14 Jan 14 | About Index, Campaigns, Press Releases, Statements
Dean Spielmann
President
European Court of Human Rights
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg cedex
France
13 January 2014
Re: Grand Chamber referral in Delfi v. Estonia (Application no. 64569/09)
Index’s coverage: European ruling spells trouble for online comment
Dear President Spielmann and members of the panel:
We, the undersigned 69 media organisations, internet companies, human rights groups and academic institutions write to support the referral request that we understand has been submitted in the case of Delfi v. Estonia (Application No. 64569/09). Signatories to this letter include some of the largest global news organisations and internet companies including Google, Forbes, News Corp, Thomson Reuters, the New York Times, Bloomberg News, Guardian News and Media, the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers and Conde Nast; prominent European media companies and associations including the European Newspaper Publishers’ Association, Sanoma Media Netherlands B.V. and the European Publishers Council; national media outlets and journalists associations from across the continent; and advocacy groups including Index on Censorship, Greenpeace, the Center for Democracy and Technology and ARTICLE 19.
We understand that the applicant in the above-referenced case has requested that the chamber judgment of 10 October 2013 be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court for reconsideration. We are writing to endorse Delfi’s request for a referral due to our shared concern that the chamber judgment, if it stands, would have serious adverse repercussions for freedom of expression and democratic openness in the digital era. In terms of Article 43 (2) of the Convention, we believe that liability for user-generated content on the Internet constitutes both a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of Article 10 of the Convention in the online environment and a serious issue of general importance.
The case involves the liability of an online news portal for third-party defamatory comments posted by readers on the portal’s website, below a news item. A unanimous chamber of the First Section found no violation of Article 10, even though the news piece itself was found to be balanced and contained no offensive language. The portal acted quickly to remove the defamatory comments as soon as it received a complaint from the affected person, the manager of a large private company.
We find the chamber’s arguments and conclusions deeply problematic for the following reasons.
First, the chamber judgment failed to clarify and address the nature of the duty imposed on websites carrying user-generated content: what are they to do to avoid civil and potentially criminal liability in such cases? The inevitable implication of the chamber ruling is that it is consistent with Article 10 to impose some form of strict liability on online publications for all third-party content they may carry. This would translate, in effect, into a duty to prevent the posting, for any period of time, of any user-generated content that may be defamatory.
Such a duty would place a very significant burden on most online news and comment operations – from major commercial outlets to small local newspapers, NGO websites and individual bloggers – and would be bound to produce significant censoring, or even complete elimination, of user comments to steer clear of legal trouble. The Delfi chamber appears not to have properly considered the implications for user comments, which on balance tend to enrich and democratize online debates, as part of the ‘public sphere’.
Such an approach is at odds with this Court’s recent jurisprudence, which has recognized that “[i]n light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally.”[1] Likewise, in Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, the Second Section of the Court emphasised that “the Internet has now become one of the principal means of exercising the right to freedom of expression and information, providing as it does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions concerning political issues and issues of general interest”.[2]
Secondly, the chamber ruling is inconsistent with Council of Europe standards as well as the letter and spirit of European Union law. In a widely cited 2003 Declaration, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe urged member states to adopt the following policy:
“In cases where … service providers … store content emanating from other parties, member states may hold them co-responsible if they do not act expeditiously to remove or disable access to information or services as soon as they become aware … of their illegal nature.
When defining under national law the obligations of service providers as set out in the previous paragraph, due care must be taken to respect the freedom of expression of those who made the information available in the first place, as well as the corresponding right of users to the information.”[3]
The same position was essentially adopted by the European Union through the Electronic Commerce Directive of 2000. Under the Directive, member states cannot impose on intermediaries a general duty to monitor the legality of third-party communications; they can only be held liable if they fail to act “expeditiously” upon obtaining “actual knowledge” of any illegality. This approach is considered a crucial guarantee for freedom of expression since it tends to promote self-regulation, minimizes the need for private censorship, and prevents overbroad monitoring and filtering of user content that tends to have a chilling effect on online public debate.
Thirdly, it follows from the above that the Delfi chamber did not thoroughly assess whether the decisions of the Estonian authorities were “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2. Under the E-Commerce Directive and relevant judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it was not unreasonable for Delfi to believe that it would be protected by the “safe harbour” provisions of EU law in circumstances such as those of the current case.[4] The chamber ruling sets the Court on a potential course of collision with the case law of the CJEU and may also give rise to a conflict under Article 53 of the Convention.
Finally, the chamber ruling is also at odds with emerging practice in the member states, which are seeking innovative solutions to the unique complexities of the Internet. In the UK, for example, the new defamation reforms for England and Wales contain a number of regulations applicable specifically to defamation through the Internet, including with respect to anonymous third-party comments. Simply applying traditional rules of editorial responsibility is not the answer to the new challenges of the digital era. For similar reasons, related among others to the application of binding EU law, a recent Northern Ireland High Court judgment expressly chose not to follow the Delfi chamber ruling.[5]
For all these reasons, we strongly urge the Court to accept the applicant’s request for a referral that would allow the Grand Chamber to reconsider these issues, taking into account the points raised by the signatories in this letter. There is no question in our minds that the current case raises “a serious question affecting the interpretation” of Article 10 of the Convention as well as “a serious issue of general importance” (Art. 43).
Sincerely,
Algemene Vereniging van Beroepsjournalisten in België
American Society of News Editors
ARTICLE 19
Association of American Publishers, Inc
Association of European Journalists
Bloomberg
bvba Les Journaux Francophones Belges
Center for Democracy and Technology
Conde Nast International Ltd.
Daily Beast Company, LLC
Digital First Media, LLC
Digital Media Law Project, Berkman Center for Internet & Society – Harvard University
Digital Rights Ireland
Dow Jones
Electronic Frontier Finland
Estonian Newspapers Assocation (Eesti Ajalehtede Liit)
EURALO (ICANN’s European At-Large Organization)
European Digital Rights (EDRi)
European Information Society Institute (EISi)
European Magazine Media Association
European Media Platform
European Newspaper Publishers’ Association (ENPA)
European Publishers Council
Federatie van periodieke pers, the Ppress
Forbes
Global Voices Advocacy
Google, Inc.
Greenpeace
Guardian News & Media Limited
Human Rights Center, Ghent University
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union
iMinds-KU Leuven, Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and ICT
Index on Censorship
International Press Institute
Internet Democracy Project
La Quadrature du Net
Lithuanian Online Media Association
Mass Media Defence Center
Media Foundation Leipzig
Media Law Resource Center
Media Legal Defence Initiative
National Press Photographers Association
National Public Radio
Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren
Nederlands Uitgeversverbond (NUV)
Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten
Net Users’ Rights Protection Association
News Corp.
Newspaper Association of America
North Jersey Media Group, Inc
NRC Handelsblad
Online News Association
Open Media Coalition – Italy
Open Rights Group
Panoptykon
PEN International
PEN-Vlaanderen
Persvrijheidsfonds
Raad voor de Journalistiek
Radio Television Digital News Association
Raycom Media, Inc.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
Sanoma Media Netherlands B.V.
Telegraaf Media Groep NV
The New York Times Company
Thomson Reuters
Vlaamse Nieuwsmedia
Vlaamse Vereniging van Journalisten
Vrijschrift
World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers
[1] Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (Nos. 1 and 2), Judgment of 10 March 2009, para. 27. See also Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, Judgment of 5 May 2011.
[2] Judgment of 18 December 2012, para. 54.
[3] Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet, 28 May 2003, adopted at the 840th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
[4] The CJEU has ruled, with reference inter alia to Article 10 ECHR, that an Internet service provider cannot be required to install a system filtering (scanning) all electronic communication passing through its services as this would amount to a preventive measure and a disproportionate interference with its users’ freedom of expression and information. See Scarlet v. Sabam, Case C-70/10, Judgment of 24 November 2011; and Netlog v. Sabam, Case C-360/10, Judgment of 16 February 2012.
[5] J19 & Anor v Facebook Ireland [2013] NIQB 113 (15 November 2013), at http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2013/113.html.
13 Jan 14 | Europe and Central Asia, European Union, Politics and Society
This article is part of a series based on our report, Time to Step Up: The EU and freedom of expression
Collectively, the European Union of 28 member states has an important role to play in the promotion of freedom of expression in the world. Firstly, as the world’s largest economic trading block with 500 million people that accounts for about a quarter of total global economic output, it still has significant economic power. Secondly, it is one of the world’s largest “values block” with a collective commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and perhaps more significantly, the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention is still one of the leading supranational human rights treaties, with the possibility of enforcement and redress. Finally, Europe accounts for two of the five seats on the UN Security Council (Britain and France), so has a crucial place in the global security framework. The EU itself has limited foreign policy and security powers (although these powers have been enhanced in recent years), leaving significant importance to the foreign policies of the member states. Where the EU acts with a common approach it has leverage to help promote and defend freedom of expression globally.
How the European Union supports freedom of expression abroad
The European Union has a number of instruments and institutions at its disposal to promote freedom of expression in the wider world, including its place as an observer at international fora, its bilateral and regional agreements, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and geographic policies and instruments including the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the European Neighbouring and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The EU places human rights in its trade and aid agreements with third party countries and has over 30 stand-alone human rights dialogues. The EU also provides financial support for freedom of expression through the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), the European Instrument for democracy and human rights (EIDHR) and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). The EU now also has a Special Representative for Human Rights. Since 1999, the EU has published an annual report on human rights and democracy in the world. The latest report, adopted in June 2012, contains a special section on freedom of expression, including freedom of expression and “new media”. It recalls the EU’s commitment to “fight for the respect of freedom of expression and to guarantee that pluralism of the media is respected” and emphasises the EU’s support to free expression on the internet.
The European Union has two mechanisms to financially support freedom of expression globally: the European Instrument for democracy and human rights (EIDHR) and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). The latter was specially created after the Arab Spring in order to resolve specific criticism of the EIDHR: that it didn’t support political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and could not react quickly to events on the ground. The EED is funded by, but is autonomous from, the European Commission, with support from member states and Switzerland. The aims of the EED, to provide rapid and flexible funding for pro-democratic activists in authoritarian states and democratic transitions, is potentially a “paradigm shift” according to experts that will have to overcome a number of challenges, in particular a hesitation towards funding political parties and the most active and confrontational of human rights activists. The EU also engages with the UN on human rights issues at the Human Rights Council (HRC) and in the 3rd Committee of the General Assembly. The EU, as an observer along with its member states, is one of the more active defenders of freedom of expression in the HRC. Promoting and protecting freedom of expression was one of the EU’s priorities for the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly (September 2012-2013). The European Union was also instrumental in the adoption of a resolution on the “Safety of Journalists” (drafted by Austria) in September 2012. The European Union is most effective at the HRC where there is a clear consensus among member states within the Union . Where there is not, for instance on the issue of blasphemy laws, the Union has been less effective at promoting freedom of expression.
The EU and its neighbourhood
The EU has had mixed success in promoting freedom of expression in its near neighbourhood. Enlargement has clearly been one of the European Union’s most effective foreign policy tools. Enlargement has had a substantial impact both on the candidate countries’ transition to democracy and respect for human rights. With enlargement slowing, the leverage the EU has on its neighbourhood is under pressure. Alongside enlargement, the EU engages with a number of foreign policy strategies in its neighbourhood, including the Eastern Partnership and the partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean. This section will look at the effectiveness of these policies and where the EU can have influence.
The EU and freedom of expression in its eastern neighbourhood
Europe’s eastern neighbourhood is home to some of the least free places for freedom of expression. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the enlargement of the European Union has significantly improved human rights in eastern Europe. There is a marked difference between the leverage the European Union has on countries where enlargement is a real prospect and the wider eastern neighbourhood, where it is not, in particular for Russia and Central Asia. In these countries, the EU’s influence is more marginal. Enlargement has clearly had a substantial impact both on the candidate countries’ transition to democracy and their respect for human rights because since the Treaty of Amsterdam, respect for human rights has been a condition of accession to the EU. In 1997, the Copenhagen criteria were outlined in priorities that became “accession partnerships” adopted by the EU and which mapped out the criteria for admission to the EU. They related in particular, to freedom of expression issues that needed to be rectified. With the enlargement process slowing since the “big bang” in 2004, and countries such as Ukraine and Moldova having no realistic prospect of membership regardless of their human rights record, the influence of the EU is waning in the wider eastern neighbourhood.
After enlargement, the Eastern Partnership is the primary foreign policy tool of the European Union in this region. Launched in 2009, the initiative derives from the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which is specific about the importance of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. In this region, the partnership covers Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Freedom of expression has been raised consistently during human rights dialogues with these six states and in the accompanying Civil Society Forum. The Civil Society Forum has also been useful in helping to coordinate the EU’s efforts in supporting civil society in this region. Although it has never been the main aim of the Eastern Partnership to promote freedom of expression, it has had variable success in promoting this right with concrete but limited achievements in Belarus, the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; with a more ineffectual role being seen in Azerbaijan.
In recent years, since the increased input of the EEAS in the ENP, the policy has become more markedly political, with a greater emphasis on democratisation and human rights including freedom of expression after a slow start. In particular, freedom of expression was raised as a focus for the ENP after its review in 2010-2011. This is a welcome development, in marked contrast to the technical reports of previous years. This also echoes the increased political pressure from member states that have been more public in their condemnation of human rights violations, in particular regarding Belarus. Belarus is one Eastern Partnership country where the EU has exerted a limited amount of influence. The EU enhanced its pressure on the country after the post-presidential election clampdown beginning in December 2010, employing targeted sanctions and increasing support to civil society. This has arguably helped secure the release of some of the political prisoners the regime detained. Yet the lack of a strong sense of strategy and unity within the Union has hampered this new pressure to deliver more concrete results. Likewise, the EU’s position on Ukraine has been set back by internal divisions, even though the EU’s negotiations on the Association Agreement included specific reference to freedom of expression.
In Azerbaijan, the EU’s strategic oil and gas interests have blunted criticism of the country’s poor freedom of expression record. Azerbaijan holds over 89 political prisoners, significantly more than in Belarus, yet the EU’s institutions, individual member states and European politicians have failed to be vocal about these detentions, or other freedom of expression violations. In the EU’s wider neighbourhood outside the Eastern Partnership, the EU has taken a less strategic approach and accordingly has been less successful in either raising freedom of expression violations or helping to prevent them.
The European Union’s relationship with Russia has not been coherent on freedom of expression violations. While the institutions of the EU have criticised specific freedom of expression violations, such as the Pussy Riot sentencing, they were slow to criticise more sustained attacks on free speech such as the clampdown on civil society and the inspections of NGOs using the new Foreign Agents Law. The progress report of EU-Russia Dialogue for Modernisation fails to mention any specific freedom of expression violations in Russia. The EU has also limited its financial involvement in supporting freedom of expression in Russia, unlike in other post-Soviet states. The EU is not united on this criticism: individual European Union member states such as Sweden and the UK are more sustained in their criticisms of Russia’s free speech violations, whereas other member states such as Germany tend to be less critical. It is argued that Russia’s powerful economic interests have facilitated a significant lobbying operation including former politicians that works to reduce criticism of Russia’s freedom of expression violations.
In this region, the European Union’s protection of freedom of expression is weakest in Central Asia. While the EU has human rights dialogues with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, it has not acted strategically to protect freedom of expression in these countries. The EU dramatically reduced its leverage in Uzbekistan in 2009 by relaxing arms sanctions with little in return from the Uzbek authorities, who continue to fail to abide by international human rights standards. Arbitrary arrests, beatings and torture at the hands of the security services, as well as unfair trials of the regime’s critics are all commonplace. The European Parliament’s special rapporteur report of November 2012, took a tough stance on human rights in Kazakhstan, making partnership conditional on respect for Article 10 rights. But, this was undermined by High Representative Baroness Ashton’s visit to the country in November 2012, where she failed to raise human rights violations at all.
This lack of willingness to broach freedom of expression issues continued during Baroness Ashton’s first official visit to four of the five Central Asian republics: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. In Kyrgyzstan she additionally attended an EU-Central Asia ministerial meeting, where the Turkmen government (one of the top five most restrictive countries in the world for freedom of expression) was represented. Baroness Ashton’s lack of vocal support for human rights was condemned by local NGOs and international watchdogs.
02 Jan 14 | European Union, News and features, Politics and Society
The law of libel, privacy and national “insult” laws vary across the European Union. In a number of member states, criminal sanctions are still in place and public interest defences are inadequate, curtailing freedom of expression.
The European Union has limited competencies in this area, except in the field of data protection, where it is devising new regulations. Due to the impact on freedom of expression and the functioning of the internal market, the European Commisssion High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism recommended that libel laws be harmonised across the European Union. It remains the case that the European Court of Human Rights is instrumental in defending freedom of expression where the laws of member states fail to do so. Far too often, archaic national laws have been left unreformed and therefore contain provisions that have the potential to chill freedom of expression.
Nearly all EU member states still have not repealed criminal sanctions for defamation – with only Croatia,[1] Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the UK[2] having done so. The parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe called on states to repeal criminal sanctions for libel in 2007, as did both the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and UN special rapporteurs on freedom of expression.[3] Criminal defamation laws chill free speech by making it possible for journalists to face jail or a criminal record (which will have a direct impact on their future careers), in connection with their work. Many EU member states have tougher sanctions for criminal libel against politicians than ordinary citizens, even though the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Lingens v. Austria (1986) that:
“The limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual.”
Of particular concern is the fact that insult laws remain in place in many EU member states and are enforced – particularly in Poland, Spain, and Greece – even though convictions are regularly overturned by the European Court of Human Rights. Insult to national symbols is also criminalised in Austria, Germany and Poland. Austria has the EU’s strictest laws in this regard, with the penal code criminalising the disparagement of the state and its symbols[4] if malicious insult is perceived by a broad section of the republic. This section of the code also covers the flag and the federal anthem of the state. In November 2013, Spain’s parliament passed draft legislation permitting fines of up to €30,000 for “insulting” the country’s flag. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muiznieks, criticised the proposals stating they were of “serious concern”.
There is a wide variance in the application of civil defamation laws across the EU – with significant differences in defences, costs and damages. Excessive costs and damages in civil defamation and privacy actions is known to chill free expression, as authors fear ruinous litigation, as recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in MGM vs UK.[5] In 2008, Oxford University found huge variants in the costs of defamation actions across the EU, from around €600 (constituting both claimants’ and defendants’ costs) in Cyprus and Bulgaria to in excess of €1,000,000 in Ireland and the UK. Defences for defendants vary widely too: truth as a defence is commonplace across the EU but a stand-alone public interest defence is more limited.
Italy and Germany’s codes provide for responsible journalism defences instead of using a general public interest defence. In contrast, the UK recently introduced a public interest defence that covers journalists, as well as all organisations or individuals that undertake public interest publications, including academics, NGOs, consumer protection groups and bloggers. The burden of proof is primarily on the claimant in many European jurisdictions including Germany, Italy and France, whereas in the UK and Ireland, the burden is more significantly on the defendant, who is required to prove they have not libelled the claimant.
Privacy
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to a private life throughout the European Union. [6] The right to freedom of expression and the right to a private right are often complementary rights, in particular in the online sphere. Privacy law is, on the whole, left to EU member states to decide. In a number of EU member states, the right to privacy can restrict the right to freedom of expression because there are limited protections for those who breach the right to privacy for reasons of public interest.
The media’s willingness to report and comment on aspects of people’s private lives, in particular where there is a legitimate public interest, has raised questions over the boundaries of what is public and what is private. In many EU member states, the media’s right to freedom of expression has been overly compromised by the lack of a serious public interest defence in privacy law. This is most clearly illustrated by the fact that some European Union member states offer protection for the private lives of politicians and the powerful, even when publication is in the public interest, in particular in France, Italy and Germany. In Italy, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi used the country’s privacy laws to successfully sue the publisher of Italian magazine Oggi for breach of privacy after the magazine published photographs of the premier at parties where escort girls were allegedly in attendance. Publisher Pino Belleri received a suspended five-month sentence and a €10,000 fine. The set of photographs proved that the premier had used Italian state aircraft for his own private purposes, in breach of the law. Even though there was a clear public interest, the Italian Public Prosecutor’s Office brought charges. In Slovakia, courts also have a narrow interpretation of the public interest defence with regard to privacy. In February 2012, a District Court in Bratislava prohibited the distribution or publication of a book alleging corrupt links between Slovak politicians and the Penta financial group. One of the partners at Penta filed for a preliminary injunction to ban the publication for breach of privacy. It took three months for the decision to be overruled by a higher court and for the book to be published.
The European Court of Human Rights rejected former Federation Internationale de l’Automobile president Max Mosley’s attempt to force newspapers to give prior notification in instances where they may breach an individual’s right to a private life, noting that the requirement for prior notification would likely chill political and public interest matters. Yet prior notification and/or consent is currently a requirement in three EU member states: Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
Other countries have clear public interest defences. The Swedish Personal Data Act (PDA), or personuppgiftslagen (PUL), was enacted in 1998 and provides strong protections for freedom of expression by stating that in cases where there is a conflict between personal data privacy and freedom of the press or freedom of expression, the latter will prevail. The Supreme Court of Sweden backed this principle in 2001 in a case where a website was sued for breach of privacy after it highlighted criticisms of Swedish bank officials.
When it comes to data retention, the European Union demonstrates clear competency. As noted in Index’s policy paper “Is the EU heading in the right direction on digital freedom?“, published in June 2013, the EU is currently debating data protection reforms that would strengthen existing privacy principles set out in 1995, as well as harmonise individual member states’ laws. The proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation, currently being debated by the European Parliament, aims to give users greater control of their personal data and hold companies more accountable when they access data. But the “right to be forgotten” clause of the proposed regulation has been the subject of controversy as it would allow internet users to remove content posted to social networks in the past. This limited right is not expected to require search engines to stop linking to articles, nor would it require news outlets to remove articles users found offensive from their sites. The Center for Democracy and Technology referred to the impact of these proposals as placing “unreasonable burdens” that could chill expression by leading to fewer online platforms for unrestricted speech. These concerns, among others, should be taken into consideration at the EU level. In the data protection debate, freedom of expression should not be compromised to enact stricter privacy policies.
This article was posted on Jan 2 2013 at indexoncensorship.org
[1] Article 208 of the Criminal Code.
[2] Article 168(2) of the Criminal Code.
[3] Article 248 of the Criminal Code prohibits ‘disparagement of the State and its symbols, ibid, International PEN.
[4] Index on Censorship, ‘UK government abolishes seditious libel and criminal defamation’ (13 July 2009)
[5] More recent jurisprudence includes: Lopes Gomes da Silva v Portugal (2000); Oberschlick v Austria (no 2) (1997) and Schwabe v Austria (1992) which all cover the limits for legitimate criticism of politicians.
[6] Privacy is also protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights through Article 7 (‘Respect for private and family life’) and Article 8 (‘Protection of personal data’).
31 Dec 13 | Europe and Central Asia, European Union, Greece, News and features, Politics and Society
(Photo illustration: Shutterstock)
As Greece prepares to take on the presidency of the Council of the European Union on January 1, the country continues to grapple with the free expression fallout from its financial crisis.
The Greek constitution protects freedom of expression in Article 14, a very lengthy provision detailing the rights and restrictions. As set in the first paragraph of Art. 14 “every person may express and propagate his thoughts orally, in writing and through the press in compliance with the laws of the State”.
Aside from domestic legislation, Greece cooperates with a number of international organizations and is a contracting party to treaties related to freedom of expression, civil/political rights and access to information, for instance the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
However, the heavy austerity measures imposed since 2010, after the fiscal agreements between the Greek government and the “troika” (IMF, European Commission, European Central Bank), resulted in serious violations of human rights including freedom of speech. Cuts in government spending forced impoverishment upon large segments of society and came with a heavy price of social exclusion and marginalization.
Reports from various intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and civil society groups are raising alarms about policies followed by the Greek state. Human rights such as free expression, free thought, free movement, right to work, equal treatment, access to decision-making and right to protest are being systematically attacked.
On 16 April 2013, Nils Muižnieks, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, published a report on human rights issues. Muiznieks urged the Greek government to use all legal instruments, domestic and international, to combat hate speech and racist crime, largely attributed to the rise of the neo-nazi party Golden Dawn.
Government Transparency: call for social justice
Looking at the evidence coming from official institutions and NGOs, the “pillar” of government accountability is characterized by corruption and maladministration.
Although “micro-corruption” is less of a problem, mainly due to economic problems, Greece is still perceived as the most corrupt nation in the European Union. In a total of 177 countries worldwide, Greece ranks 80, although some progress has been made from last year.
According to the 2012 annual report of the Greek Ombudsman, a constitutionally sanctioned independent authority investigating administrative actions regarding personal rights, “the call for social justice is the main feature of people’s complaints, reflecting the existing social fatigue.”
After evaluating the significant increase in the number of complaints, the Ombudsman reported that citizen encounters with the administration have intensified, while the explosive social conditions have lead to greater loss in human rights protection.
Press Freedom: under attack
Greece’s dramatic fall in the ranking of 2013 World Press Freedom Index, is evidence of the oppressive environment journalism is practised. Since 2008, Greece has fallen from 31 place to 84.
In the past three years, mainstream media have been experiencing a significant deterioration in their “watchdog’ role, as a result of the crisis and of long-term weaknesses and practices.
The Greek media market is shaped by media groups owned by magnates, shipowners and big contractors. Having vested interests in profitable industries, these tycoons have been working closely with every regime to ensure their dominance at any cost.
In additiona, the financial crisis has led to closures and severe cutbacks at print and broadcast outlets while hindering effective reporting and quality journalism.
Ιndex on Censorship has thoroughly reported on politically motivated firings or suspensions at both state and private media.
The case of investigative journalist Kostas Vaxevanis is an indicative example of the governments’ approach to press freedom. Vaxevanis was arrested and prosecuted after publishing a list of more than 2,000 suspected tax evaders, the so called “Lagarde list”.
Moreover, Reporters Without Borders, in a special investigation report dating from September 2011, suggested that a crisis of confidence in journalism has resulted to a devaluation process of the profession. RWB highlighted the risks entailed in reporting at street demonstrations and violent clashes with the police: “Working conditions during demonstrations are nowadays rather like in a war zone”.
During the crisis, the need for more investigative reporting led several bloggers and online activists to form independent media collectives.
While mainstream media failed to report on the social struggle, these collectives managed to report complaints and publicise dissent. But not without a cost. On April 11 2013, Indymedia, an anti-authoritarian internet collective, had its plug pulled by the government for reporting on police brutality cases and exposing the deeds of neo-fascist Golden Dawn.
In late September 2012, the case of Elder Pastitsios showed that online satire cannot be tolerated. A 27-year-old man, who published a Facebook post mocking a well known Orthodox monk, was arrested on charges of malicious blasphemy and religious insult.
It’s perhaps the first time an internet company disclosed information to the Greek authorities in order to identify an individual accused of an alleged offense relating to religious satire.
LGBTI: Living in a conservative society
Several incidents of state censorship and social discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation illustrate the mentality of an oppressive society.
According to IGAL’s Annual Review Greece ranks 25 among 49 European countries. A wave of violence has been recorded against LGBTI activists and supporters, from conservatives, extremists and supporters of the Golden Dawn party.
In 2013, (ex) Greek State television ERT decided to censor a kissing scene between men from the TV drama Downton Abbey. Following the reactions from the LGBTI community and the intervention of Greek Ombudsman, the broadcaster issued a communiqué apologizing for the “unfortunate decision”.
It is worth noting that Greece has been found violating the European Convention of Human Rights, regarding its decision to exclude same sex couples from the institution of civil partnership. Although the government plans to extend the legislation to same sex couples, there are continuing pressures from conservatives as well as from the Church.
The impact of orthodox religion to Greek society is so strong that sometimes it can be an obstacle in the perception of artistic attempts. Recently, it lead to the intimidation and persecution of a theatrical play whereby homosexuality was used as a narrative technique.
Migrants, asylum seekers, Roma: the most vulnerable
Human rights abuses against immigrants, asylum seekers and other minorities in Greece have escalated dramatically. The approach of the Greek government — together with the racist attacks organized by Golden Dawn — suggests a police-regime with almost no respect to human life.
Under stricter requirements of acquiring citizenship and with an inadequate asylum system, immigrants and refugees are “trapped” in a country with substandard detention conditions at camps and prisons. Despite reported improvements at the appeal level of the asylum procedures, Greece has made very little progress in establishing a fair and humane system.
Police mistreatment and xenophobic behaviuor from the authorities is a key factor in depriving immigrants and refugees of basic human rights. Allegations of torture and ill-treatment have been largely reported and condemned by international courts and human rights organizations.
Although the anti-racism bill, which is under discussion in Parliament, holds provisions/sanctions for hate speech and incitement to violence, it does not address problems regarding the reporting of racist incidents and the prosecution of racist violence.
Last, but not least, the fundamental right to education for all citizens is not yet granted. The country has been found discriminating against Roma children by segregating them in separate schools.
Women and children
The harsh economic conditions imposed upon Greek population seem to affect women and children more than others.
Even though the number of complaints from women is consistently low, both at a national and European level, documented domestic violence has increased by 47% in recent months. Verbal abuse, economic blackmail and sexual humiliation are among the most common types of violence against women.
Unemployment and precarious employment affect women more than any other social group. There are documented cases of work discrimination during pregnancy and maternity.
Unfortunately, marginalization of Greek women does not stop there. The unprecedented shocking story of 31 women, forcibly tested for HIV and prosecuted for intentionally causing grievous bodily harm, is strong evidence of a police-state that shows no respect to medical confidentiality and above all human dignity. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have accused Greece of violating human rights in the case.
The state of children in Greece is in no better position, in fact it is in a critical status. Almost 600.000 are living below the poverty line, while half of them lack the basic nutritional needs. Things are far worse, when it comes to refugees and asylum seekers: both women and children have been victims of xenophobic violence.
This article was originally published at indexoncensorship.org
