Are you, or have you ever been, a member of a 18th century European group hell bent on taking over the world by rejecting religion and fomenting revolution. If so, could you get me Katy Perry’s autograph? It’s for my niece.
Pop star Perry is, apparently, in the Illuminati. At least according to some of the 30,000 plus people who have signed a petition calling for her new video, Dark Horse, to be removed from YouTube.
The video, featuring Perry as a Cleopatra type queen in ancient Memphis (Egypt, not Tenessee, though apparently it’s a play on the southern hometown of her collaborator on the track, rapper Juicy J).
Anyway, ancient Egyptian imagery such as pyramids loom large in conspiracy theories about the Illuminati. But they are not the reason people are calling for Perry’s video to be banned. No, the reason is that apparently, during the video, a pendant with the word “Allah” on it is burned, or turned to dust. It’s not entirely clear. Perry hits the chap wearing the pendant with some sort of lighting bolt and then he just kind of melts.
A Shazad Iqbal from Bradford has said that this is bad and he wants it taken off the web. Iqbal’s petition reads:
This is the reason for lodging the petition so that people from different walks of life, different religions and from different parts of the world, agree that the video promotes blasphemy, using the name of God in an irrelevant and distasteful manner would be considered inappropriate by any religion
We hope that the video itself depicting such images is removed. Such acts are not condoned nor tolerated, we hope YouTube will remove the video.”
A few of the signatories appear to link Perry’s alleged Illuminati membership with the apparent Allah-name burning. This might just about make sense if one was to examine the original purpose of the real Bavarian Illuminati, which was quite anti-religious. Equally, it might make sense if the Illuminati really existed and Katy Perry was a leading member of it. But well, if “ifs” and “ands” were pots and pans…
But while most signatories do not seem to buy into the Illuminati theory, there is still a sense that Allah’s name was deliberately inserted into the video and then desecrated. Rather than the rather more obvious explanation that an LA costume designer went out looking for vaguely “Egyptian” looking jewellery and picked this pendant up without giving the first thought to what the letters might actually spell.
The petition is a good example of the “conspiracy versus cock up” clash. When something happens you don’t like, it’s easier to think it was a deliberate attempt to upset you: the grim alternative is that the person who has offended, say, a belief held deeply, neither knows nor cares about you or your belief. In the grand scheme of things, you are utterly irrelevant. Better to imagine that Katy Perry, the Illuminati, the woman behind the counter in Costa who always seems annoyed with you, Nick Clegg, Elmo, and Herman Van Rompuy are all plotting against you. It puts you back in the centre of the universe, which is where all of us really want to be.
A Bible-based play by acclaimed comedy group The Reduced Shakespeare company has been pulled from the stage after protests from Christian fundamentalists.
According to UTV, the company was due to perform The Bible: The Complete Word of God (abridged), at the Theatre At the Mill in Newtownabbey in Northern Ireland next week at the beginning of a UK tour. The RSC is famous for its fast-paced irreverent shows based on great texts. The group describes the Bible adaptation as “an affectionate, irreverent roller coaster ride from fig leaves to final judgement.”
But local politician Billy Ball, of Reverend Ian Paisley’s ruling Democratic Unionist Party, had called for the irreverent show to be banned. Ball is reported as saying:
For Christians, the Bible is the infallible word of God and it’s not something to be made fun of. These people are treating something sacred with irreverence and disrespect”
The theatre could not be contacted at time of publication. Alderman Ball confirmed to Index that the theatre had been in contact with him about the play, but declined to comment any further on the issue, saying he would make a statement at a council meeting on Monday after it had been cleared with his party.
UPDATE (16:oo). Newtownabbey Borough Council has issued a statement confirming the decision to cancel the performances:
At the Council’s Policy and Governance Committee on Monday 20 January concerns were raised by Elected Members who had received complaints from the general public about the content and nature of the show.
Yesterday the Council’s Artistic Board held a planned Away Day, to plan and develop a strategy for the Council’s future Arts Programme. During the day, next week’s performance of ‘The Bible: The Complete Word of God (abridged) at the Theatre at the Mill was discussed by the Board.
Subsequently, the Chair of the Council’s Artistic Board, Councillor Billy Webb, has written to the Council’s Chief Executive, to confirm that, with great regret the Board has taken the decision to cancel next week’s production.
In taking this decision, the Board wishes to confirm its commitment to deliver on the agreed Council’s Artistic Policy “to deliver the highest quality performing arts programme, offering a diverse, socially relevant and enriching experience to as many citizens as possible”.
800 seats were available over the two nights and 150 tickets were sold , a 19% take up on tickets.
The approximate net costs of cancelling the show are £2000. Box Office staff are contacting ticket holders to advise them of the show’s cancellation and to apologise for any inconvenience caused.
On 16 January, Greek blogger Filippos Loizos, responsible for the satirical Facebook page of Elder Pastitsios, was convicted for “malicious blasphemy and religious insult” and sentenced to 10 months in prison, suspended for three years.
Loizos has set up the page mocking a well-known deceased Greek Orthodox monk — Elder Paisios — by intentionally combining his name with a popular Greek food called “pastitsio”, a pasta based dish with béchamel sauce.
His arrest in late September 2012, came after Christos Pappas, an MP from the now-banned neo-fascist party Golden Dawn, posed a parliamentary question calling for the blogger’s arrest on the basis of the country’s anti-blasphemy laws.
Pappas is now facing charges of being involved in a criminal organization.
“My prosecution was somehow expected. At the time I drew a lot of attention on social media. The neonazi party saw ‘a chance’ in accusing me as a blasphemer, satisfying a very conservative society and inspiring strong national sentiments,” Loizostold Index on Censorship.
Loizos explained that the court did not understand his intentions — delivering a stinging rebuke for what he perceived as the monk’s dangerous nationalism and intolerance.
“The judges were very aggressive and did not want to understand my argument. They insisted on saying my intention was to insult because I hadn’t censored any posts of visitors which were considered blasphemous or vulgar. I would never do that. In a democracy we are all ‘condemned’ to disagree,” says Loizos.
Reactions in the press and on the internet after the blogger’s conviction were immediate and vociferous. Far-right publishing and Orthodox websites were gloating, while Loizos’ sympathisers and free speech advocates argued it was “a blow to freedom of expression”.
The Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR), the oldest human rights organisation in Greece, had earlier issued a press release, stating its “unfortunate certainty of an institutional and ideological setback that does not seem to end”.
“Today’s decision shows that freedom of speech, a fundamental pillar of social consistency in a state with ‘rule of law’, is being challenged not only by the enemies of democracy but by the judicial institutions,” according to the release.
Dimitris Christopoulos, an assistant professor of state and legal theory at the Department of Political Science and History at Panteion University in Athens, and vice president of the International Federation for Human Rights, told Index that “this decision is a message on how justice perceives political coexistence in society. It’s like saying ‘when you talk about God in a way we do not like, you will be punished’. In other words, people can joke about everything they want, except religion”.
Contrary to some allegations that the judges suffered social media illiteracy because of their age, Christopoulos told Index on Censorship that they were young and seemed to “fully understand the role of social media”.
In late September 2012, when Loizos was arrested, Vassilis Sotiropoulos, a lawyer and blogger specialising in internet legislation, told Index: “The legislature refuses to address the issue of internet censorship, thereby allowing law enforcers — prosecutors, police officers, judges and lawyers — to freely interpret and utilise the existing legal tools (…) the case of Elder Pastitsios provided perhaps the first example in Greece of an internet company disclosing information to the government in order to identify an individual accused of ‘alleged offences relating to religious satire’.”
However, it is not the first time cases regarding religious blasphemy have reached the courts. In 2012, controversial theatrical play “Corpus Christi” resulted in the legal prosecution and public harassment of the play’s director and actors by Golden Dawn members and Orthodox religious groups.
Legal experts told Index that there are several ongoing cases involving blasphemy in Greece and that the country should follow the Council of Europe’s recommendations and reports on abolishing “the offence of blasphemy”. According to these recommendations, freedom of thought and freedom of expression are being limited by blasphemy laws.
Loizos said he is going to appeal the verdict “for reasons of dignity”.
“We should abolish this blasphemy law in order to protect free expression,” he said.
Pussy Riot supporters prevented from praying for Putin’s resignation outside the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow (Image: Anton Belitskiy / Demotix)
Two issues preoccupying post- Soviet society are a wish to oppose outside influences (mainly from the West), and to resist aggressive behaviour in matters of religion. It is not difficult to point out inconsistencies and contradictions in these approaches, but more germane is the fact that both have survived, if in modified form, to the present day. When the possibility of further restrictions on freedom of conscience are being discussed, a key topic is invariably the need to protect society from the “expansionism” of new religious movements and radical Islam.
The arrests of members of the Pussy Riot punk band after their performance outside Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour proved a powerful catalyst for both these concerns. The protest was seen as a frontal attack on “tradition” by “pro-Western forces” (the actual point Pussy Riot wanted to make was neither here nor there), and as an attack on the religious sensibilities of the “Orthodox majority”. The reaction was accordingly heavy-handed, including not only imprisonment of two members of the group, but also the passing of a law criminalising the “offending of believers’ religious sensibilities”, often referred to as the “blasphemy” law.
The legislative proposal was introduced in September 2012 and became law in August 2013 but has not yet been enforced anywhere. There may be at least two reasons for this. First, many laws that are aimed at NGOs, protesters or what is seen as the “opposition” have either been applied much less rigorously than expected or not at all. The authorities have chosen not to resort to wholesale repression, preferring intimidation. Second, the Russian state and its political elite are still very secular and feel uncomfortable about what is widely regarded as a law against blasphemy.
Strictly speaking, this is not a law against blasphemy, unlike, for example, similar legislation in Italy. The offence is not against religious doctrine, the deity, or things considered holy. Desecration of sacred objects is an offence not under the Russian Criminal Code, but under the code of administrative offences, which means it is seen as less serious. Offending religious sensibilities or beliefs is a crime in the penal codes of several European countries, but the European Court of Human Rights (and, following it, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) has consistently confirmed that a distinction needs to be made between offending sensibilities and inciting hatred.
In Russia today there are still attempts to bring charges of incitement to hatred under Article 282 of the criminal code in incidents that the law enforcement agencies, victims or others might reasonably have been expected to regard as mere offences against religious sensibilities. In a few cases, charges have been brought and, in fewer still, these charges have led to convictions. From interviews with law enforcement officers and representatives of various religious organisations, it is evident that numerous individuals and organisations that feel they have been offended on religious grounds appeal to the police and prosecutor’s office to institute criminal proceedings under Article 282. These requests are almost invariably turned down, and this is not a matter of officials taking sides: they are simply reluctant to institute proceedings on a shaky legal basis, except when that is in their own self-interest. They will do so if there is pressure on them from above, or if they face a pressing need to meet some target.
The addition of this new article to the criminal code, if it is not repealed, will lead sooner or later to its being enforced, and the main source of litigation will be complaints from numerous indignant parties. Demands for charges to be brought rained down upon the prosecutor’s office and police even before the amendments became law. It is important to recognise that the problem is not only repressive intentions on the part of the authorities, but also the repressive instincts of Russian citizens. Representatives of a wide range of community interest groups (though, thankfully, by no means all), including a number of minorities, constantly demand that criminal prosecution be the main way to influence those who cause them offence.
If the system does start enforcing this law, freedom of conscience will come under immense new pressure because of the likelihood of the sheer volume of litigation. Enforcement is likely to be highly selective, because a law of this kind can only be applied selectively. It will be manifestly discriminatory, in accordance with some individuals’ personal preferences and depending on the government’s latest priorities. Finally, it will be completely chaotic, because complaints will come in from all directions and there is nobody remotely qualified to assess their merits.
We can hope, of course, that the new article may yet be removed from the criminal code, but the chances of that are slim. The fact that it is there in the first place results from a consistent trend towards restricting freedom of expression in matters of religion, justified on the basis of the need to maintain “religious peace”. There are two main aspects to this laudable aim, and they enjoy widespread support. The first is safeguarding national security against the preaching of terrorism motivated by religion. The second is to safeguard national security against internal, particularly ethnic, conflicts, which are seen as often being fuelled by religion.
These two security aspects were major reasons for the introduction, in 2002-2007, of the current legislation to counteract “extremism”. This legislation is used extensively against violent racist groups, but also against sundry ideological minorities, which by no means espouse violence or pose a serious, or indeed any, threat to national security.
Abuse of this legislation is made possible by its imprecise wording, which we also find in respect to the new law to protect religious sensibilities. This inevitably leads to arbitrary application and, specifically, to exploitation for political purposes. There have been numerous instances of this, but let us focus on just three. Among the first major “anti-extremist” trials associated with religion were those targeting contemporary art exhibitions at the Andrey Sakharov Museum, which presaged the Pussy Riot case. Also, in 2011, a journalist was convicted for making rude remarks about believers in general, and the clergy in particular, even though his was not by any means a high profile protest and could not be represented as involving incitement to hatred against any group. Lastly, over several years there has been a serious campaign of criminal prosecution against people who read or distribute the works of a Sufi teacher, the late Said Nursi, even though neither he nor his Russian followers have links to terrorism, or engage in conduct which might constitute a threat to society.
In the case of the Sakharov museum exhibitions, the general public could at least understand more clearly what was going on. Some might consider the exhibition a profound artistic meditation on relations between the church and society; others might see the exhibits as an amusing send-up of the church and/or orthodoxy; some might consider it a send-up in bad taste or even an attack on the church, but within acceptable limits of freedom of expression; others, however, were determined to prove that the exhibition was a criminal incitement to hatred of orthodoxy and Orthodox Christians.
In the case of the persecution of followers of Said Nursi, the general public know nothing about the subject and must either just believe or disbelieve what they are told by the security services, believe or disbelieve what is said by Muslim leaders defending those being persecuted, or simply turn and look the other way. Most people choose the last option, including a majority of journalists,which means a majority of citizens, even those who take an interest in social matters, know nothing about these prosecutions.
Our citizens’ understanding of the issues around freedom of conscience is fragmentary. Most are far more concerned about conflicts over the balance between the slow-but-sure process of de-secularisation and the constitutionally guaranteed secular nature of the state. There are controversies over the presence of religion in schools, about the erection of Orthodox churches and mosques (although in the case of mosques the main cause of dissension is racism), and about various symbols of the cosy relationship between church and state. The real-life problems facing religious groups and, more generally, people expressing an opinion about religion, get forgotten.
These problems are legion. The most acute in recent years have arisen from improper application of anti-extremism legislation, but there are also the more “ordinary” problems, like refusals to release building land for places of worship and systematic campaigns of defamation. In a number of cases, like that of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, all these problems come together.
The Federal List of Extremist Materials has, however, excited the public’s interest by its scale and, even by Russian standards, sheer absurdity. The list can be found on the website of the Ministry of Justice and itemises materials banned from mass circulation. The ban is imposed by courts at the insistence of local prosecutors, who must satisfy the court that the material contains elements that can be construed as constituting “extremist activity”. This is usually incitement to hatred of some sort, impugning the dignity of a group, asserting the superiority or inferiority of a particular religion, and so forth. The whole process is quite remarkably ineffective and does not stand up to scrutiny. Most of the materials the list is seeking to ban cannot be identified from the titles given and, no less problematically, banning them does not in strictly legal terms mean they cannot be re-published, because a new court case would be needed to re-establish the identity of the materials.
A great many of the banned books, websites, videos and material involves religion in one way or another. Many are jihadist texts openly calling for terrorism or other forms of violence, but many have nothing prejudicial in them: perhaps at most a claim of the superiority of one set of beliefs over others, to which texts of Jehovah’s Witnesses are prone. There are works by Muslim authors well known for their contribution to jihadist ideology, but on topics that are of no concern to national security (most commonly, on aspects of Sharia law). Finally, a number of texts have found their way on to the list purely by chance, having been confiscated from some “wrong-thinking” individual. This explains the presence of medieval treatises by the likes of the Persian mystic al Ghazali. In 2013 there was even a ban imposed on one of the most popular translations of the Quran.
The absurdity of such methods of “fighting extremism” has obliged even President Putin, at a recent meeting with muftis in Ufa in Bashkortostan, to acknowledge that there are problems with the current approach to banning religious materials. Alas, there is no sign of willingness to review the methods of fighting extremism more generally, or those aspects of them that most blatantly violate freedom of conscience.
