03 Feb 12 | Digital Freedom, Middle East and North Africa
The regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was an enemy to internet freedom. Significant resources were spent on censorship of the web. The Tunisian Internet Agency (established in 1996, and known as the ATI by its French acronym), was the regime’s instrument to block access to online dissident voices and websites that criticised the regime. After the ousting of Ben Ali on 14 January 2011, Tunisian netizens have started to enjoy unprecedented, uncensored web access.
And as the ATI is trying to break all ties with its image as a web censor, questions are being raised about the role of the agency in post-revolution Tunisia, the destiny of censorship machinery, and the challenges to the internet in the country.
To answer these questions and more, Index on Censorship interviewed Moez Chakchouk, the ATI’s CEO.
There is a complaint lodged against ATI to filter pornographic content on the web. If ATI loses the case, how do you see the future of internet censorship in Tunisia? Will this case pave the way for other lawsuits asking the ATI to block other content?
Currently, there are other lawsuits against the ATI requiring it to filter other content. There are lawsuits filed by investigating magistrates, similar to the complaint lodged by the military Tribunal in May. [In May, 2011, and following a verdict issued by the military tribunal, the ATI filtered five Facebook pages criticising the army]. We have received complaints to censor about 30 Facebook pages.
Who is lodging such complaints?
There are complaints lodged by one person against another one, for defamation, or for spreading false or unconfirmed information. In this case, an investigating magistrate has asked the agency to filter such content.
Under the former regime, ATI used to use censorship equipment. Questions are being raised about such equipment. Where is it now? What happened to it? Will it be ever used again?
The censorship equipment is still at the ATI headquarters. The machinery was bought by the government and installed at the ATI in 2006. In 2011, we did not buy anything new. The equipment requires an extension every year to face increase in Internet traffic. In 2011, we did not do anything; we could not buy more equipment because the government took back a subvention that was first allocated to the ATI.
What about the five Facebook pages that the Military tribunal asked you to filter in May?
We did filter those pages for some time but then we stopped for technical reasons.The global filters were not capable of covering all Internet traffic, which increased from 30 Gbits to 45 Gbits over last year. And for an increase of 15Gbits, we need two more filtering machines. When we tried to filter those pages with the available equipment, Internet service quality lowered. And we can’t allow this to happen because we have contracts with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) …We are somehow caught in between. Judicially, the agency is obliged to filter (…) but we could not do it. So we have decided not to filter until we could improve the equipment that we have.
Plus in August 2011 the agency faced another mechanical breakdown; the filtering machinery failed. And this is quite normal because over the past year no maintenance took place and we did not develop the equipment that we have.
Under the former regime, the ATI used to play the role of Internet censor. What is the role of the ATI in post-Ben Ali Tunisia? And how will it move from an agency that censors online dissident voices and content criticising the regime to an institution guaranteeing net freedom?
Right now there is no internet censorship. I’m against censorship. But in case there is a call for the comeback of censorship, it should be based on legal texts. And for the moment there are no such texts for the Internet in Tunisia.
The goal of the agency after the revolution is guaranteeing net neutrality. When we say net neutrality we should not care about the content.
Again we do not prefer Internet legislation because we are aware its risks.
If we want to develop the Internet in Tunisia we should not create obstacles. It is not urgent for Tunisia to draw red lines. This is my personal point of view independent of the agency, which has to remain neutral.
If there is to be Internet control in Tunisia, this control should be smart, transparent and for security reasons. The agency, used to carry out such control secretly. Today we are advocating absolute transparency. It would be better if a new public agency would be established and take charge of such a task. The ATI cannot guarantee internet neutrality and supervise the Internet at the same time. That is a conflict. This is my personal view as the legal representative of the ATI.
Do you know where the key technicians and officials who ran the old regime’s internet blocking and surveillance operation are? Are they still working?
The ATI is a technical agency where the censorship equipment was and is still installed. The agency has never been involved in deciding which websites should be censored. The employees of the agency know how to operate, and maintain the machinery; but they are not the ones who chose the websites to censor. They are only trained to maintain the equipment. Those who took such decisions were not ATI employees.
According to the information that I have; the Tunisian Agency for External Communication [known by its French acronym as the ATCE] was involved in taking such decisions (…) the ATCE had important transactions with the ATI. But these transactions were not documented as practices of censorship, but as website surveillance. But there is nothing documented that proves there were censorship related transactions between the two agencies.
The former ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, (now dissolved, and known by its French acronym the as RCD) , the presidential palace and the security apparatus, might have been involved in such practices too. I don’t know exactly. There are no documents that reveal exact names and parties.
What about the foreign companies that the agency cooperated with under the former regime? Are you still cooperating with them?
We are no longer cooperating with the companies that the agency cooperated with in the past. Over the past year we put an end to the agency’s dealings with old markets, and we did not launch any new censorship-related projects.
Since the agency is filtering for public institutions, we have been trying to renew a maintenance contract with a filtering company. But we have faced enormous issues, and the contract has not been renewed yet. This company considered the Tunisian Internet agency a big partner … a technical partner that hosted equipment that does not belong to it, and that was used to undertake censorship and surveillance related tests. For these companies, Tunisia responded to their needs; a country close to Europe, and a place where everything was permitted, and no one dares to raise the question about the 404 error. But now, when a website hosted in Europe, or the USA does no longer exist, and 404 error appears on the computer screen, newspapers immediately report that “censorship is back” , and that “ATI is lying to us”. Truly, there is not a single functioning machine except the local filters, which are functioning for public institutions.
What is the name of this company?
Unfortunately, I can’t tell you the names of the companies. I read the contracts of these companies with the agency, and they contain confidentiality clauses.
What are the upcoming challenges for the ATI and for the internet in Tunisia?
When we check the ICT development index, we notice that the problem of Tunisia is the content. We have an advanced infrastructure but the content and apps are not developing for simple reasons. Before, to create a website there were obstacles — namely waiting for the ATCE approval, and censorship. People did not feel comfortable and safe to create content. It was impossible to create websites in Tunisia; it was a dream.
Obtaining a domain name for a website was impossible too. But, now any Tunisian citizen can go ask for the name of the domain that he or she chooses. There are no more political constraints. And there is no more censorship. People used to be afraid from authorities tracking them and their families down. This is why Tunisia was behind.
Obstacles that were established during a specific period should be abolished now. We should try to ensure an adequate development without constraints, and barriers. The internet is freedom, the internet is openness. Of course it can be badly used, but we will go through this over time.
Now, people are lodging complaints against each other for defamation. We are overreacting and I have fears that if we over react we will receive censorship orders.
Another challenge for the internet in Tunisia is regulation. The government should not be involved in internet regulation. Instead, an independent authority should take in charge such task. But we don’t have such authorities for the internet in Tunisia, so we have to raise this issue realistically.
If the state wants to draw red lines for net freedom, it should first establish an independent authority to regulate the internet. Internet legislation should not be drafted without a regulation authority that creates balance, between public and individual interests. The state has the right to protect and eliminate defamation, but citizens have the right to freely express themselves. So we need balance, and if the government cannot create such balance, a conflict of interests will occur.
18 Jan 12 | News and features
As Wikipedia and other websites begin blackout to protest against US anti-piracy laws, Index and the international human rights community speak out on PROTECT IP Act
Sen. Harry Reid
Majority Leader
United States Senate
522 Hart Senate Office Bldg
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Majority Leader Harry Reid,
As human rights and press freedom advocates, we write to express our deep concern about S. 968, the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), and the threat it poses to international human rights. Like H.R. 3261, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), PIPA requires the use of internet censorship tools, undermines the global nature of the internet, and threatens free speech online. PIPA introduces a deeply concerning degree of legal uncertainty into the internet economy, particularly for users and businesses internationally. The United States has long been a global leader in support of freedom of speech online, and we urge the Senate not to tarnish that reputation by passing PIPA.
Today, some of the world’s most repressive countries, like China, Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria use DNS filtering as a means to silence their citizens. As over 80 human rights organizations recently wrote in a letter opposing SOPA, “institutionalizing the use of internet censorship tools to enforce domestic law in the United States… creates a paradox that undermines its moral authority to criticize repressive regimes.”[1] In fact, PIPA would send an unequivocal message to other nations that the use of these tools is not only acceptable, but encouraged.
DNS filtering is a blunt form of censorship that is ineffective at achieving its stated goal, while causing collateral damage to online communities on a massive scale. But while DNS filtering is trivial for users to circumvent, this technology would fundamentally undermine the integrity of the global internet, making users more vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks and identity fraud. Additionally, any legislation that mandates filtering of websites is prone to unintended consequences, such as overblocking. For example, in early 2011, when the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency seized the domain mooo.com, it accidentally removed the web addresses of 84,000 (almost exclusively legal) connected domain names.[2] Moreover, once the technical infrastructure enabling censorship is in place, it allows future governments (and private actors) to block virtually any type of content on the web, making the provisions of this bill prone to mission creep.
The attempts at due process provisions in this bill do not respect the global nature of the internet. The network effects of the internet are realized when users and innovators are able to connect around the globe. However, creating a mechanism that requires a representative of a website to make a court appearance in the U.S. in order to defend themselves against an allegation of infringement would disproportionately impact smaller online communities and start-ups based abroad that do not have the capacity to address concerns in the United States. These websites would risk losing access to advertising services, payment providers, search engine listings, and their domain name. Together, these pieces of the bill would drive international innovators away from depending on U.S. services as a hedge against legal threats, while missing what should be the target of this legislation: preventing large-scale commercial infringement.
PIPA further creates a double jurisdiction problem, whereby non-U.S.-based sites must determine whether a site is legal in both the country it is operating in and the United States. This raises serious concerns about the scope of the bill, as foreign websites falling under PIPA’s definition of infringement may be perfectly legal in other jurisdictions. For example, the domain of a Spanish site, rojadirecta.org, was seized in early 2011 by U.S. authorities without adequate due process, notification to the site’s owners, or an option to defend themselves, despite having been declared legal by two Spanish courts.[3]
The definition of “information location service” is overly broad and would have a chilling effect on online speech. PIPA would make nearly every U.S.-based actor on the internet, including not only blogs, chat rooms, and social networks but users as well, potentially subject to enforcement orders of the bill. Additionally, the requirement that these service providers act “as expeditiously as possible to remove or disable access” to an allegedly infringing website imposes an unprecedented burden on any service that contains links, incentivizing the screening and removal of content in order to avoid being caught up in legal proceedings. Further, even if an accused website is later found to be innocent, links to that website could have effectively disappeared from the web, having been permanently removed when the court notice was served.
PIPA is also vague with respect to how links would be defined, including if all links associated with a domain or subdomain would be required to be blocked and if this would apply to future attempts by users to post content. This provision could potentially be interpreted in a way that would force services that allow users to post links to proactively monitor and censor the activities of their users, dramatically altering the role of these platforms in promoting free speech and setting a dangerous precedent for other countries.
We understand the pressure that lawmakers face in passing copyright enforcement legislation, and agree that protecting the rights of creators is an important goal. However, enforcement should not come at the expense of free speech or due process. This bill is fundamentally flawed due to its wide range of restrictive and potentially repressive measures. Even if individual elements of the proposal, such as DNS filtering are modified, postponed or amended, the legislation as a whole represents a precedent that is a real danger for human rights on the internet. We must remain conscious of the fact that the internet is a key enabler of human rights and innovation, and decisions over its governance should not be made hastily and without full consideration of collateral consequences.
We strongly urge the Senate to stand for human rights, defend the open internet, and reject the PROTECT IP Act.
Sincerely,
Access
AGEIA DENSI
Amnesty International
Asociatia pentru Technologie si Internet (ApTI)
Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
Article 19
Bits of Freedom
Bytes for All Pakistan
Centre for Internet and Society – India
Communication is Your Right!
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
Creative Commons Guatemala
ONG Derechos Digitales – Chile
Demand Progress
Digitale Gesellschaft e.V.
Eduardo Bertoni on behalf of iLEI/CELE UP (Iniciativa Libertad de Expresión en Internet, Centro de Estudios en Libertad de Expresión, Universidad de Palermo, Argentina)
Electronic Frontier Finland (EFFi)
EsLaRed
European Digital Rights (EDRi) (an association of 27 privacy and civil rights groups in Europe)
FGV/CTS
FoeBuD
Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure (FFII)
Free Network Foundation
Free Press Unlimited
Free Software Foundation Europe (FSFE)
Fundación Karisma
FUNREDES
German Working Group against Internet Blocking and Censorship (Arbeitskreis gegen Internet-Sperren und Zensur, AK Zensur)
Hiram Meléndez-Juarbe on behalf of the New Technologies, Intellectual Property and Society Clinic University of Puerto Rico Law School
Human Rights Watch
Index on Censorship
Instituto Nupef
Internet Democracy Project – India
Iuridicum Remedium o.s.
Julia Group
Guardian Project
La Quadrature du Net
MayFirst/People Link
Net Users Rights Protection Association (NURPA)
Open Rights Group (ORG)
Open Source Initiative
Palante Technology Cooperative
Panoptykon Foundation
People Who
Public Sphere Project
Quintessenz
Reporters Without Borders
Vrijschrift
WITNESS
wlan slovenia, open wireless network
06 Jan 12 | Digital Freedom, Europe and Central Asia, News and features
Europe’s last dictatorship is clamping down on online activism, with a new law effectively requiring everyone to be a state spy. Mike Harris reports
As of this morning, the internet in Belarus got smaller. A draconian new law is in force that allows the authorities to prosecute internet cafes if their users visit any foreign sites without being “monitored” by the owner. All commercial activity online is now illegal unless conducted via a .by (Belarusian) domain name, making Amazon and eBay’s operations against the law unless they collaborate with the regime’s censorship and register there. The law effectively implements the privatisation of state censorship: everyone is required to be a state spy. Belarusians who allow friends to use their internet connection at home will be responsible for the sites they visit. Some have tried to defend the law, stating all countries regulate the internet in some form – but the Belarusian banned list of websites contains all the leading opposition websites. The fine for visiting these sites is half a month’s wages for a single view.
The Arab spring has been a wake-up call to the world’s remaining despots. The internet allowed images of open dissent to disseminate instantly. As Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak found out, once you reach a critical mass of public protest you haven’t got long to board your private jet. It’s a lesson learned by Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus and Europe’s last dictator, and also by the Belarusian opposition.
Lukashenko attempted to destroy the political opposition after the rigged 2010 presidential elections. Seven of the nine presidential candidates were arrested alongside thousands of political activists. The will of those detained was tested: there are allegations that presidential candidates Andrei Sannikov and Mikalai Statkevich have been tortured while in prison. The opposition is yet to recover; many of its leading figures have fled to Lithuania and Poland.
Within this vacuum of leadership, the internet helped spur a civil society backlash. After the sentencing of the presidential candidates, a movement inspired by the Arab spring “The Revolution Via Social Networks” mushroomed into a wave of protests that brought dissent to towns across Belarus usually loyal to Lukashenko. As the penal code had already criminalised spontaneous political protest with its requirements for pre-notification, the demonstrations were silent, with no slogans, no banners, no flags, no shouting, no swearing – just clapping.
“The Revolution Via Social Networks” (RSN) helped co-ordinate these protests online via VKontakte (the biggest rival to Facebook in Russia and Belarus with more than 135 million registered users). RSN now has more than 32,000 supporters.
RSN splits its four administrators between Minsk and Krakow to keep the page active even when the state blocks access to the page, or the country’s secret police (hauntingly still called the KGB) intimidate them.
The protests were so effective at associating clapping with dissent that the traditional 3 July independence day military parade was held without applause with only the brass bands of the military puncturing the silence. As lines of soldiers, trucks, tanks and special forces paraded past Lukashenko and his six-year-old son dressed in military uniform, those gathered waved flags in a crowd packed with plain-clothed agents ready to arrest anyone who dared clap or boo.
The internet has kept the pressure on the regime in other ways. Protesters photograph the KGB and post their pictures online in readiness for future trials against those who commit human rights violations. A Facebook group “Wanted criminals in civilian clothes”, blogs and Posobniki.com all help to expose those complicit in the regime’s crimes. The web has also helped spread the stories of individuals who have faced brutality by the regime.
It’s this effectiveness that has made the internet a target for Lukashenko. The law enacted in July 2010 allowed the government to force Belarusian ISPs to block sites within 24 hours.
The new measures coming into force today merely build upon these restrictions. The official position of the Belarusian government from the operations and analysis centre of the presidential administration is: “The access of citizens to internet resources, including foreign ones, is not restricted in Belarus.” Yet, in reality the government blocks websites at will, especially during protests. Just after Christmas, the leading opposition website Charter 97 (which works closely with Index on Censorship) was hacked, its archive part-deleted and a defamatory post about jailed presidential candidate Andrei Sannikov published on the site. The site’s editor, Natalia Radzina, who has faced years of vile death and rape threats and escaped from Belarus after being placed in internal exile last year, says she has “no doubt” that the government was behind the hack. This is one of a series of attacks on Charter 97, which include co-ordinated DDoS (denial of service) attacks orchestrated by the KGB through an illegal botnet of up to 35,000 infected computers worldwide.
The regime has even darker methods of silencing its critics. In September 2010, I flew to Minsk to meet Belarusian civil society activists including the founder of the Charter 97 website, Oleg Bebenin. The day I landed he was found hung in his dacha, his leg broken, with his beloved son’s hammock wrapped around his neck. I spoke to his closest friends at his funeral including Andrei Sannikov and Natalia Radzina. No one believed he had committed suicide, all thought he had been killed by the state. Bebenin isn’t the only opposition figure to have died or disappeared in mysterious circumstances under Lukashenko’s rule, a chill on freedom of expression far more powerful than any changes in the law.
Today marks yet another low in Belarus’s miserable slide back to its Soviet past. Clapping in the street is now illegal. NGOs have been forced underground and their work criminalised.
Former presidential candidates languish in jail. The internet is the last free public space.
Lukashenko will do all he can to close down this freedom. In Europe, the battle has opened between the netizens of Belarus and its government. Who wins will be a matter of interest for us all.
Mike Harris is Head of Advocacy at Index on Censorship.
This article originally appeared on Comment is Free on 6 January.
