19 Mar 14 | China, News and features
Hong Kong journalists are anxious at present – with good reason. On the morning of 26 February Kevin Lau, former chief editor of Hong Kong daily newspaper Ming Pao, was attacked as he got out of his car. Suffering stab wounds to his back and legs, Lau was rushed to hospital where he underwent emergency surgery.
Nine men have since been arrested over the attack, with police saying some are linked to organised crime. But many media workers believe differently, namely that the stabbing was provoked by Lau’s record of pushing journalistic boundaries at Ming Pao, and that it’s a message for local journalists to beware criticising Beijing.
Once a British colony, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese rule in 1997. Under the policy of “One Country, Two Systems”, Hong Kong was granted a degree of autonomy, with press freedom protected under the Basic Law.
The law isn’t a total farce. To this day, the city’s newsstands display a varied, vibrant collection of papers. In Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 2013 Hong Kong was ranked 58 globally, just one slot below Italy and far above China at 173.
However, beneath the surface a different story emerges. Over the past year, half a dozen violent attacks on people in media who are critical of the Hong Kong and Chinese governments have been reported, as have abrupt dismissals and resignations of several outspoken journalists.
Meanwhile, self-censorship is growing.
“It’s a creeping, insidious type of thing. If you want to keep your job, you tow the line. I work with guys who are pro press freedom, but they are still censoring constantly,” said a journalist who only agreed to talk on condition of anonymity. The man, who is a reporter at a prominent local newspaper and has been living in Hong Kong for three decades, explained how self-censorship started to emerge in the mid-90s and has become rife in recent years.
Then there are the “gatekeepers”, as he refers to them – journalists who have been educated in the Chinese school of journalism (“never question authority”) and are encouraged to run stories according to a Beijing agenda. They now get their information from Chinese media sources such as Xinhua and China Daily, as opposed to the past practice of using Reuters, AP and other international news wires.
Why has this situation emerged? Money’s a big factor. Media owners in Hong Kong used to be either local business tycoons or people in media themselves. Now they’re predominantly international businessmen with links to China, who are reliant on Chinese currency to stay afloat. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, over 50% of Hong Kong’s media owners are closely connected to the Chinese government. Other media owners, such as the Malaysian billionaire Robert Kuok from the South China Morning Post and Malaysian Tiong Hiew-king of Ming Pao, have strong commercial interests in China.
One exception to the rule is Next Media, a profitable company that owns Apple Daily, one of Hong Kong’s most widely read newspapers – and the most openly critical of China. Next Media has survived the onslaught. But certain advertisers have withdrawn sponsorship, acting as a deterrent for smaller, less profitable papers.
Gregory Lee, an academic and writer who lived in Hong Kong on both sides of the handover, says the academic press is under attack too. The days of people publishing in Hong Kong because they couldn’t in China have ended. Lee knows of one academic who criticised China’s former leader Hu Jintao and had his entire book pulled.
Lee currently teaches Chinese studies at the University of Lyon, France. Even thousands of miles from Beijing, the Communist government’s touch is still felt.
“I’ve got Hong Kong students here who are desperate about the encroachment of mainland China on Hong Kong culture. What’s interesting is that these students were very young when the handover happened, but they still see their identity as Hong Kong.”
One thing’s for sure, Hong Kong residents will not be easily silenced. In the wake of Lau’s attack, thousands took to the streets to voice support for press freedom and to denounce the violence, and this protest was just a warm-up. Occupy Central, which is set to take place in July, should see plenty more out in public demanding rights to freedom of expression.
“Hong Kong has a golden opportunity to be a watchdog for what’s happening in the mainland, due to its proximity and links to China, and yet the press are failing in their duties,” says prominent blogger and activist Tom Grundy, who plans to attend Occupy Central. Grundy believes the protest will be “a defining moment for Hong Kong autonomy” as the government is presented with different ways to respond.
Attending Occupy Central is not just about protecting Hong Kong’s present – it’s about the future too.
“There’s a concern that when 2047 comes, Hong Kong will be absorbed by the mainland,” Grundy says of the “One Country, Two systems” agreement that will expire then.
Back in the hospital, Lau’s recovery is underway. The nerves in his legs are healing and doctors are confident he will walk again. The future of Hong Kong’s free press, on the other hand, remains in the balance.
This article was posted on 19 March 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
11 Mar 14 | Europe and Central Asia, News and features, Russia
RIA Novosti newsroom (Image: Jürg Vollmer/maiak.info Reusse/Wikimedia Commons)
“I just got fired,” a RIA Novosti journalist told Index a few days ago. On 9 December 2013, a surprise decree by president Putin ordered the closure of the state-owned, 73-year-old RIA — one of Russia’s most established news services. It’s liquidation has now kicked in, and it will be replaced by a new agency named Rossiya Segodnya (“Russia Today”), headed by Dmitry Kiselyov, who made his name as an abrasive Kremlin-loyal television personality. Employees have had to choose between staying at the replacement agency or sign redundancy contracts. Most journalists at RIA’s well-respected English service are leaving. They have no intention of taking orders from Kiselyov, who is famous for his homophobic and anti-Western rants. He once said, on TV, that “fining gays is not sufficient — they should not be allowed to give blood, or sperm and in case of a car accident, their hearts should be burnt or buried as useless”.
With 60 offices abroad, RIA was a vast media empire presenting a wide range of information. In April 2013, over 9 million internet users visited its website, which made it the 11th most popular European news website. Christopher Boian, who directed RIA’s foreign language news website and helped make it more dynamic and more respected, told Index: “This was a big state-owned media outlet. It was unique. It seemed to reflect a maturity about the Russian media. We were not anti-Putin or pro-Putin but just trying to look objectively at what was going on.”
Rossiya Segodnya will share its editor in chief with the Kremlin-funded TV news channel RT. It is unlikely to strive for objectivity. In his first speech at RIA’s office, Kiselyov declared: “[Russia’s] post-Soviet journalism is unlike Western journalism in that it does not reproduce values, it produces them.” And added: “Objectivity is a myth which is proposed and imposed on us. Imagine a young man puts his hand on the shoulder of a girl, and in the best case, says ‘you know, I have long wanted to tell you that I regard you objectively.’ Is that what she is expecting? Not likely. In the same way our country — Russia — needs our love.”
In January, Dozhd, a popular independent TV channel which came to prominence for its coverage of anti-government protests in late 2011, was dropped by satellite and cable operators after it caused outrage publishing a poll asking readers whether Leningrad should have been surrendered to the Nazis in order to save hundreds of thousands of lives. Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov declared that the “station had crossed all the limits of what can be tolerated” and that the question posed by the survey was an offence “much more serious from the point of view of morality and ethics”. The channel has now lost around 80 per cent of its audience and, as a result, most of its advertisers. It’s facing imminent closure.
“The situation does not look promising. Things seem to have been orchestrated, as five independent operators dropped us in a matter of weeks, but we can’t prove they have been,” Pavel Lobkov, a veteran journalist who was dismissed from federal channel NTV in 2012 — for what he alleges were political reasons — and found a new home in Dozhd, tells Index. “When it comes to the press, the threat is not direct anymore. The strategy is now more refined. It’s like chess”, he adds.
In February, Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow), one of Russia’s few independent broadcasters, majority-owned by Gazprom-Media — the media arm of the gigantic conglomerate that is one of the bases of Kremlin power — encountered difficulties. Its head was dismissed and replaced by an editor from state media, after a reshuffling of the board of directors tilted the balance in favour of pro-government people. Alexei Venediktov, Ekho’s long-standing editor, has just been reelected by the journalists at the station, though his position still needs to be approved by the board.
“As soon as Putin became president, he moved against the media and made sure national TV was under control – which proved to be a very effective tool,” Maria Lipman, chair of the Carnegie Moscow Centre’s Society and Regions Program, told Index. Financial and legal leverage was used to shut down media outlets that were seen as potential threats. In 2000, the independent TV channel NTV — which had been critical of the war in Chechnya — was acquired by Gazprom-Media, its owner forced to flee the country and its editorial line changed. “What remained were oases of non governmental media. The government was permissive because there was no political opposition. You could make noise, but no one would pick it up,” Lipman adds.
According to her, a new crackdown began in 2012 with the return of Putin to power in the wake of big protests. A series of dismissals took place and a few publications closed down — always explained by economic factors. “Gradually there was a sense that the realm of free expression was shrinking, that there were fewer jobs to be found and more self censorship,” she says.
The recent years have seen an unprecedented increase in the concentration of media ownership, with huge media properties accumulating in the hands of a few Kremlin loyalists. These include Yuri Kovalchuk, a member of Putin’s close circle dubbed “Russia’s Murdoch”, who owns the National Media Group, or Alisher Usmanov, Russia’s richest man (who fired the editor of Kommersant Vlast in 2011 for having published pictures with anti-Putin slogans in an issue alleging election fraud). Usmanov recently acquired control over VKontakte, Russia’s largest social network, whose founder has left Russia. Lobkov tells me he believes the Kremlin’s next target will be the internet. In January, parliament passed a law giving the state powers to close blacklisted websites.
“The Kremlin has been sophisticated enough not to go against individuals or editors. Its favourite tool is to exert its influence through media owners,” Lipman says, pointing out that not every case of pressure against a media outlet necessarily comes from the government, as there are “competitions, personal scores, a combination of factors.” Dozhd owners say their troubles started after they reported on the expensive properties owned by certain Kremlin officials.
“Following recent events in Ukraine, the propaganda on national media has been extremely intense. State media has presented the picture of a fascist coup inspired by the west. For anyone interested there is no shortage of information on the web. When the crisis subsides it remains to be seen whether the outlets that have covered it in a different fashion will be punished,” Lipman says.
Last week, Izvestia newspaper reported that a United Russia party deputy is readying legislation that would, among other things, make it a crime to “allow publications of false anti-Russian information.” The tightening of control over the Russian media is likely to continue.
This article was posted on March 11, 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
11 Mar 14 | Americas, News and features, United States
(Image: Free Barrett Brown)
On 7 March, a US federal judge granted the government’s motion to dismiss the majority of its criminal case against journalist Barrett Brown. The 11 dropped charges, out of 17 in total, include those related to Brown’s posting of a hyperlink that led to online files containing credit card information hacked from the private US intelligence firm Stratfor.
Brown, a 32-year old writer who has had links to sources in the hacker collective Anonymous, has been in pre-trial detention since his arrest in September 2012 – weeks before he was ever charged with a crime. Prior to the government’s most recent motion, he faced a potential sentence of over a century behind bars.
The dismissed charges have rankled journalists and free-speech advocates since Brown’s case began making headlines last year. The First Amendment issues were apparent: are journalists complicit in a crime when sharing illegally obtained information in the course of their professional duties?
“The charges against [him] for linking were flawed from the very beginning,” says Kevin M Gallagher, the administrator of Brown’s legal defense fund. “This is a massive victory for press freedom.”
At issue was a hyperlink that Brown copied from one internet relay chat (IRC) to another. Brown pioneered ProjectPM, a crowd-sourced wiki that analysed hacked emails from cybersecurity firm HBGary and its government-contracting subsidiary HBGary Federal. When Anonymous hackers breached the servers of Stratfor in December 2011 and stole reams of information, Brown sought to incorporate their bounty into ProjectPM. He posted a hyperlink to the Anonymous cache in an IRC used by ProjectPM researchers. Included within the linked archive was billing data for a number of Statfor customers. For that action, he was charged with 10 counts of “aggravated identity theft” and one count of “traffic[king] in stolen authentication features”.
On 4 March, a day before the government’s request, Brown’s defence team filed its own 48-page motion to dismiss the same set of charges. They contended that the indictment failed to properly allege how Brown trafficked in authentication features when all he ostensibly trafficked in was a publicly available hyperlink to a publicly available file. Since the hyperlink itself didn’t contain card verification values (CVVs), Brown’s lawyers asserted that it did not constitute a transfer, as mandated by the statute under which he was charged. Additionally, they argued that the hyperlink’s publication was protected free speech activity under the First Amendment, and that the application of the relevant criminal statutes was “unconstitutionally vague” and created a chilling effect on free speech.
Whether the prosecution was responding to the arguments of Brown’s defense team or making a public relations choice remains unclear. The hyperlink charges have provoked a wave of critical coverage from the likes of Reporters Without Borders, Rolling Stone, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the New York Times, and former Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald.
Those charges were laid out in the second of three separate indictments against Brown. The first indictment alleges that Brown threatened to publicly release the personal information of an FBI agent in a YouTube video he posted in late 2012. The third claims that Brown obstructed justice by attempting to hide laptops during an FBI raid on his home in March of that year. Though he remains accused of access device fraud under the second indictment, his maximum prison sentence has been slashed from 105 years to 70 in light of the dismissed charges.
While the remaining allegations are superficially unrelated to Brown’s journalistic work, serious questions about the integrity of the prosecution persist. As indicated by the timeline of events, Brown was targeted long before he allegedly committed the crimes in question.
On 6 March 2012, the FBI conducted a series of raids across the US in search of material related to several criminal hacks conducted by Anonymous members. Brown’s apartment was targeted, but he had taken shelter at his mother’s house the night prior. FBI agents made their way to her home in search of Brown and his laptops, which she had placed in a kitchen cabinet. Brown claims that his alleged threats against a federal officer – as laid out in the first indictment, issued several months later in September – stem from personal frustration over continued FBI harassment of his mother following the raid. On 9 November 2013, Brown’s mother was sentenced to six months probation after pleading guilty to obstruction of justice for helping him hide the laptops – the same charges levelled at Brown in the third indictment.
As listed in the search warrant for the initial raid, three of the nine records to be seized related to military and intelligence contractors that ProjectPM was investigating – one of which was never the victim of a hack. Another concerned ProjectPM itself. The government has never formally asserted that Brown participated in any hacks, raising the question of whether a confidential informant was central to providing the evidence used against him for the search warrant.
“This FBI probe was all about his investigative journalism, and his sources, from the very beginning,” Gallagher says. “This cannot be in doubt.”
In related court filings, the government denies ever using information from an informant when applying for search or arrest warrants for Brown.
But on the day of the raids, the Justice Department announced that six people had been charged in connection to the crimes listed in Brown’s search warrant. One, Hector Xavier Monsegur (aka “Sabu”), had been arrested in June 2011 and subsequently pleaded guilty in exchange for cooperation with the government. According to the indictment, Sabu proved crucial to the FBI’s investigation of Anonymous.
In a speech delivered at Fordham University on 8 August 2013, FBI Director Robert Mueller gave the first official commentary on Sabu’s assistance to the bureau. “[Sabu’s] cooperation helped us to build cases that led to the arrest of six other hackers linked to groups such as Anonymous,” he stated. Presuming that the director’s remarks were accurate, was Brown the mislabeled “other hacker” caught with the help of Sabu?
Several people have implicated Sabu in attempts at entrapment during his time as an FBI informant. Under the direction of the FBI, the government has conceded that he had foreknowledge of the Stratfor hack and instructed his Anonymous colleagues to upload the pilfered data to an FBI server. Sabu then attempted to sell the information to WikiLeaks – whose editor-in-chief, Julian Assange, remains holed up in the Ecuadorian embassy in London after refusing extradition to Sweden for questioning in a sexual assault case. Assange claims he is doing so because he fears being transferred to American custody in relation to a sealed grand jury investigation of WikiLeaks that remains ongoing. Though Sabu’s offer was rebuffed, any evidence linking Assange to criminal hacks on US soil would have greatly strengthened the case for extradition. It was only then that the Stratfor data was made public on the internet.
During his sentencing hearing on 15 November 2013, convicted Stratfor hacker Jeremy Hammond stated that Sabu instigated and oversaw the majority of Anonymous hacks with which Hammond was affiliated, including Stratfor: “On 4 December, 2011, Sabu was approached by another hacker who had already broken into Stratfor’s credit card database. Sabu…then brought the hack to Antisec [an Anonymous subgroup] by inviting this hacker to our private chatroom, where he supplied download links to the full credit card database as well as the initial vulnerability access point to Stratfor’s systems.”
Hammond also asserted that, under the direction of Sabu, he was told to hack into thousands of domains belonging to foreign governments. The court redacted this portion of his statement, though copies of a nearly identical one written by Hammond months earlier surfaced online, naming the targets: “These intrusions took place in January/February of 2012 and affected over 2000 domains, including numerous foreign government websites in Brazil, Turkey, Syria, Puerto Rico, Colombia, Nigeria, Iran, Slovenia, Greece, Pakistan, and others. A few of the compromised websites that I recollect include the official website of the Governor of Puerto Rico, the Internal Affairs Division of the Military Police of Brazil, the Official Website of the Crown Prince of Kuwait, the Tax Department of Turkey, the Iranian Academic Center for Education and Cultural Research, the Polish Embassy in the UK, and the Ministry of Electricity of Iraq. Sabu also infiltrated a group of hackers that had access to hundreds of Syrian systems including government institutions, banks, and ISPs.”
Nadim Kobeissi, a developer of the secure communication software Cryptocat, has levelled similar entrapment charges against Sabu. “[He] repeatedly encouraged me to work with him,” Kobeissi wrote on Twitter following news of Sabu’s cooperation with the FBI. “Please be careful of anyone ever suggesting illegal activity.”
While Brown has never claimed that Sabu instructed him to break the law, the presence of “persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury,” and whatever information they may have provided, continue to loom over the case. Sabu’s sentencing has been delayed without explanation a handful of times, raising suspicions that his work as an informant continues in ongoing federal investigations or prosecutions. The affidavit containing the evidence for the March 2012 raid on Brown’s home remains under seal.
In comments to the media immediately following the raid, Brown seemed unfazed by the accusation that he was involved with criminal activity. “I haven’t been charged with anything at this point,” he said at the time. “I suspect that the FBI is working off of incorrect information.”
This article was posted on March 11, 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
07 Mar 14 | Americas, Ecuador, News and features, Politics and Society
Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa (Image: Reynaldo C. Paganelli/Demotix)
President Rafael Correa’s new media law has “undercut press freedoms,” and “opens the door to censorship by giving the government or judges the power to decide if information is truthful”, according to a new report by the US State Department that ranked Ecuador as one of Latin America’s worst violators of press freedoms.
Unsurprisingly, the Correa administration hit back at the US. The Ecuadorian foreign minister, Ricardo Patiño, released a statement which claimed the report was “one sided” and came from, “a country that has a poor track record in observing human rights.”
The diplomatic tussle marked another stage in the deteriorating relationship between Quito and Washington, after Correa offered Julian Assange asylum in Ecuador in August 2012 — the Wikileaks founder still remains at the Ecuadorian embassy in London. However, the report has also highlighted the explicit crackdown on the media by Correa.
At the end of January, Correa’s government lashed out at El Universo newspaper for printing a cartoon which satirised the Boxing Day raid of opposition activist Fernando Villavicencio. Using Supercom, the media regulator established by last year’s communications law, El Universo was ordered to print a correction, and the paper was fined 2% of its average monthly sales. This recent incident marks a dangerous precedent for print media in Ecuador.
The communications law is a sweeping reform to the media landscape in Ecuador that in principle was designed to prohibit censorship, redistribute broadcast fairly and protect the rights of journalists. The reality is that the law is filled with loopholes which are open to manipulation, and allow for state interference — the creation of Supercom is a clear example of such problems.
Martin Pallares, a journalist at El Comercio, said the law, and its “subjective norms,” has led to, “tremendous self-censorship and a terrible fear among journalist.” According to Pallares, newspapers are constantly overshadowed by a fear that they will be forced out of business by a heavy fine for publishing an anti-government article. He also said the situation is more worrying because, “Correa controls the judicial system and if he wants he may order that any journalist can be prosecuted for libel.”
Reporters Without Borders has said some aspects of the communications law are positive, praising the “fairer distribution” of broadcast frequencies. But Camille Soulier, the head of Reporters Without Borders Americas desk warned the cartoon incident was the most “obvious case” of the dangers of the law which, “used in this way could foreshadow an increase in the disrespect for freedom of information.”
El Universo’s cartoon fine was not the only example of Correa intimidating partisan journalists. In September 2012, the magazine Vistazo was fined $80,000 for publishing an article which supposedly advocated a “no” vote against Correa. Then in February 2013, Ecuador’s highest held court upheld a libel conviction against El Universo that imposed a $40m fine and sentenced the three directors of the paper, and its leading columnist Emilio Palacio, to three years in jail each, for an article which accused Correa of human rights abuses. The men were later pardoned by the president, but the case still demonstrates the president’s ongoing bullying of the press.
The El Universo lawsuit had serious implications for Ecuador’s media according to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ (CPJ) Andes correspondent, John Otis. Otis said that after this lawsuit, Ecuadorian publishers and newspapers became more worried about publishing material, even if they knew that all their information is correct. “The El Universo case scares people”, Otis said, because of its potential financial implications.
Incidents such as this libel case have given rise to intense animosity from Ecuador’s media against the president. El Comercio’s Pallares has accused Correa of Orwellian control of the press. He said: “Correa does not tolerate diversity of opinions because of his deep seated religious background, and other traumas which makes him think he owns the truth. ‘You are a liar and we are the truth,’ he said to a journalist who asked him an uncomfortable question at a presentation at Columbia University some years ago.” While this depiction of Correa is evidently extreme, it is true that the president, now in his third term, set off to battle against the media from the outset.
Antoni Kapcia, a professor of Latin American History, at the University of Nottingham, views the relationship between Correa and Ecuador’s press in a more complex way however. Kapcia said that the press have been, “vehemently anti-Correa from the start,” and “they have not exactly been pursuing the lily-white truth in all these battles.” Kapcia believes that faults have been convicted on both sides of the war. “Correa is as much hitting out in retaliation as repressing the press, and in reality, he doesn’t control enough to really repress, even if he wanted to, so it’s more a case of kicking the press’s shins than really chaining it up.”
With the populist Correa, who has been in power since 2006, recently losing important local elections, the political future of Ecuador remains uncertain. One thing remains clear however, Correa’s crackdowns on Ecuador’s press are a serious threat to the democratic hopes of this Latin American nation.
This article was posted on March 7, 2014 at indexoncensorship.org
