more effectively their codes of practice on freedom of expression to make clear their responsibilities and their commitment to protecting free speech on campus. This could include making clear policies on trigger warnings and safe spaces to make clear students should expect to encounter uncomfortable and offensive ideas. Codes of practice should include “highest standards tests” to ensure that opponents of a particular speaker or idea cannot use “heckler’s veto” to threaten violence in order to force a university or student group to cancel a debate.

Universities should, as a matter of course:
a. Have a clear statement of principles on university’s commitment to freedom of expression. See Appendix 1 for examples of good practice examples. These should make clear that the university has an explicit duty to protect freedom of expression.
b. Update and simplify policies on handling potentially controversial events to ensure speakers and protestors can both exercise their lawful rights to speak without risk of physical harm.

2. Student unions’ policies

We urge student unions to reaffirm a commitment to freedom of expression in their policies and remove “no-platforming” policies that involve outlawing speakers who are not members of groups already proscribed by government.

3. Prevent review

The government should undertake an immediate independent review of the Prevent policy that assesses the Prevent duty’s effectiveness in the context of higher education and its impact on freedom of speech and association, as recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others. This review should include a comprehensive survey – not simply small-scale sampling – of students and academics’ views and experiences. In particular, this should consider the degree to which these groups “self-censor”.

4. Reject fines system to punish non‑compliance

We do not believe that fines are the mechanism to promote freedom of expression on campus. Rather, a clearer commitment to freedom of expression from governing bodies and student unions would encourage this.

5. Undertake a full survey of student and staff attitudes to free speech

It is clear that there is a lack of research into attitudes towards freedom of expression in universities. A comprehensive survey of staff and students’ attitudes and experiences would help to better identify strategies for promoting the value of freedom of expression on campus. Since free speech has been identified by successive British prime ministers and members of the cabinet in recent years as a central British value, developing strategies for its better promotion – including developing educational training material for young people in secondary education – is a key component in ensuring its protection.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Appendix 1: Examples of best practice, statements of principle and codes of practice” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]

A. Statement of Principles: University of Chicago

The University of Chicago made this statement in 2012:

The University of Chicago is an institution fully committed to the creation of knowledge across the spectrum of disciplines and professions, firm in its belief that a culture of intense inquiry and informed argument generates lasting ideas, and that the members of its community have a responsibility both to challenge and to listen.

Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service professor of law and former provost of the university, captures this ethos in this July 2012 statement of the aspirations of the University of Chicago: “Eighty years ago, a student organisation at the University of Chicago invited William Z. Foster, the Communist Party’s candidate for President, to lecture on campus. This triggered a storm of protest from critics both on and off campus. To those who condemned the University for allowing the event, University President Robert M. Hutchins responded that “our students . . . should have freedom to discuss any problem that presents itself.” He insisted that the “cure” for ideas we oppose “lies through open discussion rather than through inhibition.” On a later occasion, Hutchins added that “free inquiry is indispensable to the good life, that universities exist for the sake of such inquiry, [and] that without it they cease to be universities.”
This incident captures both the spirit and the promise of the University of Chicago. Because the University is committed to free and open inquiry in all matters, it guarantees all members of the University community the broadest possible latitude to speak, write, listen, challenge and learn. Except insofar as limitations on that freedom are necessary to the functioning of the University, the University of Chicago fully respects and supports the freedom of all students, faculty and staff “to discuss any problem that presents itself,” free of interference.

This is not to say that this freedom is absolute. In narrowly-defined circumstances, the University may properly restrict expression, for example, that violates the law, is threatening, harassing, or defamatory, or invades substantial privacy or confidentiality interests. Moreover, the University may reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of expression to ensure that it does not disrupt the ordinary activities of the University.

Fundamentally, however, the University is committed to the principle that it may not restrict debate or deliberation because the ideas put forth are thought to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed. It is for the members of the University community to make those judgments for themselves.

As a corollary to this commitment, members of the University community must also act in conformity with this principle. Although faculty, students and staff are free to criticize, contest and condemn the views expressed on campus, they may not obstruct, disrupt, or otherwise interfere with the freedom of others to express views they reject or even loathe.

For members of the University community, as for the University itself, the proper response to ideas they find offensive, unwarranted and dangerous is not interference, obstruction, or suppression. It is, instead, to engage in robust counter-speech that challenges the merits of those ideas and exposes them for what they are. To this end, the University has a solemn responsibility not only to promote a lively and fearless freedom of debate and deliberation, but also to protect that freedom when others attempt to restrict it.

As Robert M. Hutchins observed, without a vibrant commitment to free and open inquiry, a university ceases to be a university. The University of Chicago’s long-standing commitment to this principle lies at the very core of the University’s greatness.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]

B. Code of Practice: Canterbury Christ Church University

Canterbury Christ Church University (‘the University’) introduces its Code of Practice with the following statement:

“Canterbury Christ Church University (‘the University’) is an academic community of staff and students. Central to this concept, and the University’s values as a Church of England Foundation, is the ability of all its members to challenge freely prevailing orthodoxies, to query the positions and views of others and to put forward ideas that may sometimes be radical in their formulation. The University recognises all forms of expression within the law.”
It also has a clear policy on external speakers:

“Some external speakers are known to hold contentious, even inflammatory or offensive, views. In some cases, their very presence on campus may be considered to be divisive and may lead to attempts by other groups to prevent the event taking place. Such speakers might include those subject to adverse media attention; and/or associated with a campaign or political pressure group; and/or a member of a group whose views may be deemed as being discriminatory or inflammatory to others. For the purposes of this Code, such speakers are regarded as controversial speakers, but their freedom of speech within the law is recognised.”[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Appendix 2: The legal landscape in the UK” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]The rights to freedom of expression in the UK must be viewed in the context of the piecemeal constitutional framework that has evolved over time. The legal origins of these rights are found among: common law, domestic legislation, and international legal obligations of the UK. These rights are closely intertwined with law protecting us from discrimination and so some of the legislation overlaps and interrelates.

The UK higher education system is quasi-public, essentially functioning as a system of “private institutions operating in the public interest”. UK HEIs are autonomous institutions that tend to be operated by internal articles of governance.

There are four common forms of legal status for HEIs, namely establishment by:

• royal charter through the Privy Council (particularly the pre-1992 universities)
• a specific act of Parliament
• the Companies Act as companies under guarantee
• charitable trusts

However, a majority of HEIs are funded by public bodies, such as the Higher Education Funding Council for England, and are required to operate within the relevant regulatory framework.

The HEFCE is also responsible for monitoring compliance with the Prevent policy (see below), although this task shifts to the new Office for Students from April 2018.

Key relevant laws in detail

Public Order Act 1986
Section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 creates the offences of using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour that cause or are likely to cause another person harassment, alarm or distress. Section 5 creates the similar offence of displaying any writing, sign or other visible representation that is threatening, abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby, whether in a public or a private place.

The Public Order Act 1986 makes it a criminal offence to stir up racial and religious hatred. Section 18 specifies that the crime of incitement to racial hatred is committed if a person uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, intending to stir up racial hatred, or where having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up. Part 3A of the act sets out the crime of incitement to hatred on the grounds of religion or sexual orientation, which is committed if a person uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, with the intention to stir up religious hatred or hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation.

Education (No.2) Act 1986
Section 43(1) states that: “Every individual and body of persons concerned in the government of any establishment to which this section applies [which includes universities] shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers.”

The above duty particularly includes a duty to ensure that “the use of any premises” of the university is not denied to any person. It has been recognised that the duty only applies to the extent allowed within the bounds of the law, namely: “It does not in any way require universities to allow or facilitate speakers to break the law through inciting violence, inciting racial hatred, or glorifying acts of terrorism.”

HEIs are required to have a code of practice setting out the means by which they aim to achieve this duty.

Education Reform Act 1988
The Education Reform Act protects academic freedom and requires university commissioners to: ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions.

Education Act 1994
The Education Act requires HEIs to bring to the attention of students, at least once a year, the requirements of the act around freedom of speech in universities and colleges.

Human Rights Act 1998
Since the Human Rights Act came into force, UK laws are required to be compliant with the rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights, including that of free speech and freedom of association and assembly. Under the act, HEIs are under a statutory duty to protect the free speech of staff and students, as well as protecting them from discrimination.

Equality Act 2010
The UK domestic law relating to free speech and freedom from discrimination has mostly been codified into the Equality Act 2010. The act brings together more than 116 pieces of legislation covering anti-discrimination law in the UK. Chapter 2 of Part 6 of the Equality Act (the Higher Education Chapter) applies, in conjunction with Part 2 of the Equality Act, to HEIs, and specifically protects students (and prospective students) from discrimination, harassment or victimisation from the institution’s governing body. The Equality Act sets out a public sector equality duty under section149. This duty applies to all public bodies and requires that they take into account the need to “eliminate discrimination” and “advance equality of opportunity” when carrying out their public functions. The Equality and Human Rights Commission, established under section 6 of the Equality Act 2006 and subject to the provisions therein, is the UK’s national equality regulator. However, Chapter 2 of the Equality Act does not cover student unions.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
Educational establishments have a duty to “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”, as set out in s 26(1) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA). Section 31 of the CTSA adds that when carrying out their duty under section 26 of the CTSA, the HEI should also consider its duty to ensure freedom of speech, and the importance of academic freedom.

The Home Office has provided guidance for HEIs in exercising the duty under s 26 of the CTSA and balancing it with the right to freedom of speech. According to the guidance, in order to properly exercise the duty, HEI’s should have policies in place for external speakers and events, and have mechanisms to assess the risks posed, and how to mitigate those risks.

The CTSA imposes a legal obligation on UK HEIs to “take steps to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. This legislation forms part of the UK government’s Prevent duty, aimed at curbing home-grown terrorism. The most controversial aspect of legislation is that aimed at potential extremist speakers, “extremism” being defined as “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”. The guidance issued in tandem with the act makes clear that it applies to both violent and non-violent extremism, which “can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit”.

Higher Education and Research Act 2017
The Higher Education and Research Act aims to create a new regulatory framework for higher education, increase competition and student choice, ensure students receive value for money, and strengthen the research sector. The act established the OfS and sets out its role as the new regulator and funding council for the higher education sector. The role includes ensuring that students receive value for money. The OfS will also hold HEIs registered under the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 to account regarding the state of free speech on their campuses, with the powers to penalise institutions that do not comply with their own freedom of speech code.

Public Sector Equality Duty
As public bodies, most HEIs are subject to the Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The duty obliges public bodies to actively have regard to: eliminating discrimination, harassment, victimisation and other prohibited conduct; advancing equality of opportunity; and fostering good relations between people who have protected characteristics and those who do not.

The Equality Act specifies the following bodies as owing the PSED:
(i) the governing body of an educational establishment maintained by an English local authority (within the meaning of section 162 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006);
(ii) the governing body of an institution in England within the further education sector (within the meaning of section 91(3) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992); and
(iii) the governing body of an institution in England within the higher education sector (within the meaning of section 91(5) of that Act).
The PSED has the effect of obliging public bodies, when exercising their powers and functions, to actively have regard to the following:
(i) eliminating discrimination, harassment, victimisation and other prohibited conduct;
(ii) advancing equality of opportunity; and
(iii) fostering good relations between people who have protected characteristics and those who do not.

The PSED is aimed at engraining equality into the exercise of all public functions such as policy and decision making and service delivery. The ultimate aim is to improve a HEI’s performance on equality, by for example preventing discrimination before it arises and creating the appropriate “culture”.

Prevent duty
There is a statutory duty on universities to tackle radicalisation through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Prevent is a counter-terrorism duty that applies across schools, further education colleges and universities. It requires educational institutions to deny a platform to those who might encourage terrorism.

Duties under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) are imposed on “specified authorities”. “Specified authorities” are defined in Schedule 6 of the CTSA, and include in particular both the following types of higher education bodies (together, relevant higher education bodies RHEBs):

• Governing bodies of qualifying institutions within the meaning given by section 11 of the Higher Education Act 2004 (which includes most universities and higher education institutions); and
• Private higher education institutions that are not in receipt of public funding from the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) or the Higher Education Funding Council Wales (HEFCW) but have similar characteristics to those that are, which have at least 250 students (excluding those on distance-learning courses) undertaking courses of a description mentioned in Schedule 6 to the Education Reform Act 1988 (higher education courses).
  RHEBs are subject to the duty contained in section 26 CTSA, which provides: “A specified authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”

Under section 31 CTSA, in carrying out the duty imposed by section 26 CTSA, RHEBs are also required to have particular regard to:

• ensuring freedom of speech (section 31(2)(a) CTSA), defined as the duty under section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 to “take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers”; and
• the importance of academic freedom (section 31(2)(b) CTSA), defined as the freedom referred to in section 202(2)(a) of the Education Reform Act 1988 to “ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions”.

Guidance
The section 26 duty is supplemented by both general and sector-specific guidance, issued by the Secretary of State under section 29 CTSA. Relevant published guidance (in relation to RHEBs in England and Wales) includes:

• The general Revised Prevent duty guidance: for England and Wales, issued 12 March 2015 and revised 16 July 2015; and
• The sector-specific “Prevent duty guidance: for higher education institutions in England and Wales”.
  (each available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance)

Other guidance has also been published on a non-statutory basis by a number of organisations which also sets out particular guidelines for RHEBs, including:

• Universities UK, External Speakers in Higher Education Institutions, issued 22 November 2013, http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Pages/external-speakers-in-higher-education-institutions.aspx
• Universities UK, Oversight of Security-Sensitive Research Material in UK Universities, issued 26 October 2012, http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Pages/oversight-of-security-sensitive-research-material-in-uk-universities.aspx
• Equality and Human Rights Commission, Delivering the Prevent Duty in a Proportionate and Fair Way, issued 9 February 2017, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/delivering-prevent-duty-proportionate-and-fair-way

Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales

This guidance provides specified authorities (including RHEBs) with a number of principles to be followed when balancing their section 26 and section 31 duties:

• The starting point for complying with section 26 CTSA is to demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation, as it applies in the specified authority’s area or institution.
• Three themes guide specified authorities (including RHEBs) in complying with the section 26 duty: effective leadership; working in partnership; and appropriate capabilities:
  • Effective Leadership: Individuals in leadership positions should establish mechanisms, or use existing mechanisms, to understand the risk of radicalisation, communicate the importance of the section 26 duty and ensure that staff understand this risk and implement the duty;
  • Working in Partnership: Specified authorities need to provide evidence of co-operation with local Prevent co-ordinators, the police, local authorities and multi-agency forums (e.g. Community Safety Partnerships), among others; and
  • Appropriate Capabilities: Staff who engage with the public need to understand the meaning of radicalisation and how to obtain support for people under the risk of radicalising influences. Appropriate training needs to be provided to such staff.
  • Whilst the Prevent programme must not involve covert activities against people, specified authorities may need to share personal information to ensure e.g. that a person at risk of radicalisation is given appropriate support. To protect the rights of individuals, information sharing agreements must be in place.
  • Specified authorities will be expected to maintain appropriate records to show compliance with their responsibilities and provide reports when requested.

[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Prevent Duty Guidance: for higher education institutions in England and Wales
This sector-specific guidance provides RHEBs with a number of principles and guidelines in the context of specific issues which are particular to higher education institutions:

i. External Speakers and Events

• RHEBs should have policies and procedures in place for the management of events on campus or other RHEB premises, setting out clear requirements for events to proceed.
• RHEBs must be particularly mindful to balance their section 26 duty against their section 31 duties to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom.
• When deciding whether or not to host a speaker, RHEBs should consider whether the views expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups. If this is the case, the event should not be allowed to proceed unless the RHEB is fully convinced that such a risk can be fully mitigated, e.g. by ensuring that speakers with extremist views can be challenged as part of the same event. If there is any doubt as to whether the risk can be fully mitigated, the event should not be allowed to proceed.
• RHEBs are expected to put in place a system for assessing and rating risks associated with planned events. This should provide evidence as to whether an event should proceed or be cancelled and whether any risk mitigation action is required. An equivalent mechanism should be put in place in respect of events that are RHEB affiliated, funded or branded, but which take place off-campus.
• RHEBs should demonstrate that staff members involved in the physical security of its premises have an awareness of the section 26 duty. This could often be achieved through engagement with the Association of University Chief Security Officers (AUCSO).

ii. Partnership

• The senior management of the RHEB is expected to engage actively with partners such as police, BIS regional higher and further education Prevent coordinators as well as students.
• With respect to larger or more complex RHEBs, there is an expectation that they should make use of internal mechanisms to share information about Prevent across faculties and establish a single point of contact for the operational delivery of Prevent.
• RHEBs should have regular contact with their relevant Prevent co-ordinator.

iii. Risk assessment

• RHEBs are expected to carry out a risk assessment as to where and how their students might be at risk of being drawn into terrorism, defined as including both violent and non-violent extremism.

iv. Action plan

• Any institution that identifies a risk should develop a Prevent action plan, setting out the actions it will take to mitigate this risk.

v. Staff training

• RHEBs will be required to demonstrate a willingness to undertake Prevent awareness training to help staff prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, enabling them to recognise vulnerability to this risk and understand what actions are available.
• RHEBs should have robust internal and external procedures for sharing information about vulnerable individuals.

vi. Welfare and pastoral care/chaplaincy support

• RHEBs should offer sufficient chaplaincy and pastoral support to all students and have clear and widely available policies for the use of faith related facilities such as prayer rooms.

vii. IT policies

• RHEBs should have policies regarding the use of their IT equipment, with a specific reference to the section 26 duty. In particular, RHEBs should consider the use of filters as part of their overall Prevent strategy. In relation to accessing extremist-related materials for non-research purposes, reference is made to the guidance published by Universities UK.

viii. Student unions and societies

• RHEBs should have clear policies setting out the activities allowed (and not allowed) to take place on campus, as well as any online activity directly related to the RHEB. This should set out expectations from student unions, in particular the need to challenge extremist ideas. Student unions should consider whether their staff would benefit from Prevent awareness training, provided by the Charity Commission.

[/vc_column_text][vc_single_image image=”103857″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes”][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”This report was compiled with the support of Clifford Chance and Jonathan Price, Doughty Street Chambers.” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_single_image image=”103827″ img_size=”full” onclick=”custom_link” link=”https://www.cliffordchance.com/home.html”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_single_image image=”102960″ img_size=”full”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_single_image image=”103830″ img_size=”full” onclick=”custom_link” link=”https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column width=”2/3″][vc_column_text]

This report is also available as a PDF

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Demonising the media: Threats to journalists in Europe

1 Nov 2018

[vc_row full_width=”stretch_row_content_no_spaces” full_height=”yes” css=”.vc_custom_1541435907815{background-image: url(https://mappingmediafreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MMF-overview-1460×490.jpg?id=100814) !important;background-position: center !important;background-repeat: no-repeat !important;background-size: cover !important;}”][vc_column][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Demonising the media: Threats to journalists in Europe” font_container=”tag:h1|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_custom_heading text=”Burned in effigy. Insulted. Menaced. Spat at. Discredited by their nation’s leaders. Assaulted. Sued. Homes strafed with automatic weapons. Rape threats. Death threats. Assassinations.” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]

This is the landscape faced by journalists throughout Europe over the past four years.

Mapping Media Freedom has documented media freedom incidents across Europe — over 3,000 were surveyed for this report — since May 2014. The information gathered shows journalists and media outlets targeted in a kaleidoscopic array by political leaders, businesses and the general public – but some key trends have emerged from the reports recorded and verified by the platform. This document outlines some of these, and is intended as a survey of the landscape for media freedom in the region to aid lawmakers and those who wish to help an independent, pluralistic media landscape to flourish.

This report is also available in PDF format

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Key trends” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_custom_heading text=”Five issues that have been identified from the reports submitted to Mapping Media Freedom” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]

National Security and Counter-terrorism Legislation

Well-intentioned legislation that aims to protect the citizens and institutions of a country is, in the best-case scenario, often blind to journalism in the public interest. In the worst-case scenario, such laws are used deliberately to prevent the dissemination of information that is in the public interest. In 39 cases, reporters have been targeted for prosecution for publishing embarrassing leaked information that governments have asserted was not meant for public discussion. This is an acute issue that often involves the judicial and extrajudicial surveillance of journalists in an effort to ferret out the identities of whistleblowers.

Political Interference

This report identifies two key trends within this category. The first is direct interference in the operations of media outlets, either by politicians requesting editors or others involved in the production of news to alter or halt a story, or by replacing journalists critical of a particular political party or policy with ones more favourable to those in power.

Political interference has come from across the spectrum – from Podemos in Spain to the Front National in France, from Fidesz in Hungary to Labour and the Scottish National Party in the United Kingdom. The methods can take many forms, sometimes subtle (behind-the-scenes phone calls to an editor), sometimes overt (preventing a journalist affiliated with particular outlets from attending a press conference) – but the goal of controlling information flow remains the same.

The second form of interference is potentially more insidious: attempts to discredit media outlets by smearing journalists, news outlets, and in some cases an entire industry in order to sow doubt about the veracity of their reporting. This is having a damaging effect, particularly on the safety of journalists, who increasingly are seen as “fair game” by the broader public and subjected to both verbal and physical threats.

Social Media/Online Harassment

Social media has provided journalists with a wide avenue to share their information and interact with readers in a public yet intimate way. This has helped media professionals in reporting and allowed for constructive debates around current events, and can help improve the quality of information available to citizens overall. However, the other side of that bargain is the growing hostility toward journalists online. This takes many forms, from tweets of sexual harassment to death threats made via Facebook. This is a widespread and pernicious issue that journalists across the continent confront on a daily basis, and is fomented by the widely reported remarks of some politicians from member states. Women are most frequently the target of such attacks.

Protests

Journalists also face a number of risks offline. When protesters pour into the streets, journalists are necessarily among the first responders – an essential part of their professional duties. Traditionally present at demonstrations to document and interpret events, media workers – whether freelance or staff – are also among the first to be corralled, targeted and injured. A number of incidents documented at protests – as recorded by the Mapping Media Freedom project – provide insight into the multidimensional threats that journalists confront when called upon to report from the scene of demonstrations, whether small or large. These include a lack of understanding among some police forces about the role of media at such events.

Public Television

A significant but underreported trend during the period was the threat to public broadcasters. A number of national broadcasters were brought under closer government control. Taken together, these reports outline the importance of maintaining the editorial independence of these vital public services.
[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”About Mapping Media Freedom” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_custom_heading text=”Monitoring violations against media professionals” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_icon icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-angle-double-right” color=”black” size=”xl” align=”right”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

Driven by Index on Censorship’s decades-long experience in monitoring censorship across the globe, Mapping Media Freedom set out to record the widest possible array of press freedom violations.

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_column_text]Mapping Media Freedom is a project, funded by the European Commission, to investigate the full spectrum of threats to media freedom in the region – from the seemingly innocuous to the most serious infractions – in a near-real-time system that launched to the public on 24 May 2014.

Driven by Index on Censorship’s decades-long experience in monitoring censorship across the globe, Mapping Media Freedom set out to record the widest possible array of press freedom violations in an effort to understand the precursors to the retreat of media freedom in a country. The ambitious scope of the project called for a flexible methodology that draws on a network of regional correspondents, partner organisations and media sources.

Mapping Media Freedom defines a media worker as anyone partaking in the gathering, assessing, creating and presenting of news and information.

How It Works

Submitted reports are fact-checked against news outlets and through discussions with the submitting correspondent. Reports are then published to a public-facing website for use by researchers, journalists and policymakers. The outputs are available to the wider public through downloadable CSV files from the database and are shared widely on social media. The project has issued periodic reports that summarised data on a quarterly and yearly basis. This document is the result of a full review of the data reported to and verified by the project’s contributors covering 35 countries.

Each report is flagged against seven main categories and 64 subcategories to provide a sortable and searchable database of the types of press freedom violations taking place in a country. EU-affiliated countries are further categorised by their status: member states, candidates and potential candidates. Full descriptions of the categories and subcategories are available in the Mapping Media Freedom methodology section of this document.  

Going beyond traditional statistical recording, Mapping Media Freedom’s correspondents write short narrative reports about the incidents. The goal is to recount the facts dispassionately, without bias toward the journalist or media outlet. Where possible, the incident is placed in the context of wider trends within the locality, whether a city or national media market. All reports for the 35 countries covered in this report are published in English and edited by project staff based at Index on Censorship.

The platform records incidents at the local and national levels. In addition to the categorisation, this geographic spread aims to provide for the first time the fullest possible awareness of the state of play for journalists away from a country’s largest media markets, where most well-publicised press freedom violations occur.

Because Mapping Media Freedom relies primarily on inputs from a concentrated group of part-time correspondents, it cannot record every violation of press freedom in the countries covered. Further, if incidents are not reported in the media, addressed by unions or self-reported by journalists on social media, there is no way for the database to register that the incident occurred.

Because of its focus on narrative, the platform allows for the retrospective interrogation of reports against new criteria as its methodology evolves, and as the database recorded an ever-larger pool of information new categories were added. For example, EU-related and “whistleblowing” flags were appended in late 2015, and a “commercial interference” flag was added in spring 2018. In a manual process, each new flag is tested against all the reports on the platform, providing researchers with insights into incidents that have occurred since 2014.

The methodology aims to be as succinct as possible, and directs submitters to flag the most appropriate subcategories that apply to the Limitation to Media Freedom category. As a result, reported incidents can appear – legitimately – in simultaneous subcategories across the project. For example, a journalist’s car or home could be firebombed after they have published a series of articles about corruption in the local administration. This report could be listed as a “Limitation to Media Freedom”, subcategories “Attack to Property” and “Intimidation”, depending on the facts of the incident. At the same time, reports are keyworded and mapped to appear geographically on the map and through the platform’s search functionalities.

Mapping Media Freedom covers all media workers, whether they work for state-backed news outlets, those funded by supporters of opposition parties or non-partisan media providers. In all instances, the reports documented are rigorously fact-checked by an independent editorial team working at Index on Censorship.

The Software

The Mapping Media Freedom map and database rest on a modified version of the Ushahidi platform, which was developed to track election violence in the wake of Kenya’s disputed 2008 presidential poll. The platform is now in its third iteration; Mapping Media Freedom uses the map as its primary visualisation of the data and offers targeted search functionality at mappingmediafreedom.org to help users navigate to the data they are seeking. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”European media freedom” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_custom_heading text=”Key themes 2014-18″ font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_icon icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-angle-double-right” color=”black” size=”xl” align=”right”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

As security – rather than the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms – becomes the number-one priority of governments worldwide, broadly written security laws have been twisted to silence journalists.

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National Security Legislation

In October 2017, a reporter for The Wall Street Journal was convicted of producing “terrorist propaganda” in Turkey and sentenced to more than two years in prison.

Ayla Albayrak was charged over an August 2015 article in the newspaper, which detailed government efforts to quell unrest among the nation’s Kurdish separatists, “firing tear gas and live rounds in a bid to reassert control of several neighbourhoods”.

Albayrak was in New York at the time the ruling was announced and was sentenced in absentia, but her conviction forms part of a growing pattern of arrests, detentions, trials and convictions for journalists under national security laws – not just in EU candidate country Turkey, the world’s top jailer of journalists.

As security – rather than the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms – becomes the number-one priority of governments worldwide, broadly written security laws have been twisted to silence journalists.

It is seen starkly in the 272 cases that Mapping Media Freedom has logged and verified from countries affiliated with the EU. This includes everything from the alleged glorification of terrorism in Spain to the hundreds of journalists jailed in Turkey following the failed coup to the seizure of a BBC journalist’s laptop in the United Kingdom.

This abusive phenomenon started small, as in the case of Turkey, where dismissive official rhetoric was aimed at small segments – like Kurdish journalists – among the country’s press corps, but over time expanded to extinguish whole newspapers or television networks that espoused critical viewpoints on government policy.

While Turkey has been an especially egregious example of the cynical and political exploitation of terror offences, the trend toward the criminalisation of journalism that makes governments uncomfortable is spreading.

In Spain, the police association filed a lawsuit against Mònica Terribas, a journalist for Catalunya Ràdio, accusing her of “favouring actions against public order for calling on citizens in the Catalonia region to report on police movements during the referendum on independence”. The association said information on police movements could help terrorists, drug dealers and other criminals.

In Turkey, reporting deemed critical of the government, the president or their associates is being equated with terrorism – as seen in the case of German journalist Deniz Yücel, who was detained in February 2017.

Yücel, a Turkish-German dual national, was working as a correspondent for the German newspaper Die Welt. He was arrested after he was summoned to a police station for questioning about a report he wrote about the Turkish energy minister. He was accused of sedition and using “terrorist propaganda to incite the population”. He was eventually released after a year in detention.

There are also multiple examples of Turkey using Interpol arrest warrants against exiled journalists like Can Dündar, whose extradition from Germany it demanded, and Hamza Yalçın, who was detained by Spanish authorities, though both of those countries declined to enforce the requests.

And governments are also using terror laws to spy on journalists. In 2014, the UK police admitted that it used powers under terror legislation to obtain the phone records of Tom Newton Dunn, political editor of The Sun newspaper, to investigate the source of a leak in a political scandal. Police used powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which circumvents another law that requires police to have approval from a judge to get disclosure of journalistic material. In September 2018, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the UK’s mass surveillance regime violated human rights.

Even jokes can land journalists in trouble under terror laws. French police searched the office of community station Radio Canut in Lyon and seized the recording of a radio programme after two presenters were accused of “incitement to terrorism”. The presenters had been talking about the protests by police officers which had recently been taking place in France. One presenter said: “This is a call to people who killed themselves or are feeling suicidal, and to all kamikazes, [to] blow themselves up in the middle of the crowd.” One of the presenters was put under judicial supervision and forbidden to host the radio programme until he appeared in court.

The misuse and abuse of national security legislation to identify government critics, or silence critical media, is of growing concern. EU governments in particular need to be mindful that loosely drafted national security laws are often copied by far more restrictive regimes to support their repression of critical media.[/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_icon icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-angle-double-right” color=”black” size=”xl” align=”right”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

All too often, politicians and business interests are short-circuiting the public’s right to information by placing their personal or party agendas ahead of the public good.

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Political Interference

Direct Interference

A journalist working for a country’s public broadcaster produces a report that points out that a high-level politician’s family could potentially gain from a government investment. The politician sends a series of emails attacking the journalist for publishing false information and accusing them of acting unprofessionally. The journalist resigns, saying that further research into the conflict of interest is being prevented by their employer.

These events took place in Finland in November 2016. The country’s prime minister, Juha Sipilä, sent emails to Yle journalist Salla Vuorikoski after she wrote articles about a deal involving public money, a state-owned mining firm and another firm linked to the prime minister’s family. Nearly three weeks later, in December 2016, Vuorikoski stepped down, and fellow Yle senior reporter Jussi Eronen resigned citing pressure to act in contradiction of his journalistic ideals. Sipilä, who had handed control of his business interests to his children several years earlier, was ultimately cleared of any wrongdoing by the country’s parliamentary ombudsman.  

Several months later, in March 2017, the political party The Finns, which was supporting Sipilä’s government in the Finnish parliament, proposed altering the governing structure of Yle, limiting its independence. At the time, the party’s opposition to multiculturalism was cited as the motive for the proposal.

While these two distinct events – the original reportage and the later push to amend Yle’s governance – may be unconnected, the appearance of political manoeuvring raises serious implications for press freedom, and highlights how journalists can come under pressure from politicians even in a country widely regarded as having some of the highest levels of media freedom worldwide.

In an ideal media environment, ethical journalists would be free to investigate and independently reveal the information that they had found, without retribution or pressurisation by political or business interests. Even the member states of the EU are not ideal environments. All too often, politicians and business interests are short-circuiting the public’s right to information by placing their personal or party agendas ahead of the public good.

Since the election of Emmanuel Macron as French president, several members of the government have tried to control coverage by calling editorial offices, by asking journalists not to criticise the government, write about the ruling party’s finances or explore allegations of corruption, or even by threatening legal action when information which was embarrassing for the government was leaked.

Other forms of interference include lawsuits, such as the 47 lawsuits being brought against investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia at the time of her murder in Malta in 2017, as well as libel cases in countries such as Spain and Greece. The use of litigation to intimidate journalists is a serious concern and an area that Index on Censorship will be focusing on in 2019.

In the United Kingdom and France, journalists may be locked in side rooms or barred from attending conferences – an all-too-common occurrence across the continent, as Mapping Media Freedom’s “Blocked Access” subcategory shows.

The purchase or takeover of previously independent or critical media outlets by government supporters, or the abuse of the media licensing system is another form of interference. In Hungary, business interests aligned with the governing party have bought up media outlets and turned them from critical to pro-government outlets overnight, and popular radio stations have lost their licences against a backdrop of diminishing media plurality. In candidate country Serbia, when a tax inspection fails to find any impropriety at a media outlet, another is ordered, then another, then another. In Poland, a network was nearly fined for reporting on protests that were sparked by opposition to reporting restrictions in parliament.

Targeting the media financially is a well-trodden route for penalising critical outlets. On 6 July 2017 the offices of Rise Project, a Romanian investigative outlet, were raided by tax inspectors. Many believe the timing of the raid was chosen to intimidate the outlet, as Rise Project had previously announced that they would publish an important story on 6 July. The investigation alleged that Liviu Dragnea, the president of the governing Social Democratic Party, had exerted control over the Romanian secret services.

On 28 January 2018, a confidential report by the Romanian Tax Authority on the activity of Rise Project, containing its sources of income as well as the list of its paid collaborators and projects, was leaked to the press. The report was used in a smear campaign against the organisation.

Other forms of direct interference include intervening in the appointment of staff at state media operators, as outlined in section on Public Broadcasting.[/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_icon icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-angle-double-right” color=”black” size=”xl” align=”right”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

The willingness to smear journalists or the outlets they report for, rather than debate the facts, in order to warp the public’s right to information is the true threat to media freedom in the EU.

[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”2/3″][vc_column_text]Demonising the Media

The willingness to smear journalists or the outlets they report for, rather than debate the facts, in order to warp the public’s right to information is the true threat to media freedom in the EU, its candidate countries and potential candidate countries. This fraught situation is occurring in countries at the heart of the EU, but it is even more pronounced in countries on its fringes, where robust checks and balances are absent in practice, and the independent media are anaemic due to shrivelling advertising budgets – or, worse, dependent on government largesse for large portions of their financing.

Leading political figures in countries from the UK to Hungary have smeared journalists and media outlets critical of them, dismissing their reports as “fake news”; they have thus created an environment in which reporters are demonised, and thereby more vulnerable to abuse online and off.

In Romania, journalists are publicly chastised for “promoting” protests against government policies. In Italy, journalists have been threatened with having their police protection removed.

In November 2016, during a press conference, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico called journalists dirty, anti-Slovak prostitutes, and before that he did not hesitate to call journalists “toilet spiders” or “slimy snakes”. In August 2017, during a press conference, Fico accused a reporter of being “controlled by the opposition”.

In Serbia, where President Aleksandar Vučić is a dominant presence on TV channels, he regularly humiliates journalists at press conferences. They are often shouted at, threatened and targeted: in some cases, journalists who Vučić mentioned by name in a negative context later receive death threats online.

Stevan Dojčinović, the editor-in-chief of KRIK, a media organisation which investigates crime and corruption, has been attacked and smeared numerous times by pro-government tabloids after reporting about the private property of politicians. Dojčinović and KRIK have been sued by Nenad Popović, a minister in the current Serbian government, after reporting on his offshore companies which appeared in the Paradise Papers data leak.

“If you are targeted, put on the front page or at the central headlines in the evening news, and accused of being a traitor, political activist, non-balanced or simply a thief – you are automatically forced to defend yourself, if not publicly, then at least in your nearest surrounding,” journalist Tamara Skrozza told Mapping Media Freedom. Skrozza was described as an “enemy of the state and President Vučić” by a pro-government TV station earlier this year, and describes the result of such smears: “Your family is in danger, your privacy is attacked and you are not able to lead a normal life. This, of course, causes a lot of stress and damages your health for a long time.”

None of this should be taken as an advocation of a position that holds that journalists and journalism should be free of critique. But the quality of the debate needs to be constructive, factual and professional. Burning a journalist in effigy, as happened twice in Croatia, does not contribute to the overall quality of information available to Croatians.

A culture of impunity is also exacerbating these problems. Investigative journalists are under particular pressure in the region: three journalists have been killed in the EU since October 2017.

These cases have received a great deal of attention internationally. However, other examples of impunity abound. In Croatia, a threatening comment was left on the Facebook page of independent and critical news website Index.hr: “These Index.hr journalists should be killed … because they undermine and damage everything that is Croatian.”

The poster was quickly identified and indicted, but legal authorities dropped the charges because, among other extenuating circumstances, he was a “highly decorated Croatian war veteran”. The Croatian Journalists’ Association (HND) condemned the decision, describing it as “scandalous”.

Ema Tarabochia, a researcher for a regional project on media freedom and the safety of journalists, said that the corrosive influence of hate speech on Croatian society in recent years has been very strong. “Even though there are no extremist parties in parliament, public space is poisoned by daily verbal attacks,” Tarabochia said. She said that evidence shows that journalists working for independent, commercial and nonprofit media, who are labelled as “leftist journalists”, are at a higher risk of suffering minor injuries and death threats. This pattern is repeated in a number of countries covered by the map.

“They are threatened or attacked out of ideological or ethnical reasons,” Tarabochia said, adding that there are still no verdicts in two cases in which members of a far-right party, Autochthonous Croatian Party of Right (A-HSP), burned copies of Novosti, the Serbian-language minority newspaper. The campaign, led by far-right political parties and conservative civil associations, reached fever pitch in September 2017 and was followed by numerous verbal threats to Novosti journalists.

“Lack of public rebuke from the centres of power, especially the political one, are encouraging the perpetrators,” Tarabochia said, adding that condemnation “would be a clear message to the perpetrators that such behaviour will not be tolerated”.

Moreover, an absence of reports should not be taken as evidence that the press freedom environment is healthy in such countries. With just 10 reports verified by Mapping Media Freedom during the time period covered here, Finland is the among the member countries with the fewest reports. Yet if the country’s prime minister is willing to pressurise a journalist, it should be assumed that only the most egregious examples of press freedom violations are being discussed in the public arena. A number of member states with smaller populations – Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have few reports, but this may be something of a false flag. Other factors – such as societal and professional pressures – may be interfering with the discussion of incidents.

The pressures placed on journalists as part of this widespread political interference also lead to self-censorship on the part of the individual, and lessen the appetite for risky investigative journalism on the part of news outlets; this was cited as the reason for the resignations in the Yle cases.

Reporting incidents of censorship – including self-censorship – is vital to building an accurate picture of the state of media freedom in the region; we would urge journalists’ unions and media outlets to continue to report incidents widely, and confidentially if necessary.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_column_text]

Blocked Access

Informal blacklists of media outlets. Exorbitant fees for access to public information. Restrictions on reporting from parliament and refugee camps. Journalists prohibited from asking questions at – or barred outright from – press conferences.

These Hungarian incidents, which were among the 545 cases of blocked access that were verified in the 35 EU-affiliated countries covered in this report, are all too often a fact of life for journalists. When journalists are prevented from reporting on an event – whether it be the opening of a pig farm or a press conference or a protest – the public’s right to information is damaged.

In the Hungarian context, preventing journalists from reporting comes in a variety of forms, from chasing them with a piece of construction equipment to preventing their investigation of a leak at a garbage dump to placing restrictions on where and how they can report in parliament. News outlets were barred from the Fidesz election centre. At the height of the government’s feud with television network RTL Klub, it was prevented from covering the opening of a new football stadium – as well as targeted with a punitive tax on its profits.  

The Fidesz government’s shifting war with the media has seen journalists from outlets owned by business interests on the outs with the country’s prime minister repeatedly blocked from attending party events. In February 2018, yet more restrictions were placed on journalists, limiting members of the press to a 10-metre-long hall in parliament. During the period covered here, Mapping Media Freedom recorded seven incidents that highlight the limiting of the right to report from the seat of government power. Further restrictions on the press in the halls of power have arisen in Poland, the Netherlands and Germany.

At the height of the refugee crisis, Hungary repeatedly denied journalists the ability to access camps housing the migrants. An AP journalist was compelled to delete footage that showed police unleashing a dog on migrants crossing the border from Serbia. Police issued a letter forbidding journalists from approaching “illegal immigrants” to ask questions. In another incident, police declared a train station an “operational zone” and pushed journalists out. One journalist tweeted that the refugees said: “Do not leave us.” The journalist accused the Hungarian authorities of trying not to let the world see what they were doing. Similar restrictions have been placed on journalists at the Greek border.

Among the candidate countries, half of Turkey’s 103 incidents of blocked access reviewed for this report took place before the July 2016 coup attempt. Police and the government have placed an array of restrictions on reporters, from curfews near to the Syrian border to deportation orders and the well-documented trials of journalists taking place in the country.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_icon icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-angle-double-right” color=”black” size=”xl” align=”right”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

The immediacy and near-anonymity of social media allow journalists to connect with a huge audience, but leave them open to insult and derision.

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Online Harassment

In December 2016, an anonymous Twitter user posted a private photo of journalist Vonny Moyes, a writer for Scottish newspaper The National, to shame her. Moyes said that she was targeted because she had written for pro-independence outlets and drawn the attention of pro-union trolls. When a particular column was commented on by leading UK conservatives, Moyes said this acted as an amplifier and exposed her to more direct harassment than usual.

The individual who ultimately sought out and posted the nude images of the journalist had trolled her over earlier articles. When the photos appeared on Twitter, Moyes asked the user to remove them and told the troll she would be contacting the police. She asked her followers to report the user to Twitter, which they did. The user deleted their account soon after.

“I then tweeted for the rest of the evening about the issue in order to deconstruct the victim-blaming and sex-shaming narrative, to essentially take back the perceived power the troll believed they had,” Moyes told Mapping Media Freedom of the incident.

In August 2014, Amberin Zaman, a Turkish journalist who was then the Turkey correspondent for The Economist, was singled out by the country’s president, who said to her: “Know your place.” In November 2014, a Twitter user wrote that she would be cut in half for writing about Isis, and she was told by a western embassy to avoid travelling to the Syrian border. Later, Zaman’s press card was revoked for her critical – tweeted – opinions about the Turkish government. In each of these situations, Zaman faced an onslaught of threats via social media.

Foreign correspondents in Turkey have also come under pressure, with one saying he had to leave the country upon receiving thousands of threatening comments after his reporting on the Soma mine disaster.

The immediacy and near-anonymity of social media allow journalists to connect with a huge audience, but leave them open to insult and derision. The online harassment incidents reported to Mapping Media Freedom from the countries covered here include a litany of death, rape and fake news accusations from members of the public and politicians.

In the 117 cases of online harassment reviewed here, the largest number of reports among EU countries came from Croatia with 16. It was followed by Italy (9), Spain (9), the UK (8) and France (5). In candidate and potential candidate countries, the highest number of incidents was logged as originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 16. It was followed by Serbia (9), the Republic of Macedonia (5), Kosovo (4) and Turkey (4).

Other studies undertaken into the level of harassment faced by journalists, particularly female journalists online, suggest the number of cases reported to Mapping Media Freedom vastly underestimates the extent of the problem. We welcome the attention that bodies such as UNESCO and the OSCE have brought to this issue.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_icon icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-angle-double-right” color=”black” size=”xl” align=”right”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

Traditionally present at demonstrations to document and interpret events, media workers – whether freelance or staff – are also among the first to be corralled, targeted and injured.

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Protests

When protesters pour into the streets, journalists are necessarily among the first responders; this is an essential part of their professional duties. Traditionally present at demonstrations to document and reflect, media workers – whether freelance or staff – are also among the first to be corralled, targeted and injured.

A number of incidents happening at protests – as recorded by the Mapping Media Freedom project – have provided an insight into the various threats that journalists confront when called upon to report from the scenes of demonstrations, whether small or large.

Against a backdrop of nationalism, xenophobia, economic insecurity and anti-government sentiment, reporters have been indirectly targeted by demonstrators, counter demonstrators and police.

This report examined 191 verified cases from the 35 countries affiliated with the EU – 28 member states, 5 candidates for entry and 2 potential candidates for entry. There were 46 incidents in France, 31 in Spain, 27 in Germany and 14 in Romania.

The numbers reflect only what was reported to and verified by Mapping Media Freedom. We have repeatedly found during the project that journalists underreport incidents they see as too minor, commonplace or part of the job, or where they fear reprisals from organised groups or law enforcement. In some cases, project correspondents have identified incidents retrospectively as a result of offhand comments on social media networks or media reports appearing only after a similar incident has come to light.  

Contexts vary, but journalists face risks originating with both protesters and police, and as a result of finding themselves stuck between protesters and police (or various groups of protesters). However, more than half the incidents (13 out of 25) reported in the first seven  months of 2018 involve members of law enforcement, suggesting the need for improvements in police handling of media attending protests.

This year also saw a number of incidents in which protesters targeted journalists because of the political alignment that they or the media outlet they work for holds. This has been exhibited by reports originating from anti-government protests aimed at Poland’s conservative Law and Justice Party.  

This issue is explored further in our companion report Targeting the Messenger, which is available here. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_icon icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-angle-double-right” color=”black” size=”xl” align=”right”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

The question of the independence of national broadcasters is regularly debated and contested across Europe.

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Public Broadcasting

During the period covered in this report, Mapping Media Freedom has recorded a number of incidents related to national broadcasters in EU member states. Taken together, these reports outline the importance of maintaining the editorial independence of public broadcasters.

The question of the independence of national broadcasters is regularly debated and contested across Europe. Many governments play an important role in selecting national broadcasters’ management, for instance in Italy or France.

Public broadcasters have come under particular pressure in Poland and Hungary. Overhauled in 2016, Telewizja Polska has come under the direct control of the ruling conservative Law and Justice Party. The Polish legislation was modelled on the Hungarian changes implemented by that country’s ruling party Fidesz. In each country, the restructuring resulted in the elimination of hundreds of positions, including dozens of journalists.

In Austria, the conservative and far-right coalition government is planning an extensive reform of the state Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF), which would include scrapping the tax funding it gets so that funds would be directly allocated by the government.

In June 2018, presenters of Galician public broadcaster TVG’s afternoon news programme resigned in protest at the alleged political influence of the news agenda at the channel. The presenters and some of their colleagues had taken part in regular “Black Friday” actions in protest at the alleged manipulation of the channel’s news report. The action was inspired by an effort launched by staff at the Spanish national broadcaster RTVE in April 2018 in protest at what they see as political manipulation of the news agenda.

The control exerted by the Polish government over state broadcasters creates a situation where state channels can be used as a platform by members of the government to attack private media outlets and journalists working for them, as happened in May when TVP published information meant to discredit Łukasz Maziewski, a journalist who had been critical of the Law and Justice government. TVP pointedly described Fakt, the publication for which he writes, as a “German-Swiss tabloid”. Fakt is the bestselling newspaper in Poland.

In 2017, in Poland, there was a proposal to introduce a 15% cap on foreign ownership of media companies, reminiscent of a Russian law passed in 2014 which prevented foreign investors from owning more than a 20% stake in Russian media outlets. In Poland, public media are pitted against privately owned channels, which government officials regularly attempt to discredit, as happened in May when an MP claimed that 90% of privately owned media belong to foreign capital.

In Poland and Hungary, Mapping Media Freedom has logged incidents in which journalists who work for independent and privately owned media outlets are banned from accessing events, while journalists who work for state media gain access.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the beginning of July, after months of pressure, a cantonal government replaced the managers of the local public broadcaster RTV USK. In Romania, at the end of June, Romanian public television terminated the contract of the production team responsible for the programme Starea Nației (State of the Nation), which had recently aired content that showed the broadcaster’s management in an unflattering light. In a video, TVR head Doina Gradea could be seen berating TVR journalists who had published reports critical of the government, and shouting: “They deserve fists in their mouths!” Gradea and the channel’s legal department signed the notice terminating the contract.

In Austria, in April, a month prior to his election as head of the ORF’s board of trustees, a member of the right-wing governing Freedom Party of Austria voiced his concerns about the “objectivity” of the broadcaster and threatened to dismiss a third of its foreign correspondents.

In Montenegro, at the beginning of June, the council supervising the Montenegrin public broadcaster RTGC dismissed the head of the broadcaster, Andrijana Kadija; the action was seen by local civil society and journalists as an attempt by the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists to stifle editorial independence. The Montenegrin Journalists’ Association said RTCG staff were working under “tremendous political pressure” from the government, making it “difficult for reporters and editors to do their jobs professionally”.

The pressure exerted on journalists results in politically warped content, increased censorship and self-censorship.

Mapping Media Freedom’s Poland correspondent said she felt that public broadcasters contributed to “creating a parallel reality”, and that when she worked for a state broadcaster she abstained from pitching stories that could be deemed controversial, as she knew they would not be commissioned. She said: “Most of the journalists for TVP are very young, not experienced and not qualified, but they fulfil their editors’ expectations. The rest does not matter. Public media outlets are seen as propaganda tools, detached from reality.”

Close governmental control over state broadcasters can have very tangible effects for a country’s citizens. Mapping Media Freedom’s Hungary correspondent, said: “Controlling and using the public media for political purposes is a very important piece in the overall plan of the Orbán government to control the information ordinary people living in rural areas have access to. In underdeveloped areas, most people get their daily news from public media. Local newspapers were purchased by businessmen close to the government; independent radio stations did not receive new licences from the Media Council (and were replaced by government-friendly stations), meaning that people who are not particularly tech-savvy, and don’t use the internet, have no access to information critical to the government. Meanwhile independent media is shrinking.”

Between 2015 and 2016, the European Audiovisual Observatory noted that a third of public media suffered budget cuts totalling nearly €139 million. In France the government asked for large cuts, prompting a strike in autumn 2017. The French government has also announced changes to public television due in 2019. Unions already fear that certain channels will be merged or eliminated.

Debate over licence fees persists across the EU, as seen last year in Switzerland, where the proposition to make the licence fee disappear was overwhelmingly opposed by citizens during a referendum.

This context of crisis contributes to deteriorating working conditions and job losses at state broadcasters. In the Czech Republic, in June, during a meeting of the parliamentary committee for the media, the head of the state radio announced planned cuts of 120 workers. When an opposition party deputy on the committee asked him whether he was planning to use this opportunity to settle scores with his opponents within the radio network by carrying out a purge, the director said that he did not want to increase the licence fee, and that the dismissals would provide enough money in the budget to pay the remaining employees.

These incidents suggest that public media, which plays a vital role in citizens’ right to information, is under acute pressure. The EU must act more decisively to ensure these services have independence.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Limitations to media freedom: Key categories” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_custom_heading text=”Five subcategories that register the most serious threats to individual media professionals” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”106449″ img_size=”full”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

Deaths

The 19 reports coded with the death flag from EU member states, candidate states and potential candidate states in the database record a variety of factors.

Member States

Slovakia

Investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his partner were killed at their home in February 2018. Kuciak was investigating the relationship between criminal syndicates and government officials. Authorities have since made a number of arrests.

Malta

Anti-corruption journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia was killed when the car she was driving exploded as a result of a bomb in October 2017. Caruana Galizia was the subject of multiple lawsuits at the time of her murder.

Denmark

Swedish freelance journalist Kim Wall was murdered during a trip on an experimental submarine in August 2017. Inventor Peter Madsen, who created the vessel Wall was writing a story about, was later found guilty of the crime.

Danish film director Finn Nørgaard and security guard Dan Uzan were murdered in February 2015 when an armed individual attacked two seminars in an attempt to assassinate Lars Vilks, a controversial Swedish cartoonist, who was scheduled to appear.

The Netherlands

Crime journalist Martin Kok was shot dead in December 2016. Kok, who was the founder of a blog about the Dutch criminal underworld, had been targeted with a car bomb in July 2016.

Poland

Journalist Łukasz Masiak was beaten to death in Mława in June 2015. Masiak, who ran local news site NaszaMlawa.pl, which monitored local officials, had regularly received death threats, though Polish authorities later found that his profession did not play a role in his death and the perpetrator was charged.   

France

Twelve people were murdered in a January 2015 terrorist attack on satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. Ten of the victims worked for the weekly, which had published cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed, and two were police officers. Four cartoonists were killed.

Candidate Countries

Serbia

Journalist and radio host Luka Popov was murdered at his home in Srpski Krstur during a burglary in June 2016. Three suspects were later arrested and police said they confessed to the crime.

Turkey

• Syrian journalists Orouba Barakat and her daughter Halla Barakat were murdered by a distant relative in September 2017. They had been subjected to threats from groups associated with the Bashar Assad government.
• In April 2017 Saeed Karimian was killed in Istanbul by several hooded men who shot him and his business partner, a native of Kuwait. Karimian, an Iranian television executive based in Istanbul, was condemned in absentia in Tehran for “spreading propaganda against Iran”.
• During the failed July 2016 coup attempt, soldiers shot and killed Mustafa Cambaz, a photographer with the pro-government newspaper Yeni Şafak, in the Çengelköy neighbourhood of Istanbul.
• Journalist Mohammed Zahir al-Sherqat was murdered in April 2016 by members of Isis, which claimed he was killed for presenting “anti-Islamic State programs”.
• Journalist Gülşen Yıldız was killed in February 2016 during a terrorist attack on a military convoy in Ankara. The journalist was among 28 people killed in the incident.
• The body of Rohat Aktaş, a news editor and reporter for the Kurdish-language daily Azadiya Welat, was recovered in February 2016 from a Cizre basement, where he was trapped with dozens of others during clashes between Kurdish separatists and Turkish forces.
• Syrian journalist Naji Jerf was shot and killed in Gaziantep. Jerf’s murder was seen as an assassination because he had documented atrocities by Isis and trained hundreds of citizen journalists.
• Syrian citizen-journalist Ibrahim Abd al-Qader was beheaded in the city of Şanlıurfa, where he had been living as a refugee. Al-Qader was a contributor to the “Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently” information network and the Ayn al-Watan website. The journalist’s body was found at the home of a friend, Fares Hammadi, who had also been decapitated.
• Influential Turkish blogger Ferdi Özmen was killed in Istanbul in October 2014. Özmen was an ardent supporter of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s policies and a critic of the government.
• Serena Shim was killed in a car crash in Suruç in October 2014. Shim, a reporter for Iran’s Press TV, had been reporting from the Turkish-Syrian border on Isis militants crossing into Turkey, and had recently said on air that she was accused of spying by Turkish intelligence.
• Media worker Kadri Bağdu was murdered in October 2014 while distributing the Kurdish dailies Azadiya Welat and Özgür Gündem in Seyhan, in the south-eastern province of Adana. He was shot five times by two individuals who then fled on a motorcycle.

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Physical Assaults

There were 445 verified incidents flagged as having a physical assault as part of the narrative in the EU member states, candidate and potential candidate countries.

Italy was the EU member state with the most reports categorised as physical assaults, with 83 incidents verified during the period covered. It was followed by Spain (38), France (36), Germany (25) and Hungary (18). In candidate and potential candidate countries, Turkey had the highest number of assaults with 36. It was followed by Serbia (26), Bosnia and Herzegovina (16), Macedonia (14) and Kosovo (13).

In Italy, assaults are most often directed against journalists by private individuals who are part of the stories being covered. In France, Germany, Spain and Hungary, journalists are most often assaulted during demonstrations – whether by protesters or police. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”106446″ img_size=”full”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

Arrests/Detentions

There were 437 verified incidents flagged as having included an arrest or detention as part of the narrative in the EU member states, candidate and potential candidate countries.

The overwhelming number of arrests and detentions in the countries covered in this report took place in Turkey. The country’s 324 reports – including the 80 that took place before the failed coup of July 2016 – document the ongoing crackdown on press freedom that accelerated after the attempted putsch.

Among the member states, Greece had 15 reports. It was followed by France (9), Germany (8), the Netherlands (7) and Latvia (6). In the candidate and potential candidate countries: Macedonia (9), Serbia (8), Bosnia and Herzegovina (4) and Kosovo (4). [/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”106448″ img_size=”full”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

Blocked Access

There were 545 verified incidents categorised as having blocked access as part of the narrative in the EU member states, candidate and potential candidate countries.

Among the member states, Hungary’s journalists were prevented from covering events in 52 incidents. It was followed by France (38), Poland (36), Germany (34) and Italy (33). In candidate and potential candidate states, Turkey had 103 incidents. It was followed by Serbia (29), FYROM (28), Bosnia and Herzegovina (19), Albania (5) and Montenegro (5). [/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_single_image image=”106453″ img_size=”full”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]

Intimidation

There were 697 verified incidents categorised as having intimidation as part of the narrative in the EU member states, candidate and potential candidate countries.

Among the member states, Italy’s journalists were intimidated most often, with 133 reports. It was followed by Romania (47), Croatia (41), France (39) and Hungary (36). In candidate and potential candidate countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina had 47 reported incidents. It was followed by Serbia (40), Macedonia (31), Turkey (31) and Montenegro (19).

Italian journalists are most often threatened by private citizens, who often resort to physical violence. The country’s journalists also face intense pressure from individuals allegedly connected to criminal syndicates. The high number of Italian reports is due to the awareness of the issue raised by the work of Ossigeno per l’informazione, which monitors press freedom in Italy using its oxygen methodology. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][vc_custom_heading text=”Selected countries” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_custom_heading text=”We have chosen six nations from the project which demonstrate the various trends outlined above. These are not indicative of “best” or “worst”, and are here to illustrate the regional themes as they are experienced in individual countries.” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]

Austria

In Austria, Mapping Media Freedom has recorded a significant rise in the intimidation of media outlets and journalists. Seven of the eight incidents that have been categorised as intimidation were logged by the platform after the December 2017 election. Journalists’ unions and watchdogs see a correlation between the change in Austria’s political landscape and the increase in violations of media freedom.

“Since the inauguration of the Austrian conservative right-wing populist government on 18 December 2017, there are rapidly increasing signs that media freedom is being restricted in Austria. Journalists are publicly attacked by politicians,” Rubina Möhring, president of Reporters Without Borders, told Mapping Media Freedom in March 2018.

Eike-Clemens Kullmann, president of the Journalists Department of Austria’s Union of Private Sector Employees, Graphical Workers and Journalists, told Mapping Media Freedom: “In the print media, the union observes with great concern an increasing number of attacks and defamation aimed at intimidating colleagues who are willing to stand up for the freedom of journalism.”  

A clear majority of threats reported to Mapping Media Freedom originated with the right-wing governing coalition partner FPÖ and its political affiliates, which targeted media outlets, in particular the public broadcasting cooperative ORF.

Fred Turnheim, president of the Austrian Journalists Club, told Mapping Media Freedom: “The former far-right opposition party FPÖ has been well known for criticising the press for what it considers a liberal bias and lack of objectivity in the past.”

Turnheim said that since joining the government, FPÖ has the ability to influence the media landscape and try to pressure journalists into silence.  

Turnheim views the influence of US President Donald Trump as an important turning point, which now risks normalising the defamation of media outlets as peddlers of fake news and journalists as liars. “President Trump opened the possibility of discrediting journalists without providing any evidence. This is an attitude which has spread not only to Austria.”

Möhring cited the FPÖ’s intention “to intimidate individual journalists in order to produce and influence reports in their favour and to reduce the reputation of independent journalism, especially the ORF, among the general public”. However, she assigned responsibility for the rise in intimidation in the country not only to the FPÖ, but also to Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, “who tolerates and approves of the FPÖ’s behaviour and, additionally, pursues an enforced one-sided information policy called message control”.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]

Hungary

Mapping Media Freedom published 69 reports of censorship in Hungary between May 2014 and 31 July 2018. The most important impact on the state of media freedom is the concentration of media outlets in the hands of a few businessmen close to the government.

Only a handful of independent media outlets continue working in Hungary, publishing almost exclusively on the internet. This has led to a situation where access to information critical of the government is difficult to obtain, especially in rural areas with low internet penetration and for people who are less tech-savvy.

One of the largest internet news sites, Origo, was sold to business circles close to the government in 2014. The most important left-leaning daily, Népszabadság, was closed in October 2016.

After Fidesz won the parliamentary elections in April 2018 for the third time, dissenting oligarch Lajos Simicska sold his media interests. The leading conservative newspaper Magyar Nemzet was closed in April 2018, and the only news channel critical of the government, Hír TV, was also sold in July 2018.

After a media outlet is taken over by business circles close to the government, the leading journalists and management are usually dismissed, and the outlet begins publishing/broadcasting materials in line with the direction set during informal meetings by people close to the government. Self-censorship is pervasive among the journalists who continue working at these outlets.

Press freedom and the right to access to information in Hungary were considerably affected by the acquisition of virtually all county newspapers by businessmen close to the government in 2016.

“We consider the government monopoly on news unhealthy and damaging, going against the laws concerning free competition and media,” Miklós Hargitai, the president of the National Association of Hungarian Journalists (MÚOSZ), told Mapping Media Freedom. He added that because MÚOSZ is not a government authority, its leverage is limited.

“We raise awareness of the illegalities through our statements and petitions, as well as interviews published in the few remaining free media outlets. We also plan to file a complaint to the European Commission, because the media conglomerate serving the interests of the government is functioning using mainly public funds: cheap credits and preferentially contracted state advertising. In our opinion, this is state subsidy, which is forbidden in the EU,” Hargitai said.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]

The Netherlands

On 21 June this year, the offices of two Dutch weekly magazines were shot at with an anti-tank gun. The property was badly damaged, but as it was late at night, no one was injured. The weeklies, Panorama and Nieuwe Revu, are both known for their reporting on organised crime, and more specifically feuds between various criminal motorcycle gangs. The main suspect turned out to be a member of one of those motorcycle gangs.

Over the past five years, Mapping Media Freedom has shown that most of the media freedom violations in the Netherlands were reported in the subcategory “Intimidation”. The intimidation came from various sources: individuals, politicians, companies and the public. Journalists are mostly the target when they deal with such topics as organised crime, Islam, right-wing politician Geert Wilders and Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan.

Several journalists received threats in the aftermath of the failed coup in Turkey and a diplomatic row between the Netherlands and Turkey in 2017. Political party Denk, a Dutch party accused of having ties with Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, refused critical journalists at their press conferences. They published a campaign video in which they warn their voters to “distrust the media, don’t fall for it”.

Journalists who write critically about far-right parties like Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom and Forum for Democracy also often receive threatening and intimidating messages.

A trend of sexist threats and intimidation against women journalists reached a low point in May 2017, when Dutch journalist Loes Reijmer received multiple rape threats after the right-wing blog GeenStijl published her photo with a salacious text. It resulted in many more women journalists coming out in the open with their stories about sexual harassment online.

“Parties like Denk and PVV increasingly depict journalists as a biased party,” said Thomas Bruning, from the Dutch Union for Journalists (NVJ). “And because of social media, the threshold is lower than it used to be for the public to react, often anonymously. And the chance of being caught is lower, so people are getting away with it.”

A prominent Dutch study showed that over 60% of Dutch journalists have at some point in their career received threats and experienced intimidation. The survey, A Threatening Climate (2017), showed that 61% of all (638) questioned Dutch journalists had been threatened, 22% even on a monthly basis. Amnesty International called the Dutch numbers “worrying”.

According to Alex Brenninkmeijer, the former Dutch ombudsman who led the investigation, an explanation is the lack of trust in the media. “This is a consequence of the attitude of politicians towards journalists. You see this in the US and the UK, and it’s spilled over to the Netherlands,” he said. “The tone used by politicians has become increasingly harsh. These are the people who should lead by example.” He added that journalism has become more polarised and politicised over the past few years, like the society has. “The pressure on journalists has increased, as if they are forced to take sides, left or right. As a result, they become the subject of hate and intimidation.”

This often results in self-censorship. The majority of journalists questioned in the survey stated that threats and intimidation have negative consequences on the quality, independence and diversity of their work, and are therefore a danger to press freedom. Some have become more careful when dealing with sensitive topics; some avoid certain places and topics.

Brenninkmeijer added that he is most worried about the vulnerable position of journalists in their profession. “Fewer journalists are contracted, instead they have flexible contracts or are freelancers,” he said. “This leads to an employer having less responsibility for the safety of the journalist. The journalist’s position is weak and unprotected. And journalism becomes increasingly under pressure in society.”[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]

Spain

Between May 2014 and August 2018, Mapping Media Freedom reported 46 cases of censorship in Spanish media. Nemesio Rodríguez, president of the Spanish Federation of Journalism Associations, said: “There is evidence of journalists being pressured to change their information. Only 21% of journalists declare they have never received pressures to change their information. 75.7% believe it is usual that journalists yield to pressure, which in many occasions leads to self-censorship.”

Rodríguez pointed to judicial decisions as one of the factors that have limited the freedom of information. These decisions derive from restrictive laws passed during the right-wing People’s Party governments, especially the so-called “Gag Law” – the Citizen Security Law – which “contains articles that have weakened this freedom, since its judicial interpretation has ended by penalising free opinion. On the other hand, police sanctions against journalists and photojournalists have led to self-censorship to avoid problems.”

The Platform for the Defence of Freedom of Information also blames legislative and judicial powers. “The Citizen Security Law has been applied against journalists in the exercise of their work; and judicial procedures against investigative journalism, mainly in corruption cases by demands for the right to honour.”

Rodríguez also blames governments. “The News Service Council – the body in charge of guaranteeing internal control and independence within Spain’s public TV and radio corporation – reported hundreds of cases of censorship, manipulation, partisanship and other bad practices during Mariano Rajoy’s government.” Rajoy, the former head of the PP, was Spain’s prime minister from 2011 to 2018. “Also, Catalan television TV3 received accusations of informative manipulation and partiality in favour of a pro-independence thesis.”

PDLI pointed out: “We cannot forget other threats, such as the reform of the Criminal Code, as well as the deterioration of working conditions in the press; and the safety of journalists, especially women, due to threats and harassment in social networks would be another relevant factor.”

Overall, Rodríguez remarked that “this is not a state of widespread risk for freedom of expression and freedom of press. There is no censorship in Spain, if we understand censorship as the aim of a government to prevent the dissemination of information contrary to its interests.” Nevertheless, he admitted: “It is much harder to put an end to pressures coming from economic powers, since many media outlets are controlled by financial groups.”

PDLI does not share Rodríguez’s views. “There has been an unprecedented deterioration, particularly since the approval of the ‘Gag Law’, and it needs to be reverted urgently.”[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]

Sweden

Sweden is still home to resilient, diverse and independent media, with relatively healthy commercial media supplementing a well-funded public service offering over TV, radio and online. The past year has however seen further evidence that the rise of populist right-wing politics in Sweden threatens both the operational freedom of journalists and their traditional place as an important component in the functioning of Sweden’s parliamentary democracy.

This threat is most obvious in the actions of extra-parliamentary hard-right activists pursuing traditional neo-Nazi methods of intimidation through marching, physical attacks and directly criminal behaviour, but a more pervasive threat is the delegitimisation of the media more generally by activists and politicians from the insurgent Sweden Democrats party.

In August 2018, for example, the SD leader Jimmie Åkesson said on air that he would like to close down the public service radio channel P3 for being too left-wing, attracting criticism. In the runup to the recent election the party has maintained a consistent hostility to the established commercial and public media, which they claim are trapped by political correctness and populated by a leftist elite. On election night Åkesson audibly lamented the number of journalists in the room, and the party’s strong showing has raised the prospect of their influencing media legislation in the coming years. Jesper Bengtsson, the chairman of Swedish PEN, said that “in Jimmie Åkesson’s world all journalism seems to just be an opinion. How should we get away from that idea of journalism?”

This type of scepticism of professional journalistic work has also been evident in the Moderate Party. This summer Hanif Bali, a member of parliament, was heavily criticised after posting mocked-up pictures of himself on the cover of the computer game Call of Duty, indicating that he was at war with the newspaper Dagens Nyheter.

Other dangers in the Swedish media include the increased precarity of work for freelancers, who are facing structural challenges to carrying out their work safely, and the apparent indifference by some members of the police to the safety and responsibility of journalists operating in public spaces. There is also a secondary challenge from foreign broadcasters in the US and Russia producing inaccurate news reporting on Sweden, which then undermines the professional legitimacy of Swedish journalists – a phenomenon which became particularly evident during the election campaign.

Going forward, the Swedish government is taking measures to combat fake news and reform support it provides to online and offline publications.[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]

Montenegro

Montenegro’s atmosphere of impunity is cited by reporters within the country as the main reason for the high rate of intimidation against media workers. Nineteen of the 47 incidents logged in the country between May 2014 and August 2018 included threats against journalists. The threats come from a variety sources, including politically connected individuals and politicians: “Prime minister’s brother threatens and swears at journalist” and “Parliament vice-president threatens and insults journalist” are among them.  

Marijana Camović, president of the Trade Union of Media of Montenegro, told Mapping Media Freedom that the escalation of threats and intimidation is the end result of unresolved assaults and the 2004 murder of Duško Jovanović, who was the director and editor-in-chief of the daily Dan. “In a society where such things are unpunished, then intimidations are even less punished,” Camović said.

According to Tea Gorjanc-Prelević, executive director of Human Rights Action, an NGO that focuses on freedom of expression, one of the main reasons for the rise in intimidation is that there is little respect for the country’s laws, authorities or institutions – “especially if the one who is threatening is affiliated to the authorities”.

Camović said that authorities need to resolve threats against journalists quickly and effectively. She pointed to the case of journalist Sead Sadiković, who was targeted twice in as many years with threats and intimidation. A year after the first incident, an explosive device was thrown at his home because the perpetrators were upset with his reporting. “If the institutions were proactive in the first incident, the second would have never happened,” Camović said.

Gorjanc-Prelević said that priority should be given to strengthening the rule of law regarding all kinds of criminal behaviour, but pressure should also be put on authorities to diligently investigate and sanction those who are threatening journalists.

HRA recently proposed amendments to the Montenegrin Criminal Code with the aim of increasing the punishment for attacks on journalists, in order to contribute to the climate of general prevention.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Methodology” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]What is Mapping Media Freedom?

The map is a collection of narrative reports about incidents targeting journalists/media workers in 43 countries. While visualised as a map, it is a news service and database verifying, collating and recording threats to media freedom that have been reported to it by a network of correspondents, partners and journalists. The strength of Mapping Media Freedom is that it contains a wealth of details about the types of incidents affecting journalists.

What kinds of incidents are reported?

Mapping Media Freedom monitors limitations, threats and violations that affect journalists as they do their job. We strive to have a complete narrative of the objective facts of incidents without bias against news outlets or journalists.

Each incident is categorised by the following:

Limitation to Media Freedom

Did the incident happen to a media worker while they were carrying out their professional duties? If so, what categories fit the facts of the incident?

• Death: Media worker killed as a result of their work
• Physical Assaults: Media worker subjected to violence as a result of their work
• Injury: Media worker injured as a result of their work
• Arrest/Detention: Media worker arrested or detained as a result of their work
• Interrogation: Media worker questioned by authorities as a result of their work
• Intimidation: Media worker menaced as a result of their work
• Collateral Targets: Threats made against those associated with a journalist, ie family or friends
• Attack to Property: Computers, cameras or other tools damaged
• Civil Charges: Media worker sued as a result of their work
• Criminal Charges: Media worker charged in connection with their work
• Legal Measures: Laws or court orders curtailing media outlets or workers
• Loss of Employment: Termination, job cuts
• Blocked Access: Media worker prevented from covering a story or speaking to a source
• Defamation/Discredit: Media worker publicly ridiculed
• Psychological Abuse: Verbal harassment, offline bullying
• Sexual Harassment: Media worker targeted for gender or sexual identity
• Trolling/Cyberbullying: Media worker harassed online
• DDoS/Hacking: News site or journalist targeted
• Violation of Anonymity: Publicly naming a source
• Bribery/Payments: Money proffered to influence coverage
• Impunity: Incidents where crimes against journalists go unpunished
• Targeting Whistleblowers: Targeting anonymous sources
• Attacking Freedom of Association: Union-busting by media outlet management

Case of Censorship

Did this incident include content produced by a journalist/media worker? What happened to that content?

• Article/Work didn’t appear at all
• Article/Work was heavily cut omitting important information
• Article/Work was slightly but significantly changed
• Article/Work was framed in a misleading way
• Self-censorship
• Soft censorship
• Commercial interference

Source of the Threat/Violation/Abuse

Who targeted the journalist/media worker?

• Employer/Publisher/Colleague(s)
• Police/State Security
• Government/State Agency/Public Official(s)
• Court/Judicial
• Political Party
• Corporation/Company
• Private Security
• Known Private Individual(s)
• Criminal Organisation
• Another Media
• Other/Unknown

Type of Journalist

What type of journalist/media worker was involved? In the case of bloggers/citizen journalists: were they involved in journalistic activities?

• Journalist
• Broadcaster
• Photographer
• Documentarist
• Cameraperson
• Editor
• Blogger/Citizen Journalist
• Other

Gender

What is the gender of the journalist/media worker involved in the incident?

• Female
• Male
• Nonbinary
• Not Applicable

Support Needed

If known, what could unions or media outlets help the journalist with?

• Legal Aid
• Physical Protection
• Training
• Informational Resources
• Publicity
• Union Intervention
• Solidarity

EU Membership

To which category does the country in which the incident took place belong?

• EU Member States
• Candidate Countries
• Potential Candidates

How do we verify the incidents submitted?

The platform’s methodology complies with the journalistic standards employed by Reuters and AP. Each report is verified by 2-3 trusted and independent sources, which include but are not limited to local and national media outlets, journalists’ unions, police reports and the social media accounts of the individuals directly involved.

When violations are self-reported or clarification is needed, Index staff also verify incidents with the media worker(s) affected by getting first-hand testimony, and/or speak to journalists’ unions.

Our verification process is a multilayered one in which staff work with a team of independent journalists to verify and report incidents submitted to the website. The goal is the most complete narrative of the incident that reflects the objective events.  

Who is considered a journalist/media worker?

A media worker is anyone partaking in the gathering, assessing, creating and presenting of news and information.

What countries are monitored?

Mapping Media Freedom monitors a total of 43 countries which include the EU member states, candidates and potential candidates for EU membership, non-EU EEA states and four former Soviet bloc nations.

Albania | Austria | Azerbaijan | Belarus | Belgium | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Bulgaria | Croatia | Cyprus (Northern Cyprus) | Czech Republic | Denmark | Estonia | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Hungary | Iceland | Ireland | Italy | Kosovo | Latvia | Lithuania | Luxembourg | Macedonia | Malta | Montenegro | Netherlands | Norway | Poland | Portugal | Romania | Russia | Serbia | Slovakia | Slovenia | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland | Turkey | Ukraine (Crimea) | United Kingdom | Vatican

European Union member states

Austria | Belgium | Bulgaria | Croatia | Cyprus (Northern Cyprus) | Czech Republic | Denmark | Estonia | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Hungary | Ireland | Italy | Latvia | Lithuania | Luxembourg | Malta | Netherlands | Poland | Portugal | Romania | Slovakia | Slovenia | Spain | Sweden | United Kingdom

European Union candidate states

Albania | Macedonia | Montenegro | Serbia | Turkey

European Union potential candidate states

Bosnia and Herzegovina | Kosovo

Non-EU states

Azerbaijan | Belarus | Iceland | Norway | Russia | Switzerland | Ukraine (Crimea) | Vatican[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_column_text]Acknowledgements

This report was prepared by Valeria Costa-Kostritsky, Sean Gallagher, Jodie Ginsberg, Joy Hyvarinen and Paula Kennedy with contributions from Mapping Media Freedom correspondents: Adriana Borowicz, Ilcho Cvetanoski, João de Almeida Dias, Amanda Ferguson, Dominic Hinde, Investigative Reporting Project Italy, Linas Jegelevicius, Juris Kaza, David Kraft, Lazara Marinkovic, Fatjona Mejdini, Mitra Nazar, Silvia Nortes, Platform for Independent Journalism (P24), Katariina Salomaki, Zoltan Sipos, Michaela Terenzani, Pavel Theiner, Helle Tiikmaa, Christina Vasilaki, Lisa Weinberger

Illustrations

Alex Green

Design

Matthew Hasteley[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_single_image image=”106454″ img_size=”full” alignment=”center”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_single_image image=”106452″ img_size=”full” onclick=”custom_link” link=”https://ecpmf.eu/”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_single_image image=”106451″ img_size=”full”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/3″][vc_single_image image=”106450″ img_size=”full” onclick=”custom_link” link=”https://europeanjournalists.org/”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row]