30 Apr 2018 | Statements
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Понедельник, 30 апреля 2018 г.
Мы, нижеподписавшиеся 26 международных правозащитных организации в сфере медиа и интернет-свобод, решительно осуждаем попытки Российской Федерации заблокировать интернет-мессенджер Telegram, результатом которых стали широкомасштабные нарушения свободы выражения мнения и доступа к информации, и в т.ч. массовая блокировка сторонних вебсайтов.
Мы призываем Россию остановить блокировку Telegram и прекратить беспрестанные нападки на свободу интернета в целом. Мы также призываем Организацию Объединенных Наций, Совет Европы, Организацию по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, Европейский Союз, Соединенные Штаты Америки и другие заинтересованные правительства оспорить действия России и поддержать основополагающие права на свободу выражения мнения и неприкосновенность частной жизни в интернете и вне его. Наконец, мы призываем интернет-компании противостоять необоснованным и неправовым требованиям, нарушающим права их пользователей.
Массовые перебои в работе интернета
13 апреля 2018 г. Таганский районный суд Москвы удовлетворил запрос Роскомнадзора о блокировке доступа к Telegram на основании того, что компания не исполнила датированное 2017 годом распоряжение передать ключи шифрования Федеральной службе безопасности (ФСБ). С того времени действия, предпринятые российскими органами власти с целью ограничить доступ к Telegram, привели к массовым перебоям в работе интернета, в т.ч.:
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16-18 апреля 2018 года Роскомнадзор отдал указание о блокировке почти 20 миллионов IP-адресов в попытке ограничить доступ к Telegram. Значительная часть заблокированных адресов принадлежит международным интернет-компаниям, в т.ч. Google, Amazon и Microsoft. В настоящее время XX из них остаются заблокированными.
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Массовая блокировка IP-адресов негативно влияет на большое число сетевых сервисов, которые не имеют никакого отношения к Telegram, в числе прочего интернет-банкинг и сайты бронирования гостиниц, электронная коммерция и покупка авиабилетов.
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Международная правозащитная группа Агора, представляющая Telegram в России, сообщила, что были получены запросы о помощи в связи с массовыми блокировками от около 60 компаний, включая интернет-магазины, службы доставки и разработчиков программного обеспечения.
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По меньшей мере шесть интернет-СМИ (Петербургский дневник, Coda Story, FlashNord, FlashSiberia, Тайга.инфо, и 7×7) пострадали от временного ограничения доступа к их вебсайтам.
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17 апреля 2018 года Роскомнадзор потребовал от Google и Apple удалить приложение Telegram из магазинов приложений, несмотря на отсутствие в российском законодательстве оснований для такого требования. Приложение на данный момент остается доступным, однако Telegram не может предоставить обновление для улучшения доступа через прокси-серверы.
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Провайдеры виртуальных частных сетей (VPN), такие как TgVPN, Le VPN и VeeSecurity, также были заблокированы из-за предоставления альтернативных средств доступа к Telegram. Федеральный закон 276-ФЗ запрещает использование VPN и интернет-анонимайзеров для предоставления доступа к вебсайтам, заблокированным в России, и дает полномочия Роскомнадзору по блокировке любого сайта, объясняющего, как пользоваться такими сервисами.
История ограничительного законодательного регулирования интернета
В течение последних шести лет Россия приняла большое число законов, ограничивающих свободу выражения мнения и право на неприкосновенность частной жизни в интернете. В их число входит создание в 2012 г. черного списка интернет-сайтов, администрируемого Роскомнадзором, и поэтапное расширение оснований для блокировки вебсайтов, включая блокировку без решения суда.
Принятый в 2016 году т.н. «закон Яровой», нацеленный на «борьбу с экстремизмом», налагает обязательства на всех операторов связи и интернет-провайдеров хранить метаданные пользователей, предоставлять ключи шифрования по запросу органов безопасности и использовать исключительно методы шифрования, одобренные российским правительством, на практике это означает создание «бэкдора» для сотрудников российских органов безопасности для доступа к данным, трафику и коммуникациями интернет-пользователей.
В октябре 2017 года мировой судья признал Telegram виновным в совершении административного правонарушения в связи с непредоставлением ключей шифрования российским властям, что, по заявлению компании, невозможно сделать в силу использования Telegram сквозного шифрования. На компанию был наложен штраф в размере 800 000 рублей. Апелляция Telegram по административному делу была отклонена в марте 2018 года, что дало российским органам власти формальные основания для блокировки Telegram в России в соответствии со статьей 15.4 Федерального закона «Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации».
Недавние меры, принятые российскими органами власти в отношении Telegram, имеют серьезные последствия для свободы выражения мнения и права на неприкосновенность частной жизни в интернете в России и по всему миру:
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Для российских пользователей такие приложения, как Telegram и другие подобные сервисы, стремящиеся предоставить защищенную связь, критически важны для обеспечения безопасности. Они представляют собой важный источник информации о важнейших проблемах политической, экономической и общественной жизни, свободный от неоправданного вмешательства правительства. Для СМИ и журналистов в России и за ее пределами Telegram служит не только платформой для обмена сообщениями с целью безопасного общения с источниками, но и площадкой для публикаций. Telegram-каналы представляют собой средство передачи и распространения контента для СМИ и отдельных журналистов и блогеров. С учетом прямого и косвенного контроля со стороны государства в отношении многих традиционных российских СМИ и самоцензуры, которую многие другие СМИ считают необходимым применять, каналы мгновенного обмена сообщениями, такие как Telegram, стали ключевым средством распространения идей и мнений.
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Компании, которые исполняют требования «закона Яровой», предоставляя правительствам «бэкдор» к своим сервисам, ставят под угрозу безопасность сетевых коммуникаций как своих российских пользователей, так и людей, с которыми они общаются за пределами страны. Журналисты особенно опасаются, что предоставление ФСБ доступа к данной информации поставит под угрозу их источники – краеугольный камень свободы печати. Исполнение компаниями требований закона также означает, что поставщики услуг связи готовы понижать стандарты шифрования и подвергать риску личную информацию и безопасность всех своих пользователей в качестве одной из издержек ведения бизнеса.
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В июле 2018 года вступят в силу статьи «закона Яровой», требующие, чтобы компании хранили все голосовые и текстовые сообщения в течение шести месяцев и открывали к ним доступ органам безопасности в отсутствие решения суда. Это повлияет на общение людей в России и за ее границами.
Такие попытки российских органов власти контролировать сетевые коммуникации и ограничивать неприкосновенность частной жизни выходят далеко за границы необходимости и соразмерности в рамках борьбы с терроризмом и нарушают международное законодательство.
Международные стандарты
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Блокировка вебсайтов или приложений представляет собой крайнюю меру, аналогичную запрету газеты или отзыву лицензии у телевизионной станции. Как таковая она с большой вероятностью в подавляющем большинстве случаев представляет собой несоразмерное вмешательство в свободу выражения мнения и свободу СМИ и должна подлежать строгому контролю. Любые меры по блокировке по меньшей мере должны быть четко сформулированы в рамках закона и требовать рассмотрения судом того, является ли полная блокировка доступа к онлайн-сервису необходимой и соответствует ли критериям, установленным и применяемым Европейским судом по правам человека. Блокировка Telegram и связанные с ней действия очевидным образом не соответствуют данному стандарту.
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Различные требования «закона Яровой» явно противоречат международным стандартам в отношении шифрования и анонимности в соответствии с Докладом Специального докладчика по вопросу о поощрении и защите права на свободу мнений и их свободное выражение 2015 года (A/HRC/29/32). Специальный докладчик ООН лично обратился к российскому правительству, выразив серьезное беспокойство, относительно чрезмерных ограничений, налагаемых «законом Яровой» на права на свободу выражения мнения и на неприкосновенность частной жизни в интернете. Европейский суд постановил, что подобные обязательства по хранению данных являются несовместимыми с Хартией Европейского Союза по правам человека. Хотя Европейский суд по правам человека пока не принял решение относительно совместимости положений российского законодательства о раскрытии ключей шифрования с Конвенцией о защите прав человека и основных свобод, он постановил, что российский правовой режим, регулирующий перехват сообщений, не обеспечивает адекватные и эффективные гарантии против произвола и риска злоупотреблений, присущих системе секретной слежки.
Мы, нижеподписавшиеся организации призываем:
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Российские органы власти гарантировать интернет-пользователям право публиковать и читать информацию в интернете анонимно и обеспечить, чтобы любые ограничения анонимности в интернете производились по распоряжению суда и полностью соответствовали требованиям Статей 17 и 19(3) Международного пакта о гражданских и политических правах и Статей 8 и 10 Конвенции о защите прав человека и основных свобод, путем:
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Отказа от блокировки Telegram и воздержания от истребования у сервисов обмена сообщениями, таких как Telegram, ключей шифрования с целью получения доступа к частной информации пользователей;
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Отмены положений «закона Яровой», налагающих на интернет-провайдеров обязательство хранить все телекоммуникационные данные сроком до шести месяцев и требующих обязательного обеспечения «бэкдоров» шифрования, а также закона 2014 года о локализации персональных данных, предоставляющего органам безопасности легкий доступ к данным пользователей без достаточных мер защиты.
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Отмены Федерального закона 241-ФЗ, запрещающего анонимность пользователей интернет-мессенджеров, и Закона 276-ФЗ, запрещающего VPN-сервисам и интернет-анонимайзерам предоставлять доступ к вебсайтам, запрещенным в России;
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Внесения изменений в Федеральный закон 149-ФЗ «Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации» с тем, чтобы процесс блокировки вебсайтов соответствовал международным стандартом. Всякое решение о блокировке доступа к вебсайту или приложению должно быть принято независимым судом и ограничено требованием необходимости и соразмерности законной цели. При рассмотрении запроса на блокировку суд или другой независимый судебный орган, в чьи полномочия входит принятие такого решения, должен рассмотреть его влияние на законный контент и возможность использования технологических средств для предотвращения излишней блокировки.
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Представителей Организации Объединенных Наций, Совета Европы, Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, Европейского Союза, Соединенных Штатов Америки и других заинтересованных правительств внимательно рассмотреть и открыто оспорить действия России с целью защиты основополагающих прав на свободу выражения мнения и неприкосновенность частной жизни в интернете и вне его, в соответствии с соглашениями, имеющими обязательную юридическую силу, стороной которых является Россия.
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Интернет-компании противостоять требованиям, нарушающим международное право в области прав человека. Компании должны следовать Руководящим принципам предпринимательской деятельности в аспекте прав человека Организации Объединенных Наций, которые подчеркивают обязательство соблюдать права человека, применимое в рамках всей глобальной деятельности компании вне зависимости от места нахождения ее пользователей и исполнения государством своих обязательств в области защиты прав человека.
Подписи
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ARTICLE 19
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Международная Агора (Agora International)
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Access Now
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Amnesty International
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Asociatia pentru Tehnologie si Internet – ApTI
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Associação D3 – Defesa dos Direitos Digitais
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Committee to Protect Journalists
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Civil Rights Defenders
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Electronic Frontier Foundation
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Electronic Frontier Norway
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Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC)
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Freedom House
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Human Rights House Foundation
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Human Rights Watch
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Index on Censorship
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International Media Support
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Международное Партнерство за Права Человека (International Partnership for Human Rights)
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ISOC Bulgaria
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Open Media
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Open Rights Group
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ПЕН Америка (PEN America)
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PEN International
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Privacy International
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Репортеры без границ (Reporters without Borders)
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WWW Foundation
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Xnet
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30 Apr 2018 | Campaigns -- Featured, Europe and Central Asia, Russia, Statements
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We, the undersigned 26 international human rights, media and internet freedom organisations, strongly condemn the attempts by the Russian Federation to block the internet messaging service Telegram, which have resulted in extensive violations of freedom of expression and access to information, including mass collateral website blocking.
We call on Russia to stop blocking Telegram and cease its relentless attacks on internet freedom more broadly. We also call the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the United States and other concerned governments to challenge Russia’s actions and uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy online as well as offline. Lastly, we call on internet companies to resist unfounded and extra-legal orders that violate their users’ rights.
Massive internet disruptions
On 13 April 2018, Moscow’s Tagansky District Court granted Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, its request to block access to Telegram on the grounds that the company had not complied with a 2017 order to provide decryption keys to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Since then, the actions taken by the Russian authorities to restrict access to Telegram have caused mass internet disruption, including:
- Between 16-18 April 2018, almost 20 million internet Protocol (IP) addresses were ordered to be blocked by Roskomnadzor as it attempted to restrict access to Telegram. The majority of the blocked addresses are owned by international internet companies, including Google, Amazon and Microsoft. Currently 14.6 remain blocked.
- This mass blocking of IP addresses has had a detrimental effect on a wide range of web-based services that have nothing to do with Telegram, including, but not limited to, online banking and booking sites, shopping, and flight reservations.
- Agora, the human rights and legal group, representing Telegram in Russia, has reported it has received requests for assistance with issues arising from the mass blocking from about 60 companies, including online stores, delivery services, and software developers.
- At least six online media outlets (Petersburg Diary, Coda Story, FlashNord, FlashSiberia, Tayga.info, and 7×7) found access to their websites was temporarily blocked.
- On 17 April 2018, Roskomnadzor requested that Google and Apple remove access to the Telegram app from their App stores, despite having no basis in Russian law to make this request. The app remains available, but Telegram has not been able to provide upgrades that would allow better proxy access for users.
- Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers – such as TgVPN, Le VPN and VeeSecurity proxy – have also been targeted for providing alternative means to access Telegram. Federal Law 276-FZ bans VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia and authorises Roskomnadzor to order the blocking of any site explaining how to use these services.
Background on restrictive internet laws
Over the past six years, Russia has adopted a huge raft of laws restricting freedom of expression and the right to privacy online. These include the creation in 2012 of a blacklist of internet websites, managed by Roskomnadzor, and the incremental extension of the grounds upon which websites can be blocked, including without a court order.
The 2016 so-called ‘Yarovaya Law’, justified on the grounds of “countering extremism”, requires all communications providers and internet operators to store metadata about their users’ communications activities, to disclose decryption keys at the security services’ request, and to use only encryption methods approved by the Russian government – in practical terms, to create a backdoor for Russia’s security agents to access internet users’ data, traffic, and communications.
In October 2017, a magistrate found Telegram guilty of an administrative offense for failing to provide decryption keys to the Russian authorities – which the company states it cannot do due to Telegram’s use of end-to-end encryption. The company was fined 800,000 rubles (approx. 11,000 EUR). Telegram lost an appeal against the administrative charge in March 2018, giving the Russian authorities formal grounds to block Telegram in Russia, under Article 15.4 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection”.
The Russian authorities’ latest move against Telegram demonstrates the serious implications for people’s freedom of expression and right to privacy online in Russia and worldwide:
- For Russian users apps such as Telegram and similar services that seek to provide secure communications are crucial users’ safety. They provide an important source of information on critical issues of politics, economics and social life, free of undue government interference. For media outlets and journalists based in and outside Russia, Telegram serves not only as a messaging platform for secure communication with sources, but also as a publishing venue. Through its channels, Telegram acts as a carrier and distributor of content for entire media outlets as well as for individual journalists and bloggers. In light of the direct and indirect control the state has over many traditional Russian media and the self-censorship many other media outlets feel compelled to exercise, instant messaging channels like Telegram have become a crucial means of disseminating ideas and opinions.
- Companies that comply with the requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ by allowing the government a back-door key to their services jeopardise the security of the online communications of their Russian users and the people they communicate with abroad. Journalists, in particular, fear that providing the FSB with access to their communications would jeopardize their sources, a cornerstone of press freedom. Company compliance would also signal that communication services providers are willing to compromise their encryption standards and put the privacy and security of all their users at risk, as a cost of doing business.
- Beginning in July 2018, other articles of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ will come into force requiring companies to store the content of all communications for six months and to make them accessible to the security services without a court order. This would affect the communications of both people in Russia and abroad.
Such attempts by the Russian authorities to control online communications and invade privacy go far beyond what can be considered necessary and proportionate to countering terrorism and violate international law.
International Standards
- Blocking websites or apps is an extreme measure, analogous to banning a newspaper or revoking the license of a TV station. As such, it is highly likely to constitute a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression and media freedom in the vast majority of cases and must be subject to strict scrutiny. At a minimum, any blocking measures should be clearly laid down by law and require the courts to examine whether the wholesale blocking of access to an online service is necessary and in line with the criteria established and applied by the European Court of Human Rights. Blocking Telegram and the accompanying actions clearly do not meet this standard.
- Various requirements of the ‘Yarovaya Law’ are plainly incompatible with international standards on encryption and anonymity as set out in the 2015 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression report (A/HRC/29/32). The UN Special Rapporteur himself has written to the Russian government raising serious concerns that the ‘Yarovaya Law’ unduly restricts the rights to freedom of expression and privacy online. In the European Union, the Court of Justice has ruled that similar data retention obligations were incompatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although the European Court of Human Rights has not yet ruled on the compatibility of the Russian provisions for the disclosure of decryption keys with the European Convention on Human Rights, it has found that Russia’s legal framework governing interception of communications does not provide adequate and effective guarantees against the arbitrariness and the risk of abuse inherent in any system of secret surveillance.
We, the undersigned organisations, call on:
- The Russian authorities to guarantee internet users’ right to publish and browse anonymously and ensure that any restrictions to online anonymity are subject to requirements of a court order, and comply fully with Articles 17 and 19(3) of the ICCPR, and articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by:
- Desisting from blocking Telegram and refraining from requiring messaging services, such as Telegram, to provide decryption keys in order to access users private communications;
- Repealing provisions in the ‘Yarovaya Law’ requiring internet service providers (ISPs) to store all telecommunications data for six months and imposing mandatory cryptographic backdoors, and the 2014 Data Localisation law, which grant security service easy access to users’ data without sufficient safeguards.
- Repealing Federal Law 241-FZ, which bans anonymity for users of online messaging applications; and Law 276-FZ which prohibits VPNs and internet anonymisers from providing access to websites banned in Russia;
- Amending Federal Law 149-FZ “On Information, IT Technologies and Protection of Information” so that the process of blocking websites meets international standards. Any decision to block access to a website or app should be undertaken by an independent court and be limited by requirements of necessity and proportionality for a legitimate aim. In considering whether to grant a blocking order, the court or other independent body authorised to issue such an order should consider its impact on lawful content and what technology may be used to prevent over-blocking.
- Representatives of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for the Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) the United States and other concerned governments to scrutinise and publicly challenge Russia’s actions in order to uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy both online and offline, as stipulated in binding international agreements to which Russia is a party.
- Internet companies to resist orders that violate international human rights law. Companies should follow the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, which emphasise that the responsibility to respect human rights applies throughout a company’s global operations regardless of where its users are located and exists independently of whether the State meets its own human rights obligations.
Signed by
- Article 19
- Agora International
- Access Now
- Amnesty International
- Asociatia pentru Tehnologie si Internet – ApTI
- Associação D3 – Defesa dos Direitos Digitais
- Committee to Protect Journalists
- Civil Rights Defenders
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Electronic Frontier Norway
- Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC)
- Freedom House
- Human Rights House Foundation
- Human Rights Watch
- Index on Censorship
- International Media Support
- International Partnership for Human Rights
- ISOC Bulgaria
- Open Media
- Open Rights Group
- Pen America
- Pen International
- Privacy International
- Reporters without Borders
- WWW Foundation
- Xnetin
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9 Apr 2018 | Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan News, Germany, Mapping Media Freedom, Media Freedom, media freedom featured, News and features, Russia, Turkey, Uzbekistan
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Journalists Erdem Gül and Can Dündar (Photo: Bianet)
Can Dündar, editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyyet, one of Turkey’s most popular newspapers, was awaiting an appeal on his case in Turkey from Germany when the news of the coup d’etat in his homeland came. Scores of arrests followed, and his lawyer advised that Dündar, who had just narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in May 2016 outside a courtroom and was facing over five years in prison for allegedly leaking state secrets, stay in Germany.
He recalls that it was the hardest decision in his life, 40 years of which he had devoted to working as a journalist in Turkey.
“I thought it was impossible to go back, decided to stay and work from Germany, and about a year ago I with a small team started a media organization here, Özgürüz.”
When it’s time to leave
As shocking as Dündar’s story is, it is hardly unusual in the Eurasian region, where, according to International Media Support, there was a steady decline in freedom of expression in Eurasia since 2011. While for years the Committee to Protect Journalists named Turkey the biggest jailer of journalists globally, there are other nations competing for this dubious title.
For some journalists, the alternative to being jailed is an exile. According to Yavuz Baydar, chief editor of Ahval Online, a Turkey-oriented news site based in Germany, “That’s an inevitable result of oppression in any country because as long as the conventional media are suffocated and put under the yoke of the powers, it leaves journalists with no other choice than leaving the profession altogether or moving abroad.”
However, only a select few survive the shock and reemerge as viable journalists continuing to work in exile.
Some of the most successful examples of the media in exile emerged from the region and operating in the more permissive environment of Western Europe, according to Jens Uwe Thomas with RSF Germany, are Meduza, Amurburg and Spektr, Russia-oriented news portals, as well as MeydanTV, an Azerbaijani multimedia outlet in exile, Dündar’s Özgürüz and Baydar’s Ahval Online.
Challenges of exile
Thomas says that upon settling in exile, the first step for the journalists is usually to legalize their status, and then they start looking for opportunities to establish their outlets.
“The most important thing is to support these media abroad in terms of their registration,” says Bektour Iskander, editor of Kyrgyz media Kloop, who monitors exiled media and is in the process of creating a digital resources kit for them, adding that oftentimes, the media can’t relocate abroad due to lack of financial resources or visas.
“In 2010 we were threatened by the special services because of our investigative reporting about the son of president Bakiyev [of Kyrgyzstan]. But we had no opportunity to leave the country. Only now I realize that we were facing scary consequences, even assassination. We were so clueless as to how to do that, or find the resources for that, we were saved by the miracle, a revolution happened in the country and the threat disappeared,” he recalls.
One common thread for these media across the board is that while their editorial teams operate in exile, they have networks of journalists working for them from inside their home country, says Thomas, adding that secure communication and creating collaborative work environment in such circumstances is often a challenge.
“Those are operating under the great risks, which causes a lot of hurdles and obstacles for continuity and consistency in the content quality,” Baydar adds. MeydanTV founder Emin Milli agrees, “Unfortunately, journalists and their family members are under pressure. The ones who work with us have been attacked, some tortured. Some parents of theirs were fired”. Galima Bukhabrayeva, former editor of exiled Uznews web site that was allegedly hacked by the Uzbek government and is now defunct, says: “In our case, the best journalists in Uzbekistan worked with us, because in our case it wasn’t enough to be a journalist, one had to be a patriot and a citizen, and a brave person, at that.”
But the relocation doesn’t always pose a challenge, says Aleksandr Kushnar, editor of Russian exiled media Amurburg. Commenting on the success of Meduza, he says, “It makes more sense for them to be located where they are for the reasons of safety of the editorial staff [because] their geographic location doesn’t affect the quality of their content.”
Uniformly, the exiled media representatives bemoan the perception in their home countries that these media lack the situational awareness on the ground. One example of successfully solving this challenge is MeydanTV, says Iskander, adding that “they encourage citizen journalism, their readers [are] often involved in the content creation, they send photos, videos, materials.”
Another challenge all of the exiled media managers interviewed for this article cite is the lack of funding, which poses a constant problem on the back of everybody’s mind. What complicates things for the managers of these outlets is the stipulation set forward by the international donors that the medium be located in-country in order to satisfy the funding criteria, which is impossible to abide by for those operating in exile.
Silver linings
But not all is hopeless for the uprooted journalists and media managers, and alongside obvious challenges, there are reasons for cautious optimism. There are quite a few success stories among the outlets who learned to capitalise on the advantages of operating from free environments.
Kushnar says attaining success is very difficult in reality, and he attributes it to the issues of funding, resources and teams. Speaking of the outlets, he says that “Their capabilities are seriously restricted. Oftentimes, they cannot compete with the leading news agencies that are funded very generously. We all know very well how RT is funded all over the world. The goal for these media is to identify the niches where they still can get in and tell the truth. It’s very difficult when pro-Kremlin outlets have an audience of 40 million, and your budget is a thousand times smaller.”
The upsides are quite self-evident, according to Anton Lysenkov, editor of Latvia-based Spektr: “Our situation is beneficial. We are not subjected to constant audits and provocations. Our work environment is much more peaceful. I admire those who continue to work from Russia, and we are trying to help them,” he adds.
According to Baydar, “The upside is you can see everything with a bird’s eye, in a free domain, analyse things much more clearly in a macro way which gives a lot of advantages to focus on the main areas that need to be covered.”
Some media in exile not only survive, but they manage to thrive and even increase their audiences, like Meduza. “They have millions of unique visitors a month, and it’s been rising year to year. They’re trusted,” says Milli. “They can work freely in Russia and come and go as they please. They’re a successful model.”
Galina Timchenko, Meduza’s editor-in-chief, cannot attribute the success of her outfit to any one strategy: “Unfortunately, there are no long-term plans and effective strategies for success in the current political climate. So far, we are not considering the possibility of moving to Russia because we cannot remain oblivious to the rising risks in that case. The media market in Russia is almost completely controlled by the state, and we don’t see a place for ourselves within such a market in the short term perspective,” she adds.
Preserving and rehearsing for the return
But what is the purpose of the media in exile and what is their end game?
While Kushnar says, exiled media preserve the freedom of the press in a dictatorship, Lysenkov adds that their goal is to supply the population with propaganda-free and less emotionally-charged content. Milli sees the enormous power of the free media to change the society for the better. “People have big hopes and need this, too. That’s why we keep working”.
Others see their ultimate goal as return home. Iskander cautions that “when a dictatorship in their home country comes to an end and [the media in exile] return home, their ratings start falling sharply. Because the credit of trust has been disintegrating, because the rhetoric could change from “at least someone is trying to do some good, even if it is from abroad” to “where have you been all these years while we were suffering?”
Despite such dangers, Bukharbayeva says, the ultimate goal of the exiled media is the return home. She points out that one loses focus and ability to write accurately when unable to visit their home country for over a decade, but “exiled media cannot exist indefinitely, and we must try to return because the time has come.”
Dündar, who has also started publishing a print magazine and opened a publishing house, is looking into opening a TV channel. He says his team’s current work is like a rehearsal in preparations for the future.
“It’s impossible to be in Turkey. But like the German Jews in WWII [who] came to Turkey, rehearsed there, came up with new ideas, and then went back to Germany after the war, we, Turks, are rehearsing and preparing for a better day in Turkey to return there”. [/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_basic_grid post_type=”post” max_items=”10″ grid_id=”vc_gid:1523289736466-bd3f6e90-fdac-9″ taxonomies=”8607″][/vc_column][/vc_row]
29 Mar 2018 | Awards, Fellowship 2018, News and features
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_video link=”https://youtu.be/M6Amr_zAgpc”][vc_column_text]Team 29 is an informal human rights association of lawyers and journalists that defends those targeted by the state for exercising their right to freedom of speech.
Run by prominent human rights lawyer Ivan Pavlov, Team 29 is based in St Petersburg and named after Article 29 of the Russian Constitution on freedom of expression.
“We use court cases not only as an opportunity to restore justice within a specific case, but also as an excuse to attract public attention to the problems of freedom of information in Russia,” said Team 29.
By taking up high profile human rights cases, and writing and disseminating information about them, Team 29 has found a way around some of the restrictions imposed on campaigners.
The legal part of the Team conducts about 50 court cases annually. These are cases of high treason and the disclosure of state secrets of journalists and citizens whose right to freedom of speech is infringed, the refusal of the state to share information, and cases of extremism.
This year, the journalist section of the team set up a website to report on legal cases, explain the background to policies which threaten free speech, give advice, and explain what is happening to human rights in Russia and the different and myriad ways it is under attack.
It is the successor organisation to the Freedom of Information Foundation (FIF), which existed between 2004 and 2014, but which was shut down by the Russian government after it was included in the state register of “foreign agent” non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
The very right of civil society organisations to exist has been cast into doubt in Russia over the past few years and ever tightening restrictions placed on public protest and political dissent, making the work of Team 29 of increasingly vital importance as the space for free expression shrinks in the country. Most human rights organisations based in Russia have been closed down and it is very difficult to campaign.
Last year, Team 29 lawyers took on the Russian state to find out the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved tens of thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Holocaust, but was captured by Soviet intelligence, placed in the Lubyanka prison and never seen again.
Journalists of Team 29 have also developed their niche media about state secrecy this year. Journalists of the team conducted their own investigation into the behaviour of Sochi’s “state officials” on the back of the Sevastidi case and are conducting a special project The Seventeenth Year in which they compare 1917 and 2017 in the history of Russia. They want to have videos on their site and develop their human rights campaigning work.
“It is a great honour for the whole Team 29 to be nominated for the Freedom of Expression Awards together with colleagues from Iran, Egypt, and Kenya, who are risk their lives constantly due to their work,” said Team 29. “Several years ago, it seemed not so dangerous to be a human rights defender or activist in Russia. We just didn’t know about a lot of cases of violence towards activists before; however, today we hear more and more news about tortures by the police, people vanishing, or security services’ secret prisons. The more people who know about our work, the better protected we become and the better chance we have to achieve our objectives and to help people whose rights to information access are abused in Russia.”
See the full shortlist for Index on Censorship’s Freedom of Expression Awards 2018 here.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row][vc_row full_width=”stretch_row_content” equal_height=”yes” el_class=”text_white” css=”.vc_custom_1490258749071{background-color: #cb3000 !important;}”][vc_column width=”1/2″][vc_custom_heading text=”Support the Index Fellowship.” font_container=”tag:p|font_size:28|text_align:center” use_theme_fonts=”yes” link=”url:https%3A%2F%2Fwww.indexoncensorship.org%2Fsupport-the-freedom-of-expression-awards%2F|||”][vc_column_text]
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