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This column was originally submitted to Today’s Zaman but was rejected by the new management. Yaşar Yakış is a Turkish politician. He is a former foreign minister, and a former ambassador to the UN Office in Vienna, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and was a columnist for Today’s Zaman.
An important step has been taken in Turkey’s painful negotiations with the EU. Turkey submitted to the Turkey-EU summit, held in Brussels on 7 March, several proposals, including the following:
-Move to 1 June 2016 the implementation of the readmission agreement, which will make Turkey contractually obligated to readmit any person who travelled to an EU country from Turkey if he or she was not admitted by that EU country;
-For every citizen of a third country readmitted by Turkey, the EU should promise that it will admit one refugee from Turkey, and the readmission expenses will be covered by the EU. This will protect Greece from the uncontrollable flow of refugees arriving in the Greek islands from Turkey’s coastal towns. However, difficulties may arise in finding an EU country that will fulfill this commitment, and Turkey’s refugee problem may continue to increase since the arrival of refugees from Syria may not stop before Syria is stabilised.
-If the readmission agreement enters into force by 1 June 2016, visa-free travel will be possible for Turkish citizens wishing to visit the Schengen countries.
-Turkey asked for an additional 3 billion euros, to be spent for refugee-related projects.
-Turkey’s EU accession process will be reactivated by opening new negotiation chapters that were blocked for political reasons, either by the EU Council or by individual countries, such as France and the Greek Cypriot administration. This positive commitment may not guarantee that Turkey will become a member of the EU but may lead to the resumption of the reforms that Turkey has to comply with under the Copenhagen criteria and the Maastricht economic criteria.
The deal will be discussed once again with Turkey before the EU Council meeting on 18 March.
Turkey’s refugee problem may thus be slightly alleviated if the genuine efforts by Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany succeed. The bulk of the burden, however, will still remain on Turkey’s shoulders. Turkey will have to accommodate the refugees, mainly from Syria, until the EU countries select among them the eligible ones. The EU does not want to assume the moral responsibility for the solution of a problem that stems basically from Turkey’s open door policy for Syrian refugees.
The good side of the deal for Turkey is that the EU is giving Turkey a helping hand. If Chancellor Merkel hadn’t taken the lead to alleviate Turkey’s refugee burden, Turkey would have been left alone to solve it. If the deal is implemented properly, Turkey will receive not only an easing of its refugee burden but will make progress in other areas: One of them is the grinding to a halt of Turkey’s EU accession process. Both Turkey and the EU had lost their appetite for the continuation of the process. Not only the refugee problem but also the entire Syrian crisis, and beyond it the other crises in various Middle Eastern countries, may have demonstrated to certain EU countries that cooperation with Turkey could facilitate the solution of the problems that the EU may face in the Middle East. Therefore, certain EU countries may have decided to revisit the question of the reactivation of Turkey’s EU accession process.
Add your support to Index on Censorship’s petition to end Turkey’s crackdown on media freedom.
The President of the European Council
Donald Tusk
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union
Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175
B-1048 Bruxelles/Brussel
Belgique/België
CC:
Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Stavros Lambrinidis, EU Special Representative for Human Rights
Elmar Brok, Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs
Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations
Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament
Dear President Tusk,
We, the undersigned press freedom and media organisations, are writing ahead of the upcoming meeting between EU leaders and Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister of Turkey, to express our concern over the collapse of media freedom in Turkey.
In the past six months, we have recorded 50 incidents in clear breach of international standards with regards to media freedom and pluralism in the country.[1] These violations include the recent government takeovers of the Feza media group and the Koza İpek Group; the prosecution and jailing of daily Cumhuriyet editor-in-chief Can Dündar and Ankara bureau chief Erdem Gül on politically motivated charges of terrorism, espionage and revealing classified information; the police raids of Bugün TV; the assault of journalist Ahmet Hakan; and the blocking of Dicle News Agency’s website.
Many of these violations took place against the backdrop of the migration and refugee crisis or are related to reporting on sensitive issues such as the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or Turkey’s security operations in the south. Hence we believe the Council has the mandate to address these violations during the specific working session on EU-Turkey cooperation.
This mandate stems from the Council’s commitment to the rights to freedom of expression including freedom of the press, which was reaffirmed when adopting the EU Human Rights Guidelines on “freedom of expression online and offline” on 12 May 2014.[2] By doing so, the Council pledged that “through its external policy instruments, the EU intends to help address and prevent violations of these rights in a timely, consistent and coherent manner.”
The guidelines also state that “all appropriate EU external financial instruments should be used to further protect and promote freedom of opinion and expression online as well as offline.”
While we welcome the fact that you discussed the situation of the media in Turkey with Prime Minister Davutoğlu last week, we believe the EU must not reach a deal without a specific conditionality clause that requires Turkey to improve the environment for freedom of expression and freedom of the media.
When meeting Prime Minister Davutoğlu on 18 March 2016, you have the unique opportunity to not only discuss the press freedom situation in Turkey, but to bring forth concrete measures that Turkey ought to take in order to start reversing its unrelenting crackdown on the media. Without taking these measures Ankara cannot and must not be considered a trustful strategic partner for the European Union. Specifically, we ask that you make any EU-Turkey agreement conditional on the release of the more than dozen journalists currently jailed for their work;[3] the immediate return of the media outlets belonging to the Feza and Koza İpek groups to their rightful owners and editorial boards; and the abandonment of Turkey’s official practice of using vague anti-terror laws to equate press coverage with criminal activity.
At a time when the very essence of the European Union is questioned, it is critical to show unity and coherence over one of its core foundations: human rights, and in particular freedom of opinion and expression, which are fundamental elements of democracy.
Yours sincerely,
Jodie Ginsberg, Chief Executive, Index on Censorship
David Diaz-Jogeix, Director of Programmes, Article 19
William Horsley, Vice President and Media Freedom Representative, Association of European Journalists
Nina Ognianova, Europe and Central Asia Program Coordinator, Committee to Protect Journalists
Jo Glanville, Director, English Pen
Mogens Blicher Bjerregård, President, European Federation of Journalists
Barbara Trionfi, Executive Director, International Press Institute
Carles Torner, Executive Director, PEN International
Christophe Deloire, Executive Director, Reporters Without Borders
Deborah Bonetti, President, Foreign Press Association in London
[1] www.mappingmediafreedom.org (verified reports from 1 October 2015 to 14 March 2016)
[2] EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014 (Foreign Affairs Council meeting)
[3] At least 28 journalists jailed in Turkey (last update: 26 February 2016). Source: European Federation of Journalists and affiliates, http://europeanjournalists.org/journalists-in-jail-europe/
This column was originally submitted to Today’s Zaman, but was rejected by the new management. Ihsan Yilmaz is the founding president of the Istanbul Institute, a think tank based in Turkey, and was a columnist for Today’s Zaman.
Just before I wrote my last piece for Today’s Zaman, there were rumors that the Zaman daily, written in Turkish, and Today’s Zaman, would be seized by the government. Thus, I wrote that if that happens, “about 90% of media coverage would directly or indirectly be in [President Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan’s hands. What does that mean? This means no one will ever be able to defeat him and his party in any election. This means a death warrant for Turkish democracy. No one will have the chance to learn about the mistakes of the [Justice and Development Party] AKP. In this Orwellian nightmare, even the mistakes of the AKP will be sold to voters as its great successes. For instance, even though Turkey is now divided in two, the AKP will successfully convince its voters that Turkey has gotten rid of its ineffective parts and is now ready to be stronger and conquer the world. Even as of today, the AKP has about 40% of the voters, and they would swallow this stupid propaganda despite the news coverage of non-AKP media. Imagine how many more could start believing AKP fabrications after these media outlets are turned into mouthpieces of the AKP?”
I also added that: “In such a setting, no party other than the AKP will ever be able to convince the AKP’s voters, who now make up about 50-55% of the electorate, that they are not working for the CIA. Turkey will continue to hold elections, but similar to Iran, only Erdoğan-approved candidates will be able to contest. In the meantime, Erdoğan will continue to deal with his NATO allies, the West, the EU, etc., with his infamous stick and carrot policies…”
Well, the AKP regime has indeed seized those two newspapers and as it did with the Bugün daily, the Millet daily, Bugün TV and Kanaltürk TV, which it seized them several months ago, it transformed these critical media outlets into mouthpieces of the AKP government. And, as I claimed, neither the US government nor the EU or NATO governments could seriously criticise the AKP regime for its seizure of the country’s best-selling Turkish and English dailies. These two dailies have joined many others in becoming the Orwellian propaganda and brainwashing tools of the AKP regime but all these Western governments could say is that they are concerned about the developments. It is like a joke. It is similar to seeing a murderer slaughtering a human and instead of doing anything, just saying that you are concerned that this person might be harmed.
As a result of the AKP seizure of the Zaman daily, Today’s Zaman, the Bugün daily, the Millet daily, Bugün TV and Kanaltürk TV, and the forced closure of STV, SHaber and a few others, the AKP indeed controls 90% of media coverage in Turkey. What is more, the AKP regime has also seized the biggest news private news agency in Turkey, the Cihan news agency. Cihan has been the only private news agency to monitor elections and report from every ballot box. For the last two elections, the efforts of the state news agency, the Anatolia news agency, to manipulate the results were neutralized by Cihan’s objective coverage of the counting of the votes. Now, it is in the hands of the AKP. It is crystal clear that Turkish voters will not have a chance to monitor the elections results, given the fact that the opposition parties are very weak and their members who work at the ballot boxes on elections day could easily be made pro-AKP with all sorts of stick and carrot methods that the AKP is infamously known for.
All in all, Turkey will never be able to have genuine elections and Turkey will never be able to count the votes fairly. Now, the AKP wants to change the Constitution with a referendum to create a presidential system without checks and balances. The AKP can easily get 60% of the vote to approve such a tyrannical system under the current conditions. Our NATO allies will continue to be concerned about such a despotic regime, but on the other hand, they will happily continue to work with such a regime.
What a shame.
Watching the surreal videos of the police takeover of Turkish newspaper Zaman last week — inside the building police officers played cards behind the newspaper’s reception desk and devoured plates of baklava in the cafeteria as journalists looked on — I was reminded of the events of the past eight years that so definitively transformed Turkey’s media scene.
The change happened so gradually over the years that many missed the transformation. But journalism in Turkey has turned into a scene of feuds and long-held hostilities. The job description of a Turkish journalist now includes the ability to help lock up journalists from the opposite political camp.
Over the past eight years, a spate of legal cases have altered Turkey’s media environment beyond return. The most recent of these was the 2014 Selam Tevhid case, in which prosecutors intended to jail Turkey’s pro-government journalists who were accused of being foreign spies and aiding terrorist organisations.
But it was the OdaTV case of 2011 that had the greatest impact on journalism. The outcome silenced the popular and populist voice of secular nationalists and spread fear and paranoia to all media workers.
Earlier, in September 2008, after selling off his secular-nationalist broadcaster KanalTurk, Turkish journalist Tuncay Özkan was detained by Turkish police in relation to the Ergenekon investigation. He was detained in the Silivri Penitentiary, Europe’s largest penal facility where he would await the outcome of his trial for more than two years. One of Özkan‘s friends, Mustafa Balbay, the Ankara correspondent of Cumhuriyet newspaper, was also imprisoned in the same trial.
To many observers, Özkan’s and Balbay’s ideas were old fashioned, parochial and too nationalistic, views that somehow defined the way they were treated in the public sphere. There was little international reaction when Özkan’s KanalTurk‘s staunchly secularist and republican editorial line was changed overnight. The same broadcaster now defended polar opposite views.
After five years in detention, Özkan was sentenced in April 2013 to life imprisonment for being part of Ergenekon, a “ultra-secularist organisation that plotted a coup”. Balbay was luckier: he received 34 years and 8 months. Again, there was little world reaction to this surreal turn of events, but, in Turkey, many progressive voices applauded the verdicts, seeing them as part of what they ominously called the country’s “normalisation”.
Throughout 2008, Turkey’s media sphere changed enormously through these trials that made the criminalisation of Turkey’s media part of the journalistic occupation. More than a dozen journalists were detained in the OdaTV trials, accused of being members of the “media arm” of the terrorist organisation Ergenekon, named after Turks’ founding myth. There were so many arrests that the prison’s sports hall needed to be transformed into a courtroom to accommodate all the defendants.
Many of Turkey’s progressives bought into the idea that what was happening was a good thing. Once “ultra-secularist coup plotters” would be placed behind bars, Turkey would finally achieve its long-awaited “liberal consensus”. Those who opposed the arrests were branded reactionaries who should have known better.
According to the newspapers, Turkey was cleaning its bowels: there were lone dissenting voices but the general reaction to the prison verdicts was that all the bad, radical people were finally getting what they had long deserved.
The normalisation discourse was built on the idea that Turkey needed a “liberal consensus” where the extreme elements of politics and the media needed to leave the public sphere to moderates of all political persuasions. Thanks to this, Turkey would be able to become “a model democracy” in the Middle East.
As the trials continued, and more than 40 Kurdish journalists were imprisoned because of their alleged ties to terrorist groups, Turkey was represented as its most liberal self in the international scene — what made it democratic, the argument ran, was the trials themselves. In fact, Turkey was being its most illiberal self, having the highest number of journalists in prison at the time. In 2012, just a year before the anti-government Gezi Park protests, the country was being held up as a paradigm. A Reporters Without Borders report from that year, read: “With a total of 72 media personnel currently detained, of whom at least 42 journalists and four media assistants are being held in connection with their media work, Turkey is now the world’s biggest prison for journalists – a sad paradox for a country that portrays itself a regional democratic model.”
Worryingly, the Ergenekon and OdaTV trials moulded a new type of journalist who took pleasure in the jailing of his colleagues. After journalist and IPI World Press Freedom Hero Nedim Sener and his colleague Ahmet Sik were detained in 2011, they were conveniently added to the list of coup plotters. When journalist and editor Soner Yalcin was arrested in February 2011 along with other OdaTv journalists, this was seen as a blow to Turkish nationalism, rather than journalism. In the fight with nationalism, the locking up of nationalist journalists was seen as a necessary evil.
By 2011, the process that had begun in 2008 reached new heights, when the character assassination of journalists became commonplace in the Turkish press. It was now acceptable to publish transcripts of phone conversations between journalists who might have been plotting a coup.
A more troubling development was the rise of a new genre: more and more journalists devoted all their work to making incriminating accusations against their colleagues. The success of a journalist’s work was now defined by the outcome of trials he had supported with his columns: if he managed to get his colleagues convicted through defaming their character, he was promoted.
No political group was able to resist the attraction of this new, adrenaline-ridden form of journalism and, most alarmingly, readers who followed those developments, started taking joy in this spectacle, a development that would surely fascinate Michel Foucault. Journalism became meta: newspaper front pages tallied which journalists were locked up and which were freed. There was fresh material every other month: the political identities of imprisoned journalists changed but the end result was the same.
It is now clear how Turkey’s fake “liberal consensus” failed spectacularly. However unpalatable progressives found them, Turkey’s secularist-nationalists, socialists and communists defended their right to exist in a society where they constitute a historical phenomenon alongside Turkey’s conservatives. Their imprisonment in the name of normalisation was unacceptable and immoral.
Instead of a liberal consensus, what Turkey needs is a proper dissensus: the coexistence of these different political camps.