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Index on Censorship’s Monitoring and Advocating for Media Freedom project monitors threats, limitations and violations related to media freedom in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Previously these countries were also included in the Mapping Media Freedom project, which Index incubated and managed between 2014 – 2018.
This report summarises policy recommendations based on analysis since April, 2019. The recommendations are based on research by in-country correspondents and Index staff. Country reports published by the project since April are available on the project webpage.
After a brief background section, the report sets out key policy recommendations that apply to all the project countries, followed by key recommendations for each project country.
Background
It is essential that media freedom groups and international organisations continue to monitor, verify and document threats, limitations and violations related to media freedom in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, continue to raise awareness about the challenges and to advocate for change. Media freedom is severely restricted in all these countries and journalists are under great pressure.
Violence against journalists; misuse of counter-terror and security legislation to silence journalists; travel bans that isolate journalists and impact them professionally; failure to investigate violent crimes against journalists and silencing and punishing journalists through defamation and insult laws – all these are familiar tactics and increasingly common. In more recent years the introduction of restrictive internet-related legislation, such as in Russia, has opened a new frontline in the fight to safeguard media freedom.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALL PROJECT COUNTRIES
Governments and multilateral groups, in particular the European Union (EU), must take a strong stand in defence of media freedom and journalists, both in their bilateral relations with the project countries and in multilateral processes. Governments and the EU should ensure that issues such as proposed or existing legislation that restricts media freedom, violence against journalists and failures to investigate crimes against journalists, form part of the agenda in strategic bilateral and multilateral discussions.
Countries that have a version of the Magnitsky Act (in the EU, this includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and The Netherlands) should consider making use of this legislation in cases where media freedom and the safety of journalists are at stake. Countries that have not yet introduced such legislation should consider doing so. The UK should put its Magnitsky amendment into use.
A man lays flowers near the picture of murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya, during a rally in Moscow, Russia, 7 October 2009. CREDIT: EPA / Alamy Stock Photo
Impunity is a major challenge in all the project countries. In Azerbaijan, the death of freelance journalist Rafic Tagi, who died in hospital after a stabbing in 2011, has never been investigated properly. Belarussian cameraman Dzmitry Zavadski disappeared in 2000 on his way to meet journalist Pavel Sheremet, later killed in Ukraine in 2016. Zavadski’s body was never found.
The instigator of the 2006 contract killing of investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya in Russia is still not known, nor is the motive. In 2018 the European Court of Human Rights found that the Russian authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into her killing. Turkey failed to investigate the death of editor Rohat Aktaş, killed when he was covering hostilities between Kurdish separatists and Turkish forces in 2016.
Ukrainan journalist Pavel Sheremet was killed by a car bomb in Kyiv in 2016 and, despite statements from the authorities that the case is a priority, there has been no progress. All the project countries should commit to investigating unsolved killings of journalists and should implement the guidelines in recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
In relation to impunity, the guidelines envisage that when investigations and prosecutions have not resulted in justice member states can consider establishing special inquiries or independent specialised bodies, and that the latter could involve participation by respected media and/or civil society figures.
Council of Europe member states must engage more actively with the Council of Europe’s Platform for the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. The partner organisations of the platform, which include Index on Censorship, should continue to use the platform to raise awareness of media freedom violations and threats to journalists. This should include advocating for states to respond to all alerts communicated to the platform.
The overall response rate from states in 2018 was only 39%. It is also important that states provide substantive replies to alerts and engage in follow-up dialogue with the partner organisations. The platform is an underused mechanism, with potential to achieve more. Partner organisations can also be of assistance to member states that are willing to engage fully.
Belarus is not a member of the Council of Europe, but other international organisations and processes, such as the special procedures of the United Nations human rights council, should be engaged to follow up cases and issues in Belarus.
Azerbaijan must halt its use of travel bans for journalists including Khadija Ismayilova
The EU must use its influence to defend media freedom and journalists in Azerbaijan. Negotiations on an agreement to replace the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, in place since 1999, are at an advanced stage and will need to be brought to a conclusion by the new European Commission. It is extremely important that the EU raises media freedom and human rights in these negotiations.
In 2018, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which recommended that the EU should make deepening of relations with Azerbaijan conditional on respecting democratic values and human rights, and that it should ensure that Azerbaijan frees its political prisoners (including journalists such as Afgan Mukhtarli) before the negotiations on a new partnership agreement are concluded. Mukhtarli remains imprisoned.
Azerbaijan must refrain from targeting journalists’ online activities, including through call hacking, internet blocking and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In October, internet blockages and disruption to mobile phone services were reported in central Baku in connection with ongoing protests. Several journalists were also detained or subjected to physical violence during the protests. Social media platforms such as YouTube should respect Azerbaijani users’, including journalists’ right to seek, receive and impart information. Platforms should implement terms and conditions consistently and transparently, including when dealing with harassment of journalists by alleged state-sponsored trolls.
Azerbaijan must halt its use of travel bans for journalists. For example, the well known journalist Khadija Ismayilova is currently under a travel ban. OSCE Media Freedom Representative Harlem Désir has stated that it is a serious hindrance to her work as a professional journalist.
Belarus must amend the law on mass media. The legislation currently requires journalists, including freelancers, who work for media outlets registered outside Belarus to obtain accreditation from the foreign affairs ministry. This has led to journalists being fined repeatedly. At a very minimum, Belarus must urgently establish procedures that enable journalists to appeal rejected accreditation requests.
Other governments must make it clear to Belarus that restrictive and repressive actions against journalists will not be tolerated. This applies to the requirements for accreditation for journalists working for non-Belarussian media outlets above, but also to the practice of detaining journalists for short periods. Some observers have credited Belarus’ tendency to impose fines on journalists or to detain them for short periods – rather than sentence and imprison them – as an attempt to build alliances in the West at a time when relations with Russia are weak. Other governments need to signal clearly it is not acceptable.
In the case of Belarus, which is not a member of the Council of Europe, it is important that support and training aimed at enabling journalists to defend their rights includes training on other international organisations and processes, such as the special procedures of the United Nations human rights council, including the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus.
Russia must investigate cases of trumped-up charges against journalists such as Ivan Golunov
Russia must refrain from finalising the legislative changes that would extend the scope of “foreign agent” to individual journalists. Existing problematic legislation already requires media outlets that receive funds from abroad to register as foreign agents. At the time of writing the Duma has approved changes that would extend this to individual journalists, including freelance journalists and bloggers. Any one of these receiving payments for services, or a salary from abroad, would need to register with the ministry of justice. All published work would need to display a “foreign agent” label. This legislation should not proceed, and existing legislation that labels media outlets as foreign agents should be reviewed.
Access to court proceedings is a frequent problem for journalists. As stated in Opinion No. 8 of the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors: “Transparency in the performance of the prosecutor’s duties is an essential component of the rule of law, and one of the important guarantees of a fair trial. Not only must justice be done, but it must also be seen to be done. In order for this to be possible, the media should be able to provide information on judicial, criminal or other proceedings” (paragraph 30). The authorities must review existing processes for compliance with international standards.
The authorities must thoroughly investigate cases of trumped-up charges against journalists and ensure that the instigators are brought to justice. Recent incidents include the high-profile case of Ivan Golunov, arrested for possession and trafficking of drugs, and what appears to be a fake letter sent in the name of Nikita Telizhenko with the aim of discrediting him.
Index on Censorship magazine editor Rachael Jolley leads chants in support of Turkey’s jailed journalists ahead of Turkish President Erdogan’s visit to Downing Street in May 2018
The judicial reform strategy (JRS), launched in May, 2019, will not achieve any meaningful change, at least not in its current form. Turkey’s judicial system is not independent: it is overloaded with cases, many which concern journalists, and it has been undermined through the large-scale dismissal of judges. It is extremely important that other countries and international organisations scrutinise the judicial reform strategy, and make it clear that in its current form it is completely inadequate when it comes to addressing the enormous structural problems of the judiciary.
In May 2019, the United Nations special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression published a follow-up report to an earlier visit to Turkey in 2016. The rapporteur had made a series of recommendations in 2016, which included releasing jailed journalists and reversing the closure of media outlets. The follow-up report found that Turkey had either failed to implement or had contravened all the recommendations, with the exception of one (lifting the state of emergency). Turkey should urgently implement all the recommendations made by the United Nations special rapporteur.
Diplomatic representations and international organisations, including the EU, need to support observation of trials that involve journalists and media outlets. High-profile trials in central locations can be well-attended by observers, but coverage of trials in remote locations is more limited. Support can include sending representatives to follow trials and/or financial support for organisations that monitor trials.
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskiy must engage with the media. Photo: Wikimedia
The government needs to undertake an independent and transparent review of state support, including financial support for far-right groups associated with extremism. The review should involve international experts. It should include investigating the possibility of state security force collusion with paramilitary and extremist organisations and thorough investigations of alleged involvement in violence against journalists, such as the unsolved murder of Oles Buzina.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy reportedly held a 14-hour press conference in October, attended by 300 journalists. Whether it signals a new era in the relationship between Ukraine’s elected representatives and the media remains to be seen. The failure of the president and lawmakers to engage meaningfully with the media in the past has been a challenge for journalists and this needs to change.
In the highly divisive media landscape, the role of the public broadcaster is extremely important. Ukraine’s public broadcasting company is severely underfunded and currently has a very small audience. As Index on Censorship outlined in its Demonising the Media report a year ago, a significant but underreported trend in the region is the threat to public broadcasters. A number of national broadcasters in the EU and neighbouring countries were brought under closer government control in 2014-18. Ensuring both sufficient funding and editorial independence are crucial in ensuring the public’s right to know is defended.
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[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner][vc_custom_heading text=”2 Incidents” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][vc_column_text]
Journalist Khadija Ismayilova was the subject of both violations this month.
12 August 2019 – Investigative reporter, Khadija Ismayilova’s request for an early end to her probation period was rejected, according to the Turan news agency.
The Binagadi district court refused to satisfy journalist’s request on the grounds the journalist was not fully recovered.
Ismayilova was released on probation in 2016 after having served a year and a half of her seven and a half year sentence. Her probationary sentence forbids Ismayilova from leaving the country or working.
Links: https://ifex.org/azerbaijan-khadija-ismayilovas-request-for-early-end-to-her-probation-rejected/
https://www.contact.az/ext/news/2019/8/free/Social/en/83009.htm
Categories: criminal charges/fines/sentences; subpoena/court order/lawsuit;
Sources of violation: court/judicial
7 August 2019 – The Supreme Court of Azerbaijan upheld charges of tax evasion against investigative reporter Khadija Ismayilova, the independent Turan News Agency reported.
The journalist has been ordered to pay 45,145 Azerbaijani manats to tax authorities, who claim Ismayilova intentionally avoided paying taxes during her time as Bureau chief of Azadliq Radio.
Ismayilova said she considers the decision unlawful and that now she has exhausted all domestic legal remedies, she will take the case to the European Court of Human Rights.
https://www.contact.az/ext/news/2019/8/free/Social/en/82962.htm
Categories: criminal charges/fines/sentences; subpoena/court order/lawsuit;
Sources of violation: court/judicial[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1575028108260-b66cab02-1f6d-6″ taxonomies=”8996″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_single_image image=”108305″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes”][vc_column_text]The morning of 9 April did not promise to be out of the ordinary for Sevinc Osmanqizi, an Azerbaijani journalist based in the suburbs of Washington DC. She started her morning routine by making a fresh pot of coffee and readying her two sons for school. Prior to starting the daily broadcasts of her YouTube-based OsmanqiziTV channel, she checked her messages, which included links sent by friends to a broadcast that had aired a few days earlier on the recently-launched Real TV in Azerbaijan.
The host of the broadcast was all too familiar to Osmanqizi. It was her former colleague Mirshahin Aghayev, known to the TV-viewing public by only his first name. She saw her picture on the studio background monitors, and then heard her own voice. “It was a complete shock,” she said, describing her emotions. “This [was broadcast on] national TV, so why is my voice there, why am I hearing my personal conversation?”
The 9 April 2019 broadcast replayed a series of private voice messages Osmanqizi had exchanged with a media colleague who is in exile in Germany. “My first question was ‘how did they get ahold of it?’ The conversation took place more than a month prior. I was trying to remember the details. I couldn’t remember what platform I had used [to communicate]. This was one of many conversations that I’d had, it was personal,” she said. Some time later, she still seems disturbed by the incident. “I was asking myself, ‘if they have this conversation, what else do they have?’”
As Osmanqizi watched the rest of the broadcast, she grew more anxious. “It contained direct hints that they had more. They ran ads saying so.” In the next two weeks, the situation worsened, she said.
The channel that Aghayev operates, where he hosts his TV show, began airing information she said she had never shared on social media, including photos. Aghayev ominously promised his audience that they would see “much more.” In subsequent broadcasts, Aghayev revealed a series of intimate emails between Osmanqizi and a US-based man who Aghayev claimed was working for US intelligence services. He also insinuated that Osmanqizi herself was on the payroll of US special services, and threatened to air intimate photos and videos of her.
“I began to understand this is not a one-man operation, there is definitely official involvement,” Osmanquizi said, implying the involvement of the government of Azerbaijan.
“I immediately got very worried about her, and about another person she had a conversation with, after the broadcasts,” said Gulnoza Said, a senior researcher with the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a New York-based media freedom watchdog. “I was outraged because any conversation that two people have should remain private, and should never be used as state propaganda or to harass a journalist. And that’s exactly what we dealt with in Sevinc Osmanqizi’s case,” she said.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Been there, seen that
Said and others’ concerns were not unfounded. Although Aghayev and his TV channel have scaled back their threats to air intimate photos, videos, and her remaining correspondence, these were not empty threats. Sonia Zilberman, South Caspian Energy and Environment Program Director at Crude Accountability, an environmental and human rights organisation in Washington DC, said that alarming parallels came to mind when she heard about the threats against Osmanqizi.
“This isn’t the first time. The case with Khadija Ismayilova was even more excruciating,” she said, referencing the 2012 case in which the Azerbaijani government had been widely criticised for airing intimate footage that had been obtained through illegal surveillance of another Azerbaijani female journalist. Ismayilova’s reporting on government corruption involving the country’s “first family” became sufficiently problematic that the authorities resorted to blackmail. Ismayilova was filmed at a private residence with a male companion, and was blackmailed with stills of video footage from a camera installed in a ceiling light. She was warned to stop her journalist investigations, and when she refused and disclosed the attempted blackmail, the video footage was leaked online.
“Talking at a human level, the amount of pressure that the Azerbaijani journalists face is enormous. Not only inside the country, but as we are seeing right now, outside the country as well,” Zilberman said. “Their personal lives are being infiltrated, they are constantly under pressure.” At the same time, she added, the pressure shows how far the Azerbaijani government is willing to go, and how dirty it is prepared to play.
Said agreed. “Khadija Ismayilova’s case was the first thing that came to my mind when I spoke to Sevinc. Also, I recall many other cases when women were harassed or extorted, or attempted to be extorted, by similar means.”
Whereas Khadija Ismayilova was illegally surveilled and recorded inside Azerbaijan, Osmanqizi’s data was collected while she resided in the United States. This is a cause for some additional concern, according to Said. “We have known for some time, and have heard allegations that the Azerbaijani authorities practice surveillance of journalists and opposition members in the country,” she said. “The case with Osmanqizi [showed] that they may go as far as to target Azerbaijanis with critical views living outside the country. This is very concerning.”
The similarity between Ismayilova’s case and the threats against Osmanqizi were not lost on other journalists. A number of media and journalism organisations issued statements condemning the actions of the Azerbaijani authorities. Both Said’s and Zilberman’s organisations have issued statements in support of Osmanqizi, and Deutsche Welle and others tweeted their support. One Free Press Coalition included her name in the 10 “Most Urgent” Threats to Press Freedom Around the World.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]“We are everything they are not”
The Azerbaijani authorities have been pouring millions, if not billions, of US dollars into “reputation laundering” to improve its standing in the west. Said noted that Azerbaijani authorities employed different tools, such as hiring respectable PR firms in Washington and some European capitals, and allegedly bribing some parliament members in Europe. “People like Sevinc Osmanqizi, or other journalists who live abroad and try to show to the world the real face of the Azerbaijani authorities, defeats the whole [set of] policies of the Azerbaijani authorities in creating their positive image,” she said, adding that the government perceives critical voices living outside the country as enemies they want to silence.
Osmanqizi’s YouTube channel airs daily broadcasts and call-in shows in Azerbaijani, and offers biting criticism of the government of Ilham Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, who is often chastised by international governments and organisations for his anti-democratic policies and imprisonment of journalists. She offers opinions not available on the government-controlled Azerbaijani media. She provides airtime to opposition figures and dissidents to whom other Azerbaijani television has been hostile for many years.
Osmanqizi is not alone.
Hebib Muntezir was nominated for a 2016 Freedom of Expression Award for his work at Meydan TV.
“Since there are no normal conditions for free and independent media to function inside the country, and the local media are under control of the government and oligarchs, no one can directly criticise the authorities. So, in the last few years, many journalists and bloggers have left the country because of the persecution and pressure against them and their families. They started to create new media abroad, so they could continue their professional work. That is why these types of exiled Azerbaijani media have been mushrooming,” said Habib Muntezir, member of the board of the Berlin-based MeydanTV YouTube channel.
Osmanqizi said she “simply cannot” broadcast from within Azerbaijan. “I would be arrested the next day. That’s a clear cut case.”
What unites nearly all YouTube-based channels broadcasting from abroad is their stance in opposition to the current Aliyev government. “You can only show one side of the story. You cannot be impartial. In order to be impartial, you would have to cover all sides of the story. But if [the officials] refuse to talk to you, your platform becomes partial and lopsided. They label you ‘opposition,’ ‘activist’ media. But, as a journalist, you might be forced into this category against your wish,” he explains, saying that even independent experts on non-political matters are afraid to speak to independent exiled media sources for fear of persecution.
These channels form a diverse tapestry of voices, and vary in audience size, length of establishment, frequency of broadcasts, and most importantly, level of professionalism. Some are headed by professional journalists like Osmanqizi, a veteran alumna of the first independent TV channel ANS, where she had for years worked side by side with Aghayev, the host of broadcasts attempting to intimidate her. After leaving ANS, she worked for the BBC in London. Her channel has around 120,000 subscribers, impressive for a country the size of Azerbaijan.
Other channels, launched by people who lack journalistic experience or education, are often merely outlets for their operators to voice criticism of the government in the form of crude and insulting insinuations and rants. Some of these have impressive audiences, as well, as people look to them as the outlet for voicing their own pent up anger and frustration.
“Nowadays in the Azerbaijani media, there are very few professional journalists. Many were originally activists, people with courage, and they gain experience on the job. Lack of formal training leads to mistakes that violate media ethics, and some unprofessional action. Pressure and fear of persecution by the government are lowering the quality of the Azerbaijani media,” Muntezir said, noting the impact of an unfree society on both sides of the camera or microphone.
“If the environment were free, if people didn’t freeze with fear whenever they saw a microphone, if citizens were not afraid to speak to media, if the government, president, and ministers talked to the free media, we would not live in a blockade state,” Muntezir said.
According to Osmanqizi, when it comes to attacks on exiled media, “the government is losing the competition” for the hearts and minds of the public. “We are everything they are not,” she said. “What they are lacking is the truth, the reality. People see themselves in our programs, they recognise their problems, which is not the case with government-sponsored TV programs. That is why they tune into our channel.”
In her view, the choice between traditional and online media is really a choice between information and disinformation, and the latter is very easy to identify, she said. “You cannot fool anyone and make them believe that Real TV or [state broadcaster] AzTV is real news. People only watch them when they lose their remote control,” Osmanqizi adds, laughing.
The new internet-based TV channels offer the chance for the people to express their own opinions, and to hear the voices of average citizens they identify with. “They participate,” she explains. “Unfortunately, this is not something that can be done from inside Azerbaijan.”
Viewers are calling from inside the country for better journalism, and sometimes their support for the hosts of foreign-based channels speaking truth to power may cost them their freedom. Osmanqizi said this fate befell her viewer, Elzamin Salayev, after he recorded a video appeal condemning Aghayev’s campaign against her. According to Osmanqizi, he was given a fifteen day prison sentence for condemning Aghayev and questioning his morals for threatening to broadcast her intimate footage.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Camera… Lights… Attack!
There is very little doubt in the mind of Osmanqizi and others interviewed for this article as to where the orders for the attacks on journalists originate. “I have absolutely no doubt that they’re coming from the highest political leadership of Azerbaijan,” Osmanqizi said.
It is common knowledge in Azerbaijan as to who stands behind attacks appearing in the Azerbaijani media. Both Osmanqizi and Muntezir point to Ali Hasanov, an aide to the president on political and social affairs, as the architect of the attacks. “The order to attack is coming from Ali Hasanov and his group. I call the people who plan these attacks the presidential apparatus trolls,” Muntezir said, referencing Hasanov’s office as part of the president’s executive office. “The [TV] channels are being directly ordered what to broadcast. XazarTV is owned by Hasanov’s son, Shamkhal Hasanov. SpaceTV is owned by Sevil Aliyeva, the sister of the president.” The channels, he argued, are completely subservient to the authorities.
Osmanqizi agrees. “Hasanov has been the president’s media adviser for 23 years. He was Heydar Aliyev’s advisor, and now he is Ilham Aliyev’s advisor.” Heydar Aliyev, the nation’s former president, passed the helm to his son Ilham.
Earlier this year, Mirshahin Aghayev, the journalist from Real TV who threatened Osmanqizi, received a medal from the state security ministry (MTN) commemorating the 100th anniversary of “State Security and Foreign Intelligence Services.” The medal was awarded by Ilham Aliyev’s presidential decree and presented to Aghayev by MTN’s head of public affairs, Arif Babayev, during a ceremony at the TV station. In footage of the event broadcast on Real TV, Babayev calls Aghayev “someone we love very much.” Osmanqizi was dismayed that a journalist would be awarded such a medal by the intelligence service, and more so, that the ceremony would be proudly broadcast. She also wondered about Aghayev’s accomplishments that merited such an unusual recognition. “What has he done for them?” she asks. “Have you heard of any such thing in another country?”
Aghayev has been a prominent journalist in Azerbaijan since the early 1990s. He began his career at ANS TV, the first independent media source in the country after the fall of the Soviet Union. He gained popularity with daring broadcasts that blurred the line between news reporting and opinion. In a country where there was no alternative to rigid state-controlled TV news, his reporting was a breath of fresh air, revitalising the media environment.
A degree of criticism was tolerated by the senior Aliyev’s regime, and ANS was allowed certain journalistic liberties. The government invariably pointed to ANS when defending itself against domestic and foreign critics who accused it of persecuting journalists. However, the Azerbaijani government’s toleration of ANS ended on 29 July 2016 when the station’s licence was revoked after ANS broadcast an interview with Fethullah Gülen, an exiled Turkish cleric based in the United States who Turkey was attempting to extradite.
“ANS was shut down because it broadcasted reports that were not in line with presidential apparatus policy,” said Muntezir. “The condition to return ANS’s licence was that it would begin working under the direct supervision of Hasanov, and not broadcast a single sentence without the presidential apparatus’s approval nor stray from its dictates,” he said.
Prior to and during the controversy around ANS, Aghayev benefited from his stardom by teaching journalism. He was regarded as an institution.
He re-emerged from relative obscurity in March 2018, when the government granted a licence to a new broadcaster, Real TV. Aghayev took the helm at Real TV, and since then has been attacking and using insults and his signature word play and intentional slips of the tongue to smear anyone who dares to disagree with or criticise the authorities. Both Osmanqizi and Muntezir say that the motivation for allowing Aghayev back on the air and installing him at the helm of a new TV channel was the government’s need to counteract exiled media and critics of the regime who were outside its legal reach.
“[Before being allowed back on TV] Mirsahin [Aghayev] was made to promise that he would go on air every week and attack not only the opposition, but also those who think differently from the government. Otherwise, he could not return to TV. And he does so, every week,” said Muntezir. He added that Aghayev’s recently-launched Real TV was issued a new broadcast licence.
On 7 April, Aghayev made one of the most notorious appeals in the history of his editorial broadcasting. Using word play and double negatives, he called for treating opposition members “as if they did not have the Azerbaijani identity card,” meaning non-citizens with no rights. “If we did not live in a democratic country, I would call on emergency medical personnel not to treat them, bus drivers not to allow them to board buses, bread sellers not to sell them bread. But we live in a democratic society,” he said on the air. Media experts and lawyers in Azerbaijan have debated whether these words rise to the level of hate speech, and quite a few of them agreed, in interviews, that it did. So do many members of the opposition.
On April 21, Aghayev issued an ultimatum to Osmanqizi on his TV broadcast demanding that she stop her critical YouTube broadcasts, “or else.” When she refused, she said, “on 28 April my intimate materials were aired.”
In addition to airing private conversations and email correspondence pertaining to Osmanqizi, Aghayev also said that Osmanqizi had asked him to assign her to conduct interviews with local businesses. Imitating her manner of speech and voice inflection, he accused her of seeking to benefit financially from puff pieces that she would air. Aghayev and Osmanqizi had worked together at ANS between 2008 and 2013. He had been her supervisor.
Finally, on 16 July, Aghayev doubled down against the chorus of condemnation, and admitted in a television interview that he is no longer unbiased, something his critics accused him of for quite some time. “Now we have a position. It is impossible to have a position and remain unbiased. Now, we take a side,” he is quoted as saying in an article, promising to be “even more harsh, and give everyone what is due to them.” The irony that was not lost on anyone in the country, judging by numerous public comments on social media, that it was ANS TV that had made him iconic and brought him his following. For years, ANS had started and ended its broadcasts with the slogan, “Reliable, Conscientious, Unbiased.” [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]Trollin’ trollin’ trollin’/Don’t try to understand them/ Just rope and throw and brand ’em
The government of Azerbaijan not only uses terrestrial broadcasters, such as Aghayev’s Real TV and other television channels that it controls, but also utilises armies of fake accounts to discredit dissident journalists, known as troll factories.
The comments sections of YouTube videos posted to OsmanqiziTV, MeydanTV, and other critical channels are full of comments from people with fake names and accounts. These comments often contain threats, insults, inane arguments or praise for the ruling regime.
But the measures taken by the Azerbaijani government to sideline, marginalise and silence critical voices in exiled media, although impressive, do not appear to be working, according to both Osmanqizi and Muntezir.
“People don’t believe them, definitely,” Muntezir said of the trolls. “It is wrong to say that the people don’t know the truth, and cannot separate fact from fiction. They know the truth very well, and are aware of what is going on in the country. They are aware of the trolls and their work. They know the Azerbaijani government supports them, they know they spread lies.”
According to Muntezir, this troll network is neither professional nor effective. “They open a new profile with no picture, a clean slate. They repeatedly copy and paste the same text, often from presidential speeches. They paste the text under content that is not even political,” he explained, saying that even news stories about football have comments citing Ilham Aliyev’s speeches and heaping praise on the government.
Muntezir said he has a good guess as to the identity of the people behind the troll profiles. “I know it for a fact that they compile reports about their work. It might be a student, or a teacher, or a government employee. Once a week, it is their turn, and they are sat down and made to copy and paste comments. They have to report how many comments they make, and support the data with screenshots. They have dedicated Whatsapp groups,” he said, referencing the smartphone app through which the trolls purportedly communicate and receive their marching orders. “People have repeatedly sent me screenshots of those conversations. They have lists of media sources they are expected to attack. But they burn themselves too fast, they operate unprofessionally,” Muntezir said.
According to Osmanqizi, the effect is exactly the opposite of the goal. She calls it the “boomerang effect.” “We are more popular, and have wider reach. On the other hand, they are not serving their target. They have not proven effective because nowadays, people can differentiate the truth from the lies. People have grown accustomed to the constant attacks accusing us of things we have not done,” she said. “They know it is propaganda. It is a lie machine.”
She said these efforts “only prove that what we are doing is important. The government of Azerbaijan is wasting its resources and money to combat its rivals and critics [because it cannot tolerate criticism].” She calls the attacks on her “the government’s defence mechanism,” because the government does not like being held accountable. “The people understand it’s a matter of accountability,” she said. “[Holding the government accountable] is something media in Azerbaijan should have been doing, but since the free media has been marginalised and destroyed [in the country, the people] appreciate our work.”
Muntezir believes that idea behind troll factories originated in Russia. “Putin started doing this with a higher degree of professionalism. Our [officials] talk about the integration with the west, while copy-pasting all of the disgusting things from Russia at the same time.” He describes the quality of the Azerbaijani trolls as akin to “Chinese-made counterfeits of the original.”
Osmanqizi, no stranger to mass troll attacks on the comments section under her videos, said that the attacks prove the effectiveness of exiled media. “If it was not the case [that exiled media was effective], we would not be targeted… They woke up one day and realised they can no longer influence public opinion. It is being formed beyond their reach and authority. Now they are playing catch-up, and they have not been very creative. They cannot prevent people from watching us. All they can do is smear and harass,” she said.
Crude Accountability’s Zilberman agrees with the ineffectiveness of the government’s tactics. “I think the government is shooting itself in the foot by dishonouring the Azerbaijani women who provide access to information inside their country. In any country, dishonouring somebody personally is really shameful, because the attack is personal, and not professional.”[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]
[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]As a former friend and colleague of Mirshahin Aghayev, this was a difficult article for me to write. It took a long time, because in the middle of writing about trolls, I myself have become the target of a wall of faceless, nameless hordes and a mass concerted effort against my online presence. I needed to distance myself from the attacks, and regain my composure, to ensure I could resume working on this article as impartially and honestly as I could.
To make matters worse, much worse, I suspect that I have become the target of attacks not by pro-government trolls, but trolls working for one of the largest opposition parties in Azerbaijan, which declares its adherence to principles of democratic development and freedom.
Following my broadcast of an interview with an opposition group member in which he criticised the leader of a much larger opposition party, I was singled out and barraged by insults, insinuations, and homophobic comments (I am openly gay in a country considered the most homophobic in wider Europe). This was a shocking experience for me, as I myself did not utter a word during the part of the interview about the opposition leader, and considered the comments by my guest to be measured and within ethical norms that did not merit my interruption.
What was shocking and bewildering to me is that these attacks came from the opposition party for which I admitted voting when I lived in Azerbaijan decades ago. I felt betrayed by the very people whose ideals I believed in and whose rights I had been trying to defend, and whose plight I had been trying to publicise in my work.
I understand that in a country with a ruthless regime playing dirty with anyone who dares to dissent, opposition parties must employ some of the government’s tactics in order to protect themselves and survive. If the government employs throngs of trolls to smear the opposition, the opposition must do something similar in order to protect itself. It is understandable that some of the proponents of opposition leaders have taken it upon themselves to engage in smear campaigns and vicious personal attacks against me. They saw me, as the owner of the channel, as ultimately responsible for whatever criticism that was voiced against their beloved leader.
I had time for little other than deleting insults from the comments sections of my videos for two days straight. My Facebook page was shut down numerous times (I lost count after eight suspensions in the span of four days). There were mass complaints against my account for “impersonating someone else.” First, I had to send a picture of my ID showing my personal data. I would regain access. Then, Facebook demanded a picture of me holding the ID. Rinse, repeat.
Once my account was unblocked, I made a passionate, and somewhat angry, appeal to the leader of the party in question. Not mincing words, I told him I had no longer considered him a friend of free press, since he had remained silent in the face of attacks by his party members against a journalist doing his best to do honest work. I called on him to deny that his party employed trolls, like many of his supporters had claimed on my Facebook page and in public comments. I called on his party to reject troll tactics, condemn them, and unequivocally state that trolls are detrimental to civilised public discourse in our country which is under ruthless dictatorial rule.
None of that happened. During an appearance on a YouTube broadcast, his supporters proceeded to call me “an American pig” (I am a United States citizen), and said that “they had lists of those they would hang when they come to power. I was on them.” Strangely, these comments were not blocked or deleted during or in the hours after the broadcast.
Due to the bizarre logic of “enemy of my enemy is my friend,” I found myself defended by pro-government newspapers, Facebook pages and journalists. The very same ones that had, a year earlier, run shaming headlines leaking pictures of my wedding (to another man) and calling me an abomination or far worse. The shame of being defended by regime apologists is the worst thing with which I must now come to terms.
At the time, the party denied any involvement. Officials and supporters alike demanded that I produce screenshots of the comments. Though I had deleted most of them out of sheer embarrassment, I was able to send them the ones I and my friends had saved. There were denials that these commenters had been affiliated with the party in question, but my friends pointed to their profiles, which showed that they were. Then the response was that these accounts had been hijacked by government trolls to attack me. At that point, I stopped following the zigzags of disingenuous denials. However, I have heard privately from friends that a few of the party’s members “have been chided,” and were told not to use slurs regarding sexual orientation. I will take that.
The very nature of trolling means people do not use their real names or pictures most of the time. They do not pose for avatar pictures holding their party IDs in their hands. I cannot name names, but I did what I could. In addition, I know for a fact that I was not the first, nor will I be the last person to be attacked by the trolls affiliated with this particular political party. There have been numerous cases before me, and I believe the public was on my side. I feel I was vindicated. I learned a valuable lesson in the process: speaking truth to power does not entail just the regime; at times, it means even the pro-democracy opposition. This was a shocking and unpleasant discovery that informs the direction of my future work. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]The author of this piece, Ismail Djalilov, previously worked with Mirshahin Aghayev at ANS. Djalilov and Sevinc Osmanqizi did not coincide with each other at ANS. He is also host of duzdanisaq (Straight Talk), a YouTube channel broadcasting into Azerbaijan.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Monitoring and Advocating for Media Freedom” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:left” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=”1/4″][vc_icon icon_fontawesome=”fa fa-times” color=”black” background_style=”rounded” size=”xl” align=”right”][/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=”3/4″][vc_column_text]Index on Censorship’s Monitoring and Advocating for Media Freedom project documents, analyses, and publicises threats, limitations and violations related to media freedom in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, in order to identify possible opportunities for advancing media freedom in these countries.
The project collects, analyses and publicises limitations, threats and violations that affect journalists as they do their job, and advocates for greater press freedom in these countries and raises alerts at the international level.
The project builds on Index on Censorship’s 4.5 years monitoring media freedom in 43 European countries, as part of Mapping Media Freedom platform.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column_inner][/vc_row_inner][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][three_column_post title=”Incidents by month: Azerbaijan” full_width_heading=”true” category_id=”34499″][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_custom_heading text=”Press Freedom Violations in Azerbaijan” font_container=”tag:h3|text_align:center” use_theme_fonts=”yes”][vc_column_text]
Incidents can be in more than once category.
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Blocked Access
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Attack to Property
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Offine Harassment
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Online Harassment
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DDoS/Hacking/Doxing
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Leyla Mustafayeva (Photo: RFERL)
Leyla Mustafayeva is an Azerbaijani journalist and the wife of investigative journalist Afgan Mukhtarli, who was kidnapped in Georgia in May 2017 and later imprisoned in Azerbaijan.
Mustafayeva left Georgia along with her daughter Nuray after being followed by the same individual who was following her husband before his abduction. Today she lives in Germany and continues to campaign for the release of her husband.
When Mukhtarli fled to Georgia, Azerbaijani authorities were shutting down NGO’s and independent media outlets. In Georgia, he continued to openly criticise the Azerbaijani regime as a journalist and arranged protests to demand the release of journalists and political prisoners.
Mukhtarli, who had investigated the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, was stalked by employees and later kidnapped. The company has been repeatedly linked to corrupt activity and human rights violations. The oil and gas sector in Azerbaijan is also well known for its lack of transparency and is considered the greatest source of corruption in the country.
Mustafayeva has put her career on hold. Today, she dedicates herself to learning German, integrating into German society and campaigning for her husband’s release.
Index on Censorship: What were the official reasons for your husband being abducted from Georgia and extradition to Azerbaijan, and how does this compare with why he was actually taken
Leyla Mustafayev: In January 2015 we were in Qazax, Azerbaijan. If my memory doesn’t betray me, it was midday. Afgan decided to flee to Georgia after he received information from one of the sources in the Chief-Prosecutor’s Office in Azerbaijan. As soon as he received the leaked information from the General Prosecutor’s office he fled to Georgia.
In 2014 he had been interrogated once about the criminal case which had been launched against Radio Liberty. In December 2014 journalist Khadija Ismayilova was arrested. It was the continuation of a crackdown by the Azerbaijani authorities’ against NGOs and the independent media.
After settling in Georgia he started investigating Azerbaijani state money that they had been invested in Georgia. It was obvious that the president’s spouse Mehriban Aliyeva, and his daughters Leyla and Arzu Aliyeva, had invested enough into banking, tourism and the cargo sector in Tbilisi and Batumi. Along with their Azerbaijani business partners, the family-owned big hotels in Tbilisi and Batumi.
Afgan was also very critical of the government in his posts on social media. At that time Afgan was not the only one who had fled to Georgia. Before his arrival to Tbilisi, some activists and journalists had already moved there. He fled to Georgia so that he could avoid being arrested, continue his professional activity, and fight for the release of his colleagues who had been imprisoned.
Along with his friends, he organised protests in front of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tbilisi and demanded the release of political prisoners, which included journalists.
The investigation was not the only reason he was kidnapped. Imagine one journalist organising a protest in front of the Azerbaijani embassy and demanding for the release of political prisoners while the president’s family is spending millions in European countries trying to build up their image. All of his activities were negatively impacting the reputation of the Azerbaijani government.
Index: What was Afgan working on when he was abducted?
Mustafayev: Afgan was working on similar topics that he had worked on before. He was visiting different places with regard to his investigation and was being stalked by plainly clothed people intensively. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) has a security section in Georgia. Afgan told me that the Security Committee of Azerbaijan had replaced their employees in the Georgian branch of SOCAR and that they had been told to stalk activists and journalists in Tbilisi, collect information about the places that they visited, and identify the people who they were meeting. One of the topics that Afgan was investigating was related to SOCAR.
Index: How have you been campaigning for the release of your husband, and what have been the major developments in that campaign?
Mustafayev: After Afgan was kidnapped I decided to stay in Georgia and campaign against both governments. Georgia is responsible for protecting the safety of all the people living within its borders. The Georgian Dream government not only failed to protect our safety but also collaborated with its authoritarian neighbour, the Azerbaijani government, so that it could silence the voice of one critical journalist.
Afgan’s kidnapping was the so-called “victory” of the authoritarian coalition in Georgia.
When I was living in Georgia, Afgan had not yet been convicted. I was hoping that our campaign with the civil society members and journalists would force the authorities to drop the charges against him in Azerbaijan, and reveal to the Georgian people and the world that the Georgian government was responsible for Afgan’s kidnapping.
Until that time, Georgia had been known as an island of democracy in South Caucasus. After Afgan was kidnapped in Tbilisi, it was obvious that it was no longer a place of democracy. When it comes to political interests, the Georgian government ignores fundamental freedoms and human rights.
Index: How has Azerbaijan responded to this campaign?
Mustafayev: Azerbaijani government officials kept repeating that Afgan had been detained while crossing the border illegally. Prior to and after his arrest, pro-Azerbaijani government websites were publishing articles that accused him of collaborating with an “anti-Azerbaijani network”. Elman Nasirov, one of the Azerbaijani MPs, said in an interview with Radio Liberty that Afgan had been taken to Azerbaijan as the result of a successful security services operation between Georgia and Azerbaijan.
During one of the court trials in Azerbaijan, Afgan had recognised the Azerbaijani border official that the Georgian kidnappers had delivered him to. Although Afgan was blindfolded after being kidnapped, he could remember the voice of senior border official Azar Shirinov, who had given a testimony in the court.
It has been two years since his kidnapping, and the criminal case that was launched in regard to his abduction in Georgia is still open. Within the last two years, Georgian law enforcement has erased all the facts that confirm his kidnapping from Georgia.
Georgia’s responsible government organisations failed to investigate the case. In this situation, the Georgian parliament needed to set up a special investigation group. However, they refused to do so. I believe that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, and the Georgian parliament are still protecting the senior Georgian government officials who were complicit in the adduction. I believe that this is the case because Afgan told me that his Georgian kidnappers were reporting to someone “on the top” about the steps that they had taken during the operation. CCTV in the Ministry of Internal Affairs was also not operating along the streets where the kidnappers abducted him. Law enforcement in both countries has mobilised their administrative power to bury this case. The police and security forces have entered private enterprises, obtained CCTV footage, and deleted all of the evidence. There was only one piece of footage that showed Afgan taking the mini-bus that takes a route to our home. The lawyer noticed one person in the footage who was following Afgan. Our lawyer asked the prosecutor’s office to clarify the identity of that person. The CD containing the video has not been opened since then.
Index: How did your husband’s abduction affect your own sense of security in Georgia and why did you leave the country?
Mustafayev: It was very stressful to live under surveillance. My daughter was asking each evening why her dad did not come home. She had heard about the kidnapping on the news and knew that something bad had happened to her father. She cried each morning when she got up, which she never did before. Once I realised that the person who had stalked Afgan the day before he was kidnapped was stalking me as well, I decided to leave Georgia. I recognised the person from footage on the Rustavi 2 TV channel. Although I had delivered photos and videos of the person who was stalking me and my daughter to the police and the Chief Prosecutor’s office, they did not investigate my complaints and failed to protect our safety. That is why I decided to leave Georgia.
Index: How has all of this affected your own work as a journalist?
Mustafayev: I started a new life in Germany. I have been integrating myself into society by learning the language and continuing my campaign for him. However, it has been extremely demanding. As a result, I have not been able to pursue my professional career like I had hoped after I graduated from journalism school in Tbilisi.
Index: How do you view the state of media freedom in Azerbaijan?
Mustafayev: The main critical and independent websites have been blocked in Azerbaijan. They are the websites of OCCRP, Radio Liberty, exile-based Meydan TV, Turan TV, the Azerbaijan hour TV programme, and the website of opposition newspaper Azadliq. There are around 70 political prisoners in Azerbaijan and five of them are journalists. There is no independent television in the country. The government has taken control of the mass media by blocking the main media platforms that criticised it. About 15 journalists have been involved in the criminal case that was launched against Meydan TV in 2015. In 2017 the president gifted 255 apartments to journalists to mark National Press Day on 22 July 22. During the last 14 years, three journalists have been murdered in Azerbaijan. Those who killed Elmar Huseynov and Rafig Tagi remain free. Azerbaijan has gone down three ranks and is now ranked 166th among 180 countries for media freedom, and is famous for the imprisonment and habitual intimidation of journalists.
Index: What are your hopes for Azerbaijan?
Mustafayev: The Azerbaijani government poses the biggest threat to media freedom in the country. It has already been 26 years since the ruling New Azerbaijan Party took power. They have established deep roots throughout these 26 years by ordering the authorities to “strengthen” their censorship of the media. The Chief Prosecutor’s Office lifted the travel ban that it imposed on journalists in 2015. Sevinj Vagifqizi, the journalist collaborating with the exile-based Meydan TV, was one of them. Shortly after the travel ban was lifted, she was sued for filming election fraud. The presidential elections were held in April 2018. The timing of the case soon after the travel ban was lifted led us to question the true motivation behind the lawsuit. All of this leaves very little space for hope. It shows that Azerbaijani authorities have no intention of pursuing fundamental reforms, and will always silence criticism from the media by any means they deem necessary. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”4″ element_width=”6″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1562165207475-534f6dfb-857d-2″ taxonomies=”7145″][/vc_column][/vc_row]