Xi’s the one: What the pundits are saying about China’s next leader

The world’s two biggest superpowers are about to choose their next leaders. While the American battle is laid bare for all to see, in China, Beijing’s new emperor and his closest advisers are something of a mystery.

Chinese flags (Shutterstock)

Chinese flags (Shutterstock)

That hasn’t stopped the rest of the world debating what Xi Jinping (China’s most likely candidate for the new Communist Party chief) and his top officials will mean for the country.  So far it’s all guesswork, and there are some widely differing opinions from Xi the reformer, to Xi the hardliner. Here’s a round-up of the predictions from Tokyo to Washington.

Hong Kong

While there is virtually no discussion in mainland media about the new incoming Politburo, Hong Kong-based pundits are free to publish their views. According to AFP, Hong Kong-based website Mirror Books is pessimistically predicting that the new line-up will be dominated by conservatives and not reformers. It predicted the line-up “would include Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Zhang Gaoli and Wang Qishan, citing sources close to the party.”

Hong Kong political commentator Willy Lam was positive: “This looks like the line-up. It is not one that will be good for reform hopes”.

Australia

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute argues that it will be business as usual under Xi. He won’t be “making any drastic domestic changes”, argues Hayley Channer, because of his “allegiance to the Communist Party.”  But compared to current premier Hu Jintao, Xi is “more approachable as well as more confident.” Channer suggests that domestic problems will keep Xi busy and away from acting too feisty in regional politics.

Kevin Rudd, the Chinese-speaking former Australian prime minister, pointed out last month that the new government — likely to be announced on 8 November, two days after the US elections — will have the same key goal as all other Chinese governments since 1949: that is “the new leadership will seek to sustain the political pre-eminence of the Chinese Communist Party within the country.” This will be tough, Rudd says, because of corruption, economic issues, and the need to boost the country’s international standing.

In terms of issues of free speech, Xi will be walking into a much freer China: “Democratic forces within China also now have greater space to operate than used to be the case,” Rudd writes. “There is now a much more open debate about Chinese policy questions in the Chinese media.”

And while the Party itself is off limits and will continue to be so as a topic of public discussion, Rudd suggests that “the public debate, both in the mainstream media, the social media and on the ground through popular protest activity over local decisions, is now a firm and probably fixed feature of Chinese national political life.”

We can only bide our time,  he says, to see how much Xi is prepared to allow this develop.

Xi Jinping during a trip to Dublin, Ireland, February 2012. Art Widak | Demotix

Xi Jinping during a trip to Dublin, Ireland, February 2012. Art Widak | Demotix

Japan

Dr. Satoshi Amako at The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies bleakly pedicts that Xi will be more hardline than Hu.

“Some analysts contend that [Xi] will adopt more conservative policies and try to strengthen one-party rule domestically,” Amako says. “ His statements are conservative but reformist, China-centric but internationalist.”

Xi will have to grapple with a number of crucial issues, one of which is the struggle between a growing need among the people for more freedoms and the supremacy of the Party. He says:

China’s open reform policies not only realized economic growth but also generated a sense of rights, and the Communist Party has applied a strong brake to social and political liberation. On the other hand, various steps have been taken to introduce a degree of flexibility. Nevertheless, resistance from minorities, farmer movements, frequent civil and mass protests, civil rights movements aimed at raising public awareness of rights, and expansions of “free spaces” by informal media are now all evident.

Amako, sadly, offers no prediction over how Xi will attempt to juggle this one.

United States

Xi’s strong ties to the military could mean that he will be a “formidable leader for Washington to contend with”, writes Jane Perlez in the New York Times. With an increasingly stronger People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Xi is likely to focus on making China more assertive on the world stage, particularly in Asia, Perlez cites analysts as saying.

Not so, says infamous former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. After he held talks with Xi this year he said he was convinced China’s new leader would bring sweeping reforms to the country.

“It’s unlikely that in 10 years the next generation will come into office with exactly the same institutions that exist today,” Kissinger said.

Like Rudd, Kissinger believes internal issues will dominate Xi’s agenda so that he will not be looking for confrontation with the West:

What we must not demand or expect is that they will follow the mechanisms with which we are more familiar. It will be a Chinese version (…) and it will not be achieved without some domestic difficulties.

According to The Diplomat, Xi’s “confidence” — which Channer in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute also referred to — may be good or bad. A. Greer Meisels writes:

It could mean that President Xi may be more difficult to work with, at least from an American perspective, because he may feel as if the U.S. should be more deferential to China and its core interests. On the other hand, he could be easier to deal with because he may have the confidence to make bolder moves on the foreign policy, political, and economic reform fronts.

So again we’re advised to “wait and see”. And we may have to wait some time: The Diplomat warns that it will be at least one to two years before  Xi will have amassed enough “political capital” to make his mark.

United Kingdom

The Economist asks if Xi has “the courage and vision to see that assuring his country’s prosperity and stability in the future requires him to break with the past?” In other words, Xi must start to relax the party’s grip on power to deal with the problems facing China today: a slowing economy, corruption and growing social discontent.

Social media and growing incomes have meant people are more willing and able to voice their complaints, and news of protests can now be debated nationwide.

Xi could, the Economist says,  privatise rural land and give it to peasants. The judicial system needs to properly address grievances, and  “a free press would be a vital ally in the battle against corruption.”

While the magazine concedes this scenario is highly unlikely, it argues that Xi has no choice if he wants a strong a stable China in the years to come.

More on this story:

China will change leaders, but keep censorship

Chen Guangcheng’s nephew arrested on attempted murder charges

UPDATE: Chen Guangcheng’s relatives have described beatings by local authorities since the activist fled house arrest last month. His brother, Chen Guangfu, father of Chen Kegui was reportedly detained for three days, during which time he was beaten and interrogated. 

Chen Guangfu described his ordeal to Hong Kong-based magazine iSunAffairs.com, telling them he was hooded and taken away from his home shortly after Chen Guangcheng escaped. He said: “They put me on a chair, bound my feet with iron chains and locked my hands with handcuffs behind my back,” he said. “They pulled my hands upwards forcefully. Then they slapped me in the face.”

Chen Guangcheng condemned the “pattern of abuse” against his relatives. 

The nephew of blind Chinese activist and “barefoot lawyer” Chen Guangcheng has been arrested on charges of attempted murder. Chen Kegui faces charges ranging from 10 years in prison to the death sentence, after he brandished a meat cleaver at intruders searching for his uncle, who escaped from his 18 month-long house arrest in his native Shandong province last month.

Speaking to the Independent, Chen Guangcheng said his nephew had injured, but not killed, some of the intruders who broke into his house in Linyi, Shandong, to search for the activist.

Chen Kegui’s lawyers have come under pressure to drop the claim that Kegui acted in self-defence. His lawyer, Liu Weiguo, has been forbidden from talking to foreign media about the case. Other Chinese lawyers have branded the charges as “ridiculous”.

Chen Guangcheng, who was housed at the US embassy in Beijing following his escape, has said he fears his family would be subject to reprisals if they returned to Shandong. The blind self-taught legal activist, who is currently in a Beijing hospital awaiting permission to travel to the USA, criticised the “mad retribution” his family were experiencing.

Guancheng has told the Guardian that his brother was not allowed to leave his village, and his sister-in-law has been released on bail. His older brother’s family have had all of their phones confiscated, including mobiles.

Chen, noted for his efforts to expose forced abortions and sterilisations, spent four years in prison on charges of disturbing public order before being placed under house arrest in September 2010. Those attempting to visit him have faced harassment and beatings from officials.

Chen Guangcheng won the Index on Censorship whistleblowing award for his activities in 2007

 

Playing cat and mouse with China’s censors

The twists and turns in the fate of “barefoot lawyer” Chen Guangcheng have held all in its thrall. Despite the vigilance of web censors, China’s netizens — particularly its social media users — have found inventive new ways of discussing the case.

China’s web nannies have been on high alert ever since Chen fled his home in his native Shandong province. To bypass the censors, netizens concocted nicknames for Chen, including “Shawshank” (a reference to the film, The Shawshank Redemption) and “Sunglasses” (denoting Chen’s trademark black sunglasses). But within days, these search terms were also blocked .

Tea Leaf Nation, a blog that “makes sense of China through social meda”, rounded up the memes and graphics that people used to express their support for Chen, including photos of girls on Weibo with “Free CGC” tacked onto their bare legs. The pictures are now likely to be deleted.

Blocking on Sina Weibo (China’s hugely popular version of Twitter) has been systematic in the Chen case. “Chaoyang Hospital” the facility where Chen received treatment, is now an illegal term. When you search for it, Weibo tells you that “according to the relevant regulations, search results cannot be shown.”

The authorities are also using soft blocking – Beijing-based film-maker and writer Charles Custer explored how Weibo hides content from users. For Tech in Asia Custer wrote:

What we found is that while Sina did not block “left of his own volition” as a search term … the company clearly took steps to smother discussion of the term by disabling the indexing of new posts containing the term. … While you can still search for posts with “left of his own volition,” you will only see results from before 16:50 this afternoon, which is approximately when Sina blocked the indexing.

Hong Kong University’s China Media Project, has been, as always, the most reliable source of information on what’s been censored. A post by Xiong Peiyun, a journalist and fellow of the centre, is on the Weibo ban list. Links to Xiong’s piece which criticised China for asking for an apology from the US for sheltering Chen in its embassy have been deleted.

Although overtaken by Chen case, China’s crackdown on “rumour-mongering” in the sensitive Bo Xilai affair continues. On 24 April it was reported that the Chinese government shut down at least four Sina Weibo accounts —  “Li Delin,” “Guangzhou Wu Guanchong,” “Yangguang de yuanshi” and “Longyitian—945″ — and several reports claim people running these Weibo handles have disappeared.

The Financial Times report that Wu Guanchong was an entrepreneur and avid internet user based in Guangzhou who allegedly used Weibo to circulate rumors about a coup in Beijing. He has been missing for about a month, it is being claimed he was taken away at the end of March by officials from the capital.

Meanwhile, when one searches on Weibo in Chinese for Li Delin, a financial journalist who also blogged extensively on the case, the following notice appears:

Recently, some lawless individuals have used Sina microblog to make up and spread rumors for no reason, which has had a bad effect. They are now being dealt with by Public Security according to the law.

 There were a few comments on Weibo about these notices. A student called Zhang Shaoyan wrote:

This [notice] made me think of how our textbooks had described the Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]. It’s been eighty years, but now the mountains are on our own heads.

Zhang’s comparison of the tactics of the ruling party with the Kuomintang (defeated by the Communist Party during the Chinese civil war) is hardly original. There was a reason he felt so strongly: one of his microblogs had just been deleted.