11 Jun 14 | Africa, News and features, South Africa
President Jacob Zuma of South Africa (Photo: Jordi Matas/Demotix)
Rumours in the run-up to South Africa’s fifth democratic election that a “ministry of propaganda” was planned, have come to fruition as the formation of a new “ministry of communication” has been announced. The reasons for this development could be found in the results of the 8 May national and provincial elections, which returned the African National Congress (ANC) to power but, as predicted by the party’s own research, with a reduced majority – from 65.9% to 62.1%.
The party experienced its primary electoral setbacks in metropolitan areas, particularly Johannesburg and the capital Tshwane (Pretoria), both situated in the province called Gauteng, which means “place of gold” in the local Sesotho language – aptly so, as Gauteng is the economic heartland of the country.
ANC provincial votes in Johannesburg came to 52% while provincial votes for the ANC in Tshwane dipped to 49%, both cases a decline of 10% from the previous election in 2009. It was left to the more peripheral cities to pull the ANC through in Gauteng. Another large city, Nelson Mandela Bay in the Eastern Cape, came in below 50% again, just as it had done in 2009. Notably, the ANC received its usual high percentages of votes in the predominantly rural provinces of Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Free State and KwaZulu Natal, which clocked between 64% and 78% in turnout for the ANC.
This discrepancy in ANC support between metropolitan and rural areas could be explained with regards to access to media. The residents of Tshwane and “the Afropolitan city” of Johannesburg (as some scholars call it) have several options when it comes to accessing information and news opinion. Apart from the public broadcaster’s TV and radio stations, there is a range of privately owned media to choose from: from newspapers and radio stations owned by competing media companies, to various online news sources, to social media in the form of blogs, Twitter and Facebook.
This would indicate the political need for the creation of a ministry particularly aimed at controlling the flow of information, especially as local government elections are due to take place in two years’ time, with the ANC running the risk of losing control of the most significant metropolitan areas in the economic centre of South Africa. The ANC’s poor performance in Gauteng can be attributed to various controversies concerning its leader Jacob Zuma, who has been the president of South Africa since 2009. These controversies range from the introduction of a road tolling system in Gauteng without proper public consultation to Zuma being implicated in massive misappropriation of state funds spent on his private homestead in the rural hinterland of KwaZulu Natal. Combine these events with Zuma’s status as self-proclaimed traditionalist who frowns upon women’s emancipation and gay rights, it would seem that the president was a liability that cost the ANC votes in Gauteng.
While these controversies are debated in Gauteng media, voters in the more rural provinces found themselves mostly beholden to officially sanctioned news from the South African Broadcasting Service (SABC). The SABC has been immersed in successive battles for political control which reflect the factional conflicts within the ruling ANC. Political interference in the SABC has become a feature of the Zuma presidency.
During the 2014 election campaigns, the SABC banned no less than three opposition party advertisements even though it is legally compelled to ensure fair exposure of all political parties in the run-up to elections. The reasons were spurious. For example, the SABC claimed that footage showing and criticising excessive police force amounts to inciting violence against the police. Appeals to the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (Icasa), constitutionally mandated to oversee the SABC, failed. The affected political parties – the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters – took to YouTube to ensure public exposure of the ads – with ads going viral.
The new ministry of communication seems a direct intervention to stem negative publicity. Polls show that Zuma has become a liability to his party. He is however just one factor influencing the growing impression that the ANC is failing in its task to overturn the legacy of apartheid. The party’s response has been to further tighten control over the flow of information – a trend that includes the adoption of the Protection of State Information Act, which seeks to clamp down on journalists and citizens generally accessing state information that reveals government corruption or incompetence.
In Zuma’s announcement of his new cabinet after the election, the erstwhile ministry of communications has been split into two: a ministry for telecommunications and postal services and a ministry for communications. The latter, he said, would be responsible for overarching communication policy and strategy, information dissemination and publicity as well as the branding of the country abroad. Improved communication and marketing will promote an informed citizenry and also assist the country to promote investments, economic growth and job creation.
This conflation of marketing and branding with information dissemination, all for an “informed citizenry”, is further strengthened by the “components” that the ministry would be “formed out of”:
- Icasa
- SABC
- Government Communications and Information System (GCIS)
- Brand SA and
- Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA)
As mentioned, the SABC’s constitutional mandate is to act as a public broadcaster, which includes being politically unpartisan. Similarly, Icasa is constitutionally mandated to act independently. The MDDA Act clearly states this body’s functions as impartially and independently promoting the diversification of the media. Lumping together marketers and government communicators with journalists and bodies responsible for promoting access to information suggests that the new ministry represents a more concerted attempt to obviate the country’s constitutional commitment to the “freedom to receive or impart information or ideas”.
This article was published on June 11, 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
22 Apr 14 | Africa, News and features, Swaziland
(Image: Aleksandar Mijatovic/Shutterstock)
The case against human rights lawyer Thulani Maseko and journalist and editor of the independent Nation magazine, Bheki Makhubu, resumes today in Swaziland after adjourning over Easter. The two were arrested last month, and face charges of “scandalising the judiciary” and “contempt of court”. The charges are based on two separate articles, written by Maseko and Makhubu and published in the Nation, which strongly criticised Chief Justice Michael Ramodibedi, levels of corruption and the lack of impartiality in the judicial system in Swaziland.
Makhubu’s home was raided by armed police, and the men were initially denied the right to a fair trial when their case was heard privately in the judge’s chambers. They were also denied bail as they were deemed to pose a security risk. Over the last few weeks, they have been released, and re-arrested in a highly unconventional course of events, so far spending 26 days in custody.
Last week, armed police blocked the gates of the High Court and stopped members of the public and banned political parties from attending the case. Continuous requests to move the case to a larger courtroom so that journalists, observers and family members could monitor proceedings have been refused. The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) said this was in order to minimise disturbances in the court.
There was public outcry as the two men appeared in court bound by leg irons. This highly unusual treatment has been described as “inhumane and degrading” by the Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organisations (SCCCO). When questioned on the issue, Mzuthini Ntshangase, Commissioner of His Majesty’s Correctional Services told the media to “stay away from [commenting on] security matters”.
Maseko and Makhubu’s lawyers have claimed that the arrests are a blatant form of judicial harassment intended to intimidate the accused and are unconstitutional, unlawful and irregular. They are currently being held in a detention centre in the capital Mbabane, and journalists have been prevented from visiting.
The local press has faced severe censorship of its reporting on the case. The JSC warned the media and public against commenting on the case. It argues that: “[Freedom of expression] is not as absolute as the progressive organisations and other like-minded persons seem to suggest.” Managing editor of The Observer newspaper, Mbongeni Mbingo commented on the case in his editorial: “For now though, the rest of us will do well to toe the line, and hold our breath and mourn in silence for our beautiful kingdom.” One local journalist said he was scared to comment on the situation for fear of arrest – or worse.
Maseko and Makhubu’s articles highlighted the disturbing case of Bhantshana Gwebu, a civil servant employed to monitor the abuse of government vehicles, who was arrested after stopping a high court judge’s driver for driving without the required documentation. Gwebu was detained for a week without charge and initially denied the right to representation. He now also faces a contempt of court charge.
In his article, Maseko wrote that “fear cripples the Swazi society, for the powerful have become untouchable. Those who hold high public office are above the law. Those who are employed to fight corruption in government are harassed, violated and abused”. He described how the Swazi people have lost faith in the institutions of power, as cases like Gwebu’s show how such institutions are being used to settle personal scores “at the expense of justice and fairness”.
Their case has sparked both local and international condemnation, from civil society organisations and the Swazi business community, as well as EU representatives and the American Embassy. “The only crime in this case is judges abusing the judicial system to settle personal scores,” says CPJ Africa advisory coordinator Mohamed Keita. The Law Society of Swaziland has called the arrests an “assassination of the rule of law”. They claim that the Swazi court had become the persecutor instead of the defender of the rights and freedoms of the people. But many in the country are still scared to speak out. The media operates under strict government imposed regulations. Journalists are often forced to exercise various forms of self-censorship when reporting on sensitive issues.
The arrests and the continuation of an abysmal human rights record could have wider implications for Swazi society and the economy. The situation threatens to further derail Swaziland’s highly beneficial African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) with the United States, which is currently being reviewed in Washington. AGOA requires that a country demonstrates that it is making progress towards the rule of law and protection of human rights — including freedom of expression. “There is peace in Swaziland,” the head of the country’s Federation of Trade Unions, once said, “but it’s not real peace if every time there is dissent, you have to suppress it. It’s like sitting on top of a boiling pot.”
This article was originally posted on 22 April 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
12 Mar 14 | Africa, Kenya, News and features
(Image: Semmick Photo/Shutterstock)
Kilifi County’s Marafa ward representative Renson Kambi is working on a bill that will bar women from wearing short skirts and men from wearing tight trousers. Kambi says the motion, to be tabled before Kilifi County Assembly soon, is aimed at restoring decency. “Moral standards have gone down in Kilifi” due to “improper dressing,” he stated. “Most ladies are dressing skimpily and that cannot be tolerated.”
The bill, still in its initial stages, proposes among other things, to ban garments that “expose the flesh” in public. He said undue dressing continues to cultivate prostitution, and that the situation must be put under control before it deteriorates further. The bill, however, will not only centre around women’s dress, but also aims at barring men from wearing tight trousers.
Kambi said that it has become difficult to stroll around markets in Kilifi county, especially in the company of in-laws and children, because of the way young men and women have decided to dress. He claims young girls are now putting on micro miniskirts in schools, making it difficult for their male colleagues and male teachers to concentrate. “The girls are putting on ‘very short miniskirts’ to an extent that they cannot even pick up a pen when it falls down without exposing their flesh,” he said.
Kilifi County Deputy Speaker Teddy Mwambire is among a host of leaders who have come out strongly in support of the bill. He says it aspires to ensure that the people of Kilifi county go back to the traditional mode of dressing, bringing to an end what he labelled borrowed cultures.
Mwambire says youths have adopted a way of dressing that has to be dealt with, before immorality makes huge strides in the community. “We cannot just sit still as young people – both male and female continue roaming our streets half naked.”
But former Kilifi Town Council Chairman Anthony Kingi has admonished Kambi for planning to introduce a bill he believes will have no impact on people’s lives, saying he should come up with bills that will improve the state of education in the county. Kingi rubbished claims that improper dress is the main cause of dwindling education standards.
If the bill reaches a majority in the county assembly, it will be passed to Governor Amason Jeffa Kingi who may sign it into law or reject it. For now, debates for or against continue to gain momentum in Kilifi county and across Kenya.
This article was posted on March 12, 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
14 Feb 14 | Kenya, News and features, Politics and Society
Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta (Image Demotix/David Mbiyu)
In 2010 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued summons for Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, among others, for their alleged role in the violence that erupted following the 2007 Kenyan General Elections. The charges include crime against humanity. Nevertheless, in the elections of 2013, Kenyatta was sworn in as president — Ruto his deputy president — after securing 50.51 percent of the vote in a highly contested but generally peaceful election.
This now means that any movement to evaluate the defendants’ criminal culpability implicates the broader state itself. With Kenyatta and Ruto heading the executive branch of government, the implications of the ICC cases cannot be overstated. But while testing the state’s eagerness to confront the legacy of 2007 these cases offer up a further test; the ability of Kenya’s media institutions, journalists and citizens to freely interrogate the proceedings. Will Kenyatta, Ruto and, by extension, the state let such scrutiny happen in public?
Kenyan legislation in this regard is coloured by tragedy. Following the attacks on Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013, the state moved fast to shore up perceived gaps in legislation that could have enabled the attacks to happen. One of these “gaps” referred to the media, ushering in two pieces of legislation: the Kenya Information and Communications (Amendment) Bill (KICA) and the Media Council Bill. The former, an amendment to the 1998 law, creates a Communication and Multimedia Appeals Tribunal under the jurisdiction of the state-controlled Communications Authority. According to free speech group Article 19, the tribunal has the power “to impose hefty fines on media houses and journalists, recommend de-registration of journalists and make any order on freedom of expression”.
While raising concerns for media bodies looking to cover the ICC cases of Kenyatta and Ruto among others, the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC), have pointed out a number of more systemic issues. The 2010 constitution drafted to address the political and ethnic divisions that led to the violence of 2007 established robust protections for freedom of expression. KICA potentially undermines these protections, as CIC explained in a statement:
“Clause 7 of the Bill creates a Communications Authority of Kenya…with some of its board members appointed through a process that solely involves the National Executive and the National Assembly…These clauses violate the provisions of Article 34(3) of the Constitution by leaving the Body responsible for licensing broadcasters under the control of two arms of government, the Executive and the National Assembly.”
Any information deemed too sensitive to be in the public domain during the individual cases draws out KICA as a potential tool for the state to restrict the media’s ability to analyse the cases in an unobstructed manner.
The punitive measures outlined in KICA are not to be sniffed at. According to Charles Onyango Obbo of the Daily Nation: “The Sh20 million penalty against a media house that violated several provisions of the new Bill or the Code of Conduct for the Practice of Journalism, is again among the highest a tribunal can hand out in Africa.” A further provision states that media houses will face punitive measures if 45 percent of their coverage is not deemed “local”. The is a potential hindrance for media bodies looking to analyse the ICC cases – how local is The Hague?
Clause (37) of KICA goes on to state that the tribunal may “accept an anonymous complaint concerning an issue of public interest”. This inability for media bodies to identify its accusers opens the process up to manipulation. Can the tribunal determine that protecting Kenyatta and Ruto is in the public interest? When members of the tribunal are selected at the discretion of the National Executive, it is a possibility.
In the context of the ICC cases, this has created a perfect storm in terms of media freedom. Media houses face disproportionate measures, while their governance is outlined by a body at the discretion of both the executive and legislative branches of government – the former facing interrogation from both the ICC and the media.
It’s too early to tell what will happen and what powers will be invoked, but there have already been warning signs. A case was thrown out after it was alleged that a key witness had received a bribe from the defendant and questions remain regarding similar allegations in the case against William Ruto. Does this represent a collective desire to withhold information? The acts of alleged bribery are by no means definitive, but to skew proceedings, it would be the place to start.
And the next step? Media bodies must surely be holding their collective breath because, while they have not used them yet, KICA offers just the tools the state may need.
This article was posted on 14 February 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
